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In this thesis, I focus on North Korea’s communications with the outside world through the 
medium of the English-language, with a particular focus on the workings of gender in North 
Korea’s international relations. First, I focus on the North Korean government’s 
communications in the official English-language magazine, Women of Korea between 1964 
and 1992. The magazine was modelled after the Korean-language equivalent Chosǒn Yǒsǒng 
(Korean Women). The visual images and text in the English version of the magazine portray 
a positive image of gender equality in North Korea to the world. However, close reading of 
Women of Korea reveals that the North Korea government operates according to gendered 
assumptions about the roles of men and women in society. North Korean women are seen to 
be the primary carers of children and responsible for the majority of domestic chores while 
men’s role is to work outside the home to earn money. Additionally, visual images and text in 
the magazine reveal that women are mobilised to work outside the home in occupations seen 
to be “suitable” to their characteristics. While publications like Women of Korea cannot be 
taken at face value as a literal and empirical portrait of the situation of women in North 
Korea, they can be analysed for insight into the government’s official views of the roles 
performed by men and women. I then focus on communications between the North Korea 
and the United Nations between 2000 and 2011. Since the admission of the country into the 
United Nations in 1991, the North Korean government has communicated formally with the 
international community about the human rights of women and other vulnerable groups. The 
United Nations has advocated for the North Korean government to accede to and ratify 
various conventions and to make changes to its legal system to improve the human rights of 
all North Korean people. In this thesis, I analyse reports exchanged between the North Korea 
and the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (“CEDAW Committee”) between 2001 and 2005. Although the relationship between 
North Korea and the CEDAW Committee is limited, the exchange of reports gives those 
outside North Korea an insight into the government’s thinking about the roles men and 
women perform in society and the home. While North Korea has taken the initial step in 
signing and ratifying United Nations conventions it does not mean that the government has 
always followed, implemented, or made legal changes to existing state laws to ensure 
requirements within the conventions are met. Consequently, non-governmental organisations 
charge that the North Korean government has not adequately addressed issues such as gender 
equality and discrimination against women in all forms. Instead, presenting a positive picture 
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of gender relations and gender equality is one of the North Korean government’s strategies in 
international relations. I argue in this thesis that the communication between North Korea and 
the United Nations and in its official English-language magazine, Women of Korea, reveals 
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In this thesis, the Revised Romanisation system adopted by the Republic of Korea’s (South 
Korea’s) Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in 2000, has been employed. Some 
exceptions have been made and warrant a mention. Exceptions are made for the names of 
authors who have published in English and where well-known names of people, places or 
publications used other forms of romanisation, for example Kim Il Sung or newspaper titles 
such as the Chosun Ilbo. Korean names are written according to the standard usage in Korean 
with family names preceding given names, except where authors have published in English 
and family names have been placed last.  
 On the subject of Chinese romanisation, the Pinyin system is adopted, for example, 
“Mao Zedong” rather than “Mao Tse-tung”.  
This thesis is written using British English. Date order reflects British English usage 
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7.1 Statistics of Rape Cases (2003–2004) 












Just as a vehicle cannot run smoothly when only one of its 
wheels is turning, so society cannot make rapid progress 
based on the role played by the men alone. 





Before the official formation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North 
Korea) in 1948, the Provisional People’s Committee of North Korea (the so-called interim 
government) addressed gender equality in Korean society. The leader of the newly-formed 
North Korean region, Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) is said to have personally promulgated the 
Law on Equality of the Sexes on 30 July 1946 in response to the oppression of women during 
the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula (1910–1945).
2
 The government expressed 
the need to address gender equality by embracing women as former victims of human rights 
violations experienced under colonial rule (Article 7 and Article 9).
3
 By addressing gender 
equality in this way the newly-formed government was said to have liberated women from 
their past experiences, ensuring they were able to leave their homes to participate in the social 
labour force to build the new North Korean regime.
4
 In the decades after the promulgation of 
the Law on Equality of the Sexes, the North Korean government established and promoted 
gender equality in state laws in the name of liberating women from their homes. As we shall 
see, however, North Korean government policies reveal the government’s patriarchal view 
towards the roles of North Korean men and women, and assumptions that women’s primary 
role is to care for children in the home.  
 For much of the time from the 1940s to the 1990s, it was difficult to gain a reliable 
picture of achieving gender equality and gender relations in North Korea, and this is still true 
                                                     
1
 Kim Jong Il (30 April 1975), in “The First Women’s Technical School”, Women of Korea, 4 (124) (1989), p. 
28. 
2
 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
“Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women”, Initial Report of States Parties: Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, CEDAW/C/PRK/1 (Beijing: thirty-third session, 5 to 22 July 2005), (distributed 11 September 2002), 
para. 70 and para. 71, p. 11 and para. 52, p. 8. 
3
 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2003), p. 93. 
4
 Jiyoung Song, Human Rights Discourse in North Korea: Post–colonial, Marxist and Confucian Perspectives 
(London: Routledge, 2011), p. 78. 
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to some extent today. In this thesis, I focus on the North Korean government’s 
communications with the outside world though the medium of the English-language, with a 
particular focus on the workings of gender in North Korea’s international relations. I focus on 
the communications of the North Korean government in two sets of texts. First, the North 
Korean government presented one picture through its official English-language magazines, 
Women of Korea and Korea Today. Women of Korea was largely designed to promote the 
results of the Communist revolution and the achievement of gender equality in North Korea, 




 From 1964 to 1992, the North Korean government disseminated information about 
North Korean women’s lives and experiences through the English-language magazine 
Women of Korea. The magazine was modelled after the Korean-language equivalent Chosǒn 
Yǒsǒng (Korean Women), which was specifically addressed to Korean women.
6
 The visual 
images and text in the English version of the magazine were intended to portray a positive 
image of gender equality within the DPRK to the world. Close reading of Women of Korea, 
as we shall see below, reveals that the North Korean government operated according to 
gendered assumptions about the roles of men and women in society. While women were 
mobilised into work outside the home, this was in occupations which were seen to be 
“suitable” to their characteristics.
7
 Further, women were seen to be the primary carers of 
children and responsible for the majority of domestic chores while men’s role was to work 
outside the home to earn money. Other aspects of North Korean society such as the political 
and economic goals of the government were portrayed in the magazine Korea Today, from 
1959 to the present. While publications like Women of Korea cannot be taken at face value as 
a literal and empirical portrait of the situation of women in the DPRK, as an official 
publication it can be analysed for insight into the North Korean government’s views of the 
roles of men and women in society and the home.  
                                                     
5
 The Chinese publication Women of China is published monthly by the Foreign Language Press in Beijing from 
1953 to the present day. The Vietnamese publication Women of Vietnam was originally published by the 
Vietnam Women’s Union in Hanoi on a bi-monthly basis from 1958 and in 1963 the magazine was published 
quarterly. The Chinese and Vietnamese magazines aimed to introduce the lives, experiences and perspectives of 
Chinese and Vietnamese women to the outside world.  
6
 For further information on the early years of Chosǒn Yǒsǒng see Suzy Kim, “Revolutionary Mothers: Women 
in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 52 (4) (2010), pp. 
742–767; Suzy Kim, Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2013), pp. 174–203. 
7
 Kim, “Revolutionary Mothers”, pp. 742–767.  
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The second set of texts I analyse are the reports exchanged between the North Korean 
government and the United Nations (UN) Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (hereafter “CEDAW Committee”) between 2001 and 2005. 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) admitted the DPRK to the UN under 
Resolution 702 on 8 August 1991.
8
 Since the admission of the DPRK into the UN, tension 
has grown, as the UN has urged the DPRK to take responsibility for human rights violations 
and the DPRK has often displayed blatant disregard for the human rights institute. The UN 
has advocated for the DPRK to accede to and ratify various UN conventions and to make 
changes to its legal system to improve the human rights of the North Korean people.
9
 
Pressure has also grown from the international community for the North Korean government 
to implement the provisions of the UN human rights instruments which it has signed, as well 
as those it has not yet acceded to. As of mid-2015, the DPRK had acceded to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1984, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1984, the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) in 1990, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) in 2001, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) in 2013.
10
 After its admission to the UN, the North Korean government began to 
communicate formally with the international community about the human rights of women 
and other vulnerable groups such as children and persons with disabilities.
11
 
                                                     
8
 On 17 September 1991, the United Nations General Assembly welcomed the DPRK and Republic of Korea 
(South Korea) under UNSC Resolution 46/. United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Admission of New 
Members to the United Nations, Resolution 702, S/RES/702 (3001st meeting, 8 August 1991), p. 46; United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Admission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic 
of Korea to membership in the United Nations, Resolution 46/1 (1st plenary meeting, forty-sixth session, 17 
September 1991, Agenda Item 20). 
9
 UNGA, Admission of the DPRK and the ROK. 
10
 The DPRK submitted its initial report to the ICESCR on 14 December 1984, to the ICCPR on 2 April 1984, to 
the CRC Committee on 13 February 1996, and to the CEDAW Committee 11 September 2002. Although the 
DPRK signed the CRPD on 3 July 2013 it has not submitted an initial report. 
11
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), “Report on the mission to the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the issue of military sexual slavery in wartime”, Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/45, E/CN.4/ 1996/53/Add.1 
(4 January 1996); United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), Concluding Comments: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/PRK/CO/1 (Thirty-
third session, 5 to 22 July 2005), (distributed 22 July 2005); United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), “List of issues and questions with regard to the 
consideration of periodic reports: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, CEDAW/PSWG/2005/II/CRP.1/Add.3 (Beijing: Thirty-third session, 5 to 22 July 2005), (distributed 9 
February 2005);United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), “Responses to the list of issues and questions for consideration of the initial report,” Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, CEDAW/PSWG/2005/II/ CRP.2/Add.3 (Beijing: Thirty-third session, 5 to 22 July 
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In this thesis, I am interested in the communication between the North Korean 
government and the CEDAW Committee about women’s rights and achieving gender 
equality in the DPRK. Although the communication between the North Korean government 
and the CEDAW Committee just spans the years from 2001 to 2005, the exchange of reports 
gives those outside the DPRK an insight into the government’s thinking about the roles of 
North Korean women and men.
12
 Even though the North Korean government has taken the 
initial step in agreeing to the guidelines set out in CEDAW, it does not mean that the DPRK 
has always followed, implemented, or made legal changes to existing state laws to ensure 
requirements in the UN convention are met, as we shall see. Non-governmental organisations 
charge that the North Korean government has not adequately addressed issues such as gender 
equality and discrimination against women in all forms (see chapters 3, 7 and 8 below). 
Instead, presenting a positive picture of gender relations in the DPRK is one of the 
government’s strategies in international relations. I will argue that these texts reveal the North 
Korean government’s gendered ideologies. 
As gender issues within a country are shaped by the policies of both the state and its 
subsidiary organs, as well as the policies of international human rights institutions such as the 
UN, I frame this thesis within the field of gender and International Relations. Below I outline 
the use of a gender-sensitive lens in International Relations (IR) and what this means when 
examining how the North Korean government communicates its views on gender equality to 
the world.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
2005), (distributed 15 April 2005); United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), “Summary Record of the 699th meeting”, Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/SR.699 (Thirty-third session, 5 to 22 July 2005), (New York: 18 July 2005 at 10 
am), (distributed 9 September 2005); United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), “Summary Record of the 700th meeting”, Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/SR.700 (Thirty-third session, 5 to 22 July 2005), (New York: 18 July 2005 at 
3pm), (distributed 9 September 2005); United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
“Consideration of Reports submitted by states parties under Article 44 of the Convention”, Concluding 
Observations: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CRC/C /PRK/CO/4 (Fiftieth session, 12-13 January 
2009),  (distributed 27 March 2009); United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
“Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parities under Article 44 of the Convention”, The combined third 
and fourth reports of States parties due in 2007, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,  CRC/C/PRK/4 
(submitted 10 December 2007), (distributed 15 January 2008); United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), “List of issues to be taken up in  connection with the consideration of the third and fourth periodic 
report of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,  CRC/C/PRK/Q/4 (Fiftieth session, 12-13 January 2009),  (distributed 20 October 2008); United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Written replies by the government of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea to the List of Issues (CRC/C/PRK/Q/4) prepared by the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
in connection with the consideration of the third and fourth periodic reports of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, CRC/C/PRK/Q/4/Add.1 (Fiftieth session, 12-13 January 2009), (distributed 22 December 
2008). 
12
 CEDAW, Initial Report; CEDAW, “List of issues and questions”; CEDAW, “Responses”; CEDAW, “699th 




Employing a Gender-Sensitive Lens 
While gender studies and feminist theories have long been accommodated in other branches 
of the social sciences, IR was late to realise the relevance of gender to the discipline.
13
 
Together with a range of new perspectives on world politics, including postmodernism, 
constructivism, critical theory and green politics, gender and IR scholars have contested the 
power and knowledge of mainstream realists and liberal international relations scholars.
14
 
This has meant that previous research in the IR discipline has only presented a partial picture 
and from a masculine perspective.
15
 Feminists in IR argue that realism, dominated by elite, 
white, male practitioners, is a patriarchal discourse that renders women invisible from the 
high politics of IR.
16
 Sandra Whitworth explains that to examine gender within the context of 
IR is to explore the ways in which knowledge about gender difference is sustained, 
reproduced and manipulated by institutions such as state policies and laws.
17
 It can be said, 
therefore, that gender is an important dimension of IR as it challenges the conceptual 
framework which has excluded women from the discipline in the first place.  
One of the key contributions of feminist thought to IR has been to draw attention to 
the necessity for a “deconstruction of gender-biased knowledge claims” and the 
“reconstruction of gender-sensitive theory”.
18
 This has allowed IR scholars, who focus on the 
inclusion of both men and women, to unsettle the gendered foundation of mainstream thought 
and to introduce gender into the analysis of key constructions in IR such as the state and 
sovereignty.
19
 Feminist scholars have also encouraged IR to consider perspectives of 
previously excluded groups, such as women, children, and ethnic and religious minorities.
20
 
These scholars have a common commitment to highlighting and addressing the disadvantages 
of women and other vulnerable groups within the social and political context and from 
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different cultural and economic backgrounds.
21
 Feminist IR scholars are also concerned with 
studying the ways in which the practices of state policies and international politics 
discriminate against women.
22
 They note, for example, the exclusion of women from foreign 
policy decision making. In this case feminist scholars point to the “extent to which 
international politics is such a thoroughly masculinised sphere of activity that women’s 
voices are considered inauthentic”.
23
 For many feminist scholars, the role of gender in IR is 
not a subset of the discipline but rather something that is intrinsic to every aspect.
24
 A gender-
sensitive lens offers IR scholars a broader series of issues which should be studied as part of 
the discipline, and this provides a guide to how to address areas of gender-based 
discrimination.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, feminist scholars contributed to IR by highlighting what 
they saw as the masculine bias of core assumptions and concepts of the discipline.
25
 Three 
important contributions were Cynthia Enloe’s Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making 
Feminist Sense of International Politics (1989), J. Ann Tickner’s Gender in International 
Relations (1992) and Jan Jindy Pettman’s Worlding Women: A Feminist International 
Politics (1996).
26
 These authors demonstrated how the theories and practices of IR reflected 
and respected the experiences of men and masculine qualities over the experiences of both 
genders. IR could then shift away from a singular focus on interstate relations toward a 
comprehensive analysis of transnational actors and structures and their transformations in 
global politics.
27
 Until these interventions, IR used abstract categories such as “the state” and 
“the system”, which effectively removed people as agents embedded in social and historical 
contexts from theories in IR. In contrast, when feminist scholars examine such themes as war, 
peace, democracy, governance, economics, development, justice, and security they always 
keep in mind the concept of gender.
28
 Consequently, one of the first engagements by feminist 
scholars in IR was to question realism’s “rational man” as a basis of international life, a 
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theory which modelled human nature based upon aggression, competitive and warlike 
mannerisms and did not speak for many women or indeed most men.
29
  
Gender and IR is a broad and diverse field of study and is often interdisciplinary. 
Studying gender includes examining stories, locations, and rules of behaviour in connection 
with other social categories such as class, ethnic background, age, religion, region and so 
on.
30
 Feminist scholars in IR often take a bottom-up approach, which brings the lives of 
ordinary women into focus and works towards understanding IR not as abstract practices but 
as something that affects and is affected by the lives of people.
31
 By exploring the ideas about 
gender difference which inform both domestic and international activities, one discovers the 
impact these ideas have on cultural practices and the roles of men and women.
32
 This point is 
significant in the North Korean context, as the government’s ideas about gender roles have 
shaped state policies and the DPRK’s attitude towards men and women in the home as well 
as the state’s relationships with neighbouring countries. By framing this research project 
within the field of Gender and International Relations, I consider how the roles of men and 
women are represented in official North Korean communication with the world, particularly 
when it comes to the portrayal of gender equality in North Korean society.  
 
Gender and Sexuality 
At this point, it is important to discuss the meaning of gender and sexuality as standalone 
terms and then within the context of IR. First, we need to note the term gender and the 
differences between biological sex and socially constructed gender,
33
 found in most societies 
including the DPRK. In the mid-twentieth century feminist scholars conceived the term 
gender in order to capture the difference between biological sex and socially and culturally 
constructed differences.
34
 While the term sex refers to the biological and physiological 
characteristics that define men and women, gender refers to the socially-constructed roles, 
behaviours, activities, and attributes that a society considers appropriate to men and women.
35
 
Feminist scholars use the terminology of gender to argue against the “biology is destiny” 
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 As many people think of sexuality as private, individual and biological, it is also a 
highly political and policy-related issue, as shown by the current mobilising around sexuality 
worldwide.
37
 In 2002, the World Health Organisation (WHO) provided a working definition 
of sexuality as:  
 
a central aspect of being human throughout life [which] encompasses 
sex, gender identities and roles, sexual orientation, eroticism, 
pleasure, intimacy and reproduction. Sexuality is experienced and 
expressed in thoughts, fantasies, desires, beliefs, attitudes, values, 
behaviours, practices, roles and relationships.
38
   
 
While sexuality can include all of these dimensions, not all of them are always experienced or 
expressed. Sexuality is influenced by the interaction of biological, psychological, social, 
economic, political, cultural, ethical, legal, historical, religious and spiritual factors.
39
 
Unsurprisingly, discussion of sexual rights in the women’s rights movement internationally 
and in the field of gender and development has given significant attention to such issues as 
sexual violence against women and the trafficking of women. Breaking the silence and 
mobilising to prevent sexual violence was a major achievement of the women’s rights 
movement.  
 Gender identities develop in gendered societies, where the pressure to adopt the 
“correct” and “corresponding” gender according to one’s biological sex is strong.
40
 While 
men are socialised to identify with masculine traits which emphasise autonomy, male 
superiority, fraternity, strength, public protector roles and ultimately the bearing of arms, 
women are taught to defer, as wives and daughters, to the protection and stronger will of 
men, while providing the private emotional, economic and social support systems for men’s 
activities.
41
 Gender identity is similar to other social identities in that it relates to physical 
embodiment, and is mediated by people’s relative location within their social environment 
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and how they are judged by others, but ultimately is concerned with how people view 
themselves with respect to gender.
42
 While individuals’ inner feelings influence how they 
present themselves as a man, a woman, or another gender, feminist scholars argue that the 
state manipulates gender identities for its own internal unity and external legitimacy.
43
 In the 
context of the DPRK, despite the promulgation of the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946, 
the government has directed men and women into stereotypical roles based on the assumption 
that the home is a space for women and men are to work outside. This point is made clearer 
in later chapters of the thesis. 
 
Gender Roles  
Assumptions by governments (including the North Korean state), about appropriate gender 
roles in society, the labour force, and what is considered masculine or feminine, all inform 
the practices of men and women. Practices do not take place independently but exist within 
particular historical and material conditions and across different cultures.
44
 Socially-
constructed gender roles are considered to be hierarchical and characterised as a male-
advantaged gender hierarchy by social constructionists.
45
 Feminist scholars argue that it is not 
simply the case that there are differences between the social construction of masculinity and 
femininity. There is an unequal relationship between masculinity and its associated 
characteristics of being strong, aggressive, and dominant and feminine characteristics of 
being weak, conciliatory, irrational, and peaceable. Further, femininity is politically, 
economically, and socially devalued compared to masculinity.
46
  
 The concept of gender is also located in an analysis of social relations, and refers to 
the real conditions and particular understandings about relationships between men and 
women in society.
47
 Gender roles can be described as social norms, or rules and standards 
that dictate different interests, responsibilities, opportunities, limitations, and behaviours for 
men and women.
48
 Gender roles are social and behavioural norms that are considered 
appropriate for a man or a woman in a social or interpersonal relationship. They impact 
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aspects of daily life from choice of clothing to occupation. While gender roles differ 
according to the specific cultural-historical context,
49
 in every culture the socialised 
difference between girls and boys begins during early childhood.
50
 From middle childhood 
and adolescence, children are taught to behave according to customary gender roles. The 
roles of women and girls encompass a range of responsibilities associated with taking care of 
the home, nurturing and caring for the family, performing biological reproductive functions 
and involvement in society and productive labour. In many societies, men and boys 
contribute to household security through involvement in productive labour and public 
participation and, for men, in ensuring the education of male children.
51
 Through education 
systems and the modelling of female relatives, female children are taught to perform caring 
and nurturing roles.
52
 Gender roles shape and constrain individuals’ experiences because men 
and women are treated differently and have diverse life trajectories because of their ascribed 
roles and the degree to which they conform to these expectations.
53
 
 Gender is both produced and shaped by institutions such as the media, religion, and 
educational, medical, and other political and social systems, creating a societal gender 
structure that is deeply entrenched and rarely questioned but hugely influential.
54
 
Institutionalised gender refers to the ways that gender is rooted in and expressed through 
these large social systems, through the different responses, values, expectations, roles, and 
responsibilities given to individuals and groups according to gender.
55
 Individuals develop 
their sense of gender in the face of strong messages about the correct gender role for their 
perceived body.
56
 While individuals can accept or resist the stereotyping of men and women 
to certain roles in their own presentation of self, gender roles are a powerful means of social 
organisation.
57
   
 From as early as the eighteenth century in Europe, the concept of women’s rights 
developed in response to claims to the rights to bodily integrity and autonomy, to the vote 
(suffrage), to hold public office, to work, to fair wages or equal pay, to own property, to 
access education and healthcare, and to have marital or parental rights. Next, I discuss the 
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contemporary understanding of women’s rights and its development alongside the United 
Nations’ espousal of human rights in the period immediately after the Second World War 
(1939–1945). 
 
The Women’s Rights Movement  
Over the course of the evolution of the human rights system, feminists argued for an explicit 
inclusion of women in UN human rights instruments.
58
 The rights of women differ from 
broader notions of human rights through claims of an inherent historical and traditional bias 
against the exercise of rights by women and girls in favour of men and boys.
59
 Women’s 
rights were explicitly mentioned in the founding Charter of the UN in 1945. In 1947, the 
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women was established. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
in December 1948. The UN designated the year 1975 as International Women’s Year, 
extending it to International Women’s Decade from 1976 to 1985.   
 In 1979, the UN first applied international rights frameworks to gender with the 
establishment of CEDAW. The Convention was one of the major achievements of the United 
Nations Women’s Decade (1976–1985).
60
 While often criticised for its weak language, at the 
very least the Convention articulates an international standard for what is meant by “equality” 
between men and women, grants formal rights to women, and also promotes equality of 
access and opportunity (see Appendix 1).
61
 CEDAW also recognises that rights can be 
meaningless unless attention is paid to the economic, social and cultural context in which 
they are claimed.
62
 The Convention calls for changes to stereotypical gender roles where 
these are deemed to perpetuate inequality and discrimination. CEDAW was slow to obtain 
signatories and is notable for the large number of reservations made by state members. Many 
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 In the 1980s and 1990s, there was concerted lobbying for the inclusion of sexuality in 
UN human rights instruments.
64
 The first international instrument of human rights to make an 
explicit reference to sexuality was the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. The UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights was created by this Vienna Declaration and endorsed by the UNGA under 
Resolution 48/121.
65
  Due to the intensive lobbying efforts of a global group of feminist 
activists, the Vienna Declaration called on states “to eliminate gender based violence and all 
forms of sexual harassment and exploitation” (paragraph 18), including trafficking in women, 
rape as a weapon of war, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy (paragraph 38).
66
 In 1994, a 
year after the World Conference on Human Rights was held in Vienna, the notion of “sexual 
rights” first appeared on the international agenda, during preparations for the 1994 United 
Nations International Conference on Population and Development (UNICPD) in Cairo. 
Although advocates of the international women’s health movement put forward the idea of 
sexual rights in the end this concept was not incorporated into the final document of the 
conference, the Programme of Action (PoA).
67
 The UNICPD and the PoA understood the 
interconnections between gender and sexuality as follows. 
 
Human sexuality and gender relations are closely interrelated and 
together affect the ability of women and men to achieve and maintain 




They also recognised that gender-based sexual violence, and efforts to control women’s 
sexuality, affected women’s health and their status in society.
69
 Following the UNICPD, 
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autonomy and choice in relation to sexuality were linked to reproduction and began to be 
articulated as women’s rights.
70
 
 A year later, in 1995, the Beijing Platform for Action (BPA), adopted at the Fourth 
UN Conference on Women, imposed on states an obligation to promote and protect all 
human rights, regardless of political, economic and cultural systems.
71
 Sexual rights were 
also a major topic of debate at the Conference where an alliance of conservative Muslim and 
Catholic delegations strongly objected to the term, as they believed it represented what they 
called a “homosexual agenda”.
72
 After prolonged negotiation, the BPA was saved from being 
completely watered down in the area of sexuality and reproductive rights when agreement 
was reached on retaining the language employed at the 1994 Cairo Conference whenever 
possible.
73
 Retaining the “Cairo language” was a crucial political achievement for women’s 
groups since it re-asserted the right of women to control their own sexuality.
74
 It also had 
implications for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) rights in that autonomy 
and choice extended to issues of sexual partners. 
 The BPA also called for efforts to “mainstream” gender issues into all substantive 
areas of international and national policy, an emphasis which had begun at the Third UN 
Conference on Women, in Nairobi, Kenya (1985). Nevertheless, the BPA allowed a degree of 
discretion in how these broad principles would be implemented, in deference to cultural 
sensibilities. In practice, those charged with the implementation of women’s human rights 
and gender mainstreaming often worked with a notion of gender roles as complementary.
75
 
At the Beijing conference, liberal states and activists resisted concessions to “difference”, 
fearing this would result in the watering-down of state obligations to protect and promote 
women’s rights. Feminists sympathetic to cultural pluralist arguments, on the other hand, 
supported equity, either in deference to cultural differences or on pragmatic grounds as the 
only viable way to mainstream gender in policy-making within specific societies outside of 
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 Since 1995, gender mainstreaming has given rise to landmark developments in 
international law in the areas of human rights, asylum and humanitarian intervention.
77
 
 In 2000, the Optional Protocol to CEDAW entered into force, allowing women within 
the jurisdiction of parties to CEDAW to make complaints about breaches of the Convention 
(see Appendix 2).
78
 Potentially, this complaints procedure allows the implementation of 
CEDAW to be monitored more effectively. Countries such as the DPRK, who have not 
signed on to the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, though, are not scrutinised to the same extent 
as those countries that have signed on to the Protocol (see chapter 7).  
 The existence of strong national women’s movements and their effective lobbying of 
official delegations played a critical role in changing the attitudes of particular countries.
79
 In 
2000, at the Beijing+5 Conference, Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country, became a 
proponent of sexual rights for the first time and played a key role in the inclusion of marital 
rape, so-called “honour crimes” and forced marriages in the outcome document due to the 
pressure of women’s groups.
80
 Many of the issues raised at the Fourth UN Conference on 
Women and the Beijing+5 Conference re-emerged in 2005 in New York at the Beijing+5 
Review, a meeting designed to generate renewed momentum for the implementation of the 
BPA.
81
 Some Islamic women’s groups, conservative Catholic women’s groups and delegates 
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) affiliated to the Vatican (which enjoys permanent 
observer status at the UN) objected to the emphasis given to what they characterised as 
“homosexual rights”. These countries and organisations made appeals to protect the 
traditional family model against homosexuals’ demand for equal rights in marriage. An 
Outcome Document was agreed but only after a period of protracted negotiation and after the 
terms “sexual rights” and “sexual orientation” were removed from the document.
82
 The 
difficult and protracted process of negotiation at Beijing, which has been a feature of more 
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Gender, Sexuality and the Rights of North Korean Women 
Next, I examine scholarship regarding gender, sexuality and North Korean women. Since the 
1990s, academic scholarship has attempted to shine a brighter light on the subject of gender 
and sexuality and achieving gender equality in the DPRK.
84
 One element of this interest has 
been the large number of North Koreans leaving their homeland and telling their stories to the 
international community. The North Korean government also increased communication with 
the world at various institutions such as the UN for a time.
85
 It can be said, though, that 
unlike the extensive scholarly literature that examines gender and sexuality in other states in 
Asia, such as South Korea, Japan and China, gender roles in North Korea have not been fully 
scrutinised. Recent research on gender, sexuality and North Korean women has focused on 
several aspects: the role and status of North Korean women,
86
 the experiences of North 
Korean women as refugees,
87
 the representation of North Korean women in media,
88
 changes 
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in North Korean women’s roles since the famine in the mid-1990s,
89
 and studies of family 
life in the DPRK.
90
 This means a large gap still exists in academic research about North 
Korea and gender studies. This thesis attempts to fill a small part of the gap, with a particular 
focus on how gender roles are presented to the world by the North Korean government. In the 
following section, I highlight the scholarly discourse currently available concerning aspects 
of North Korean women’s lives, relevant North Korean laws and the representation of women 
in North Korean media.  
First, it is important to outline the contribution made to scholarship regarding the roles 
of Korean women during the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1897) and the occupation of Korea by 
Japan from 1910 to 1945. Scholarship on these two periods is extensive and is known as a 
shared history between North and South Korea.
91
 Even though the principles of 
Confucianism were not law in Korea during the Chosŏn Dynasty the elite ruling class enacted 
laws to bring society gradually into line with these principles, ultimately to strengthen their 
own power. The integration of Confucianism into Korean society went along with an ongoing 
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influence of Chinese culture and language.
92
 Confucianism and the patriarchal system were 
supposedly followed by all classes and saw heaven, husband, king, parents, and men as 
holding superior positions, while earth, wife, subject, child, and women were inferior.
93
 
While persons in inferior positions were to obey their superiors, persons in superior positions 
were supposed to employ their power to take care of their inferiors. Each position had a role 
to fulfil for the good of the whole society, but when Confucianism merged with the ruling 




In accordance with Confucian teachings, women learned their role in the family unit.  
Although they played an important role in the management of the home and the rearing of 
children, often these duties were not evenly distributed amongst family members, particularly 
men.
95
 Fathers were expected to be somewhat emotionally distant from their children in order 
to maintain their position of authority.
96
 However, at the same time they were to guide their 
children, in particular sons, and demand discipline and obedience from them. In contrast, the 
role of mothers was taken extremely seriously as the preservation, rise and fall of the family 
were thought to depend on the education of the children, and mothers were regarded as their 
primary educators.
97
 Elite women were restricted to the inner rooms of their homes and 
separated from their male counterparts from the age of seven.
98
 Unmarried daughters were to 
remain confined to the domestic sphere as they prepared for their future roles as wives and 
mothers. These customs, though, were unrealistic for common women, who were expected to 
participate in work activities in the fields and marketplace. Thus, their ability to move outside 
of the family home facilitated the transition for some Korean women to new economic roles 
during Japanese colonial rule.
99
  
In the 1920s, during the occupation of Korea, a small group of educated so-called 
“New Women” (sinyǒsǒng) emerged from the missionary education system with modern 
ideas about Korean womanhood. These women seized the opportunity to enhance all 
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women’s access to education, to determine their own physical appearance, and to contribute 
to the public debate about changing female identity and roles.
100
 They also challenged the 
legacy of Confucian principles and the patriarchal system in Korean society and the family 
unit which were reinforced during the Chosŏn Dynasty.  The “New Women” produced a 
desired space for public debates but also had to defend themselves from male intellectuals 
and nationalist reformers, who were also fighting to be heard in an occupied Korea.
101
  
During the occupation of Korea by Japan, the Japanese military kidnapped, falsely 
recruited, and forced between 100,000 and 200,000 women in the Asian region into sexual 
slavery as part of the so-called “comfort women” (Japanese “ianfu”/ Korean “wianbu”) 
system.
102
 It is estimated that 80 per cent of these women were Korean.
103
 The women were 
forced into so-called “comfort stations” (ianjo) to serve up to 50 men a day with little food, 
water or sanitation.
104
 Although factors such as the lack of documentary evidence and the 
reluctance of survivors to reveal their past may be offered to explain the long silence about 
these war atrocities, a major factor is the cultural legacy of Confucianism.
105 
During the 
occupation of Korea the sexual culture of men was often overlooked by society, while 
women’s sexuality was rigidly controlled by standards of virginity and chastity.
106
 Unmarried 
women were supposed to maintain their virginity until married and widows were expected to 
be chaste. Regardless of their individual circumstances, women who lost their chastity were 
considered dishonoured, made to feel ashamed and were likely to be ostracised by their own 
families and society.
107
 It was not until the early 1990s that several survivors, predominantly 
from South Korea, came forward to testify about their experiences. This encouraged the 
DPRK to start reporting on North Korean women who had similar experiences, although their 
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testimonies are limited in number.
108
 Below, I will consider how the DPRK has deployed the 
discussion of this issue in its interactions with the international community (see chapters 7 
and 8). 
 Studies of women’s social status in the DPRK have been concerned with the power 
relations that socially and culturally structure the reproduction of gender inequality in North 
Korean society.
109
 In this regard, “gender politics is based upon an existing social patriarchal 
order and system and the state is gendered by enforcing gendered policies and ideologies”.
110
 
In this context, in modern communist states, such as the DPRK, gender inequality is 
reproduced in the family and social patriarchal systems.
111
 It has also been argued, though, 
that the reform process in the DPRK, the collectivisation of agriculture and industry and the 
elimination of private property “led to the demolition of inheritance, which destroyed the 
material basis of traditional patriarchy” and enabled North Korean women to “acquire 
economic independence through paid labour”.
112
 Others argue that neither the socialist 
revolution in the DPRK nor the rapid modernisation in South Korea has liberated women, but 
state interference in the North in favour of women, especially, in the economic arena, has 
greatly contributed to enhancing women’s position in that society.
113
 Reform of the North 
Korean agricultural and industrial sectors, though, did not necessarily mean that the 
patriarchal structure in society was challenged to the extent that all women achieved 
economic independence by participating in the labour force. North Korean women were often 
assigned to occupations that were seen as lower skilled and therefore lower paid.
114
  
 Others acknowledge that gender politics in North Korea is based upon an existing 
social patriarchal system and that the state enforces gendered policies and ideologies based 
upon this system.
115
 Kyung Ae Park refers to the household registration system in the DPRK 
under the male household head and states that due to the abolition of the system “patriarchy” 
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has also been undermined.
116
 However, the use of the word “patriarchy” is ambiguous as it is 
unclear whether Park is referring to the father’s rule within the family, male domination in 
society in general, or a form of political power or kinship system.
117
 We shall see below that 
the abolition of the patrilineal household registration system has not necessarily led to 
women’s emancipation in the DPRK. While more North Korean women have left the home 
to participate in the economy, they have effectively been forced to bear the double burden of 
external employment and being responsible for the majority of household chores.
118
  
 After the Korean War (1950–1953), North Korea worked to forge a socialist order and 
stated its commitment to abolishing the Confucianist patriarchal social structure.
119
 To 
accomplish this task, the DPRK adopted laws that would bring women out of the home and 
into society to participate in the labour force.
120
 Eun-young Shin argued in the early 2000s 
that, “[t]oday, we no longer see such practices as early marriage, polygamy and concubinage 
... and now women are an important segment of the labour force”.
121
 However, Shin has not 
considered the gendered rhetoric found in North Korea’s state laws and instead takes the 
words of the government at face value. Alternatively, Jin Woong Kang acknowledges that the 
North Korean regime has been characterised by contradictory goals in its policies toward 
women.
122
 For example, in the name of gender equality and women’s emancipation, the 
DPRK has: 
 
[e]nforced gendered policies and ideologies, structured the patriarchal 
family and social systems through the reproduction of the mechanism 





                                                     
116
 Park, “Women and Revolution”, p. 528. 
117
 Ibid., For further  information on “patriarchy” see Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1988), pp. 19–38; Abeda Sultana, “Patriarchy and Women’s Subordination: A Theoretical Analysis”, The 
Arts Faculty Journal, (July 2010–June 2011), pp. 1–18; Raewyn Connell, Gender (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2002), pp.106, 107. 
118
 Ibid; Jung and Dalton, “Mothers of the Revolution”, p. 753. 
119




 Ibid., pp. 81, 82. 
122
 Kang, “The Patriarchal State”, pp. 55, 57, 60; Jung and Dalton, “Mothers of the Revolution”, pp. 749, 759; 
Ryang, “Gender in Oblivion”, pp. 330, 332. 
123
 Kang, “The Patriarchal State”, p. 55. 
21 
 
Thus, the government’s gendered view has created developments contrary to its original 
socialist ideals of solving the “woman question”.
124
 The DPRK moved away from its initial 
socialist reforms, which aimed to mobilise women to contribute to nation building. 
Superficially, women’s economic participation was egalitarian but this meant that women 
suffered the double burden of domestic and social work. In this way the patriarchal state 
mobilised society through gender construction and in this process, women’s status in the 
family and society was subordinated to gender stereotyping.
125
 
 Jiyoung Song, in Human Rights Discourse in North Korea (2011), closely examines 
the evolution of the North Korean legal system and human rights discourse in the DPRK.
126
 
Song offers three alternative perspectives to understand North Korean thought on human 
rights: postcolonial, Marxist, and Confucian. These perspectives situate North Korea’s 
discourse within Korea’s historical context, and within the international evolution of human 
rights discourses. Song details North Korea’s human rights thought from the pre-modern 
Korean ideas of Confucianism, Sirhak and Tonghak,
127
 to postcolonial and Marxist ideas on 
human rights, to the development of the Juche ideology and its relationship to human rights, 
and finally “Our Style” human rights under Kim Jong Il. She has not, however, examined 
closely the institution of gender equality. For example, in chapter 4, Song provides an 
overview of the so-called interim government period of North Korea from August 1945 to 
September 1946 and the wide range of rights institutionalised.
128
 She only briefly, however, 
examines the rights of women and children, outlining the Law on Equality of the Sexes. The 
main purpose of the law, she notes, was to embrace women as former victims of human rights 
violations under Japanese colonial rule in order to mobilise them into the labour force,
129
 but 
does not question the gendered logic of North Korean laws and policies. In this thesis, in 
chapter 3, I analyse in detail provisions in North Korean laws from 1945 to 2010 and 
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Representations of North Korean Women  
Recently, academic scholarship in North Korean studies has made a major contribution to the 
new areas of North Korean art, theatre, cinema, and fashion.
130
 Two major books are Suk-
Young Kim’s The Illusive Utopia (2010) and Suzy Kim’s Everyday Life in the Korean 
Revolution 1945–1950 (2013).
131
 Both works examine the representation of revolutionary 
women in the personality cult of Kim Il Sung. Suk-Young Kim explores state-produced 
propaganda, stage performances, film productions, parades, mass games, and visual arts.
132
 
She investigates how the DPRK’s national imagination is formed, functions, and is 
represented for the sake of maintaining and solidifying the regime. Since the foundation of 
North Korean cinema and theatre, the main aim of these arts was to glorify the leader and 
instil an intense sense of nationalism in the audience.  North Korean cinema has relied on a 
“process of blurring the boundary between performed illusion and social reality by 
transforming spectators into performers”.
133
 This occurred on two fronts, with actors striving 
to emulate the virtues of revolutionary citizens and spectators aiming to become like the film 
characters who were role models.
134
  
 Suk-Young Kim also discusses North Korean paintings and illustrations and considers 
the relationship of the cult of the Kim family to traditional patriarchal authority. She notes 
how Kim Il Sung, the father of the nation, overshadows the authority of traditional parents, 
especially the father figure, in the many paintings depicting him.
135
 In North Korean 
paintings family life is transformed, “depriving traditional patriarchs of masculinity” and 
substituting “omnipresent state patriarchs”.
136
 They are “shaped by the need to promote a 
military spirit”, and feature women as protagonists. Kim outlines the representation of female 
protagonists or heroines and the “ideal female body” in North Korean fashion in a variety of 
visual media.
137
 The North Korean state politicised the female body through the production 
and consumption of women’s fashion from the 1960s to the 1970s. 
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While some other socialist and authoritarian states glorified 
masculine clothing as a preferred means to represent revolutionised 
women, North Korean fashion has continuously explored and 
expressed degrees of femininity, seemingly contradicting the 




She looks at two pieces of clothing in particular: the hanbok (or joseonot), the ethnic Korean 
clothing for women composed of the jeogori (jacket) and chima (skirt) and the feminised 
military uniform. The hanbok represents timeless national tradition and domesticity and the 
military uniform represents the ideals of socialist revolution and public life.
139
 In North 
Korea, visual images of women are not only objects of visual consumption but concrete 
models to emulate, instilling in viewers the desire to produce specific bodily presentations.
140
 
 Suzy Kim mobilises a range of materials, including statistics, photos, interviews, and 
official reports to provide a history of ordinary life in North Korea in the second half of the 
1940s.
141
 During this time, there were three main focuses of governmental activity – land 
reform, literacy and elections. Kim examines how villagers experienced, understood, and 
later remembered such events as the first land reform and modern elections in Korea’s 
history, as well as practices in the schools, communal halls, mass organisations, and study 
sessions. North Korea from the outset attempted to meld the old and the new through the 
figure of the revolutionary mother as a uniquely feminine revolutionary subject. This is 
reflected in the representations of motherhood in Chosǒn Yǒsǒng (Korean Women) 
magazine.
142
 The figure of the revolutionary mother sets North Korea apart from other 
historical examples of social revolutions and their handling of the “woman question”. 
Although North Korean women during the early period of the country began to participate in 
the public arena, women’s agency was cast in the framework of the home, reinforcing 
stereotypical roles of women as wives and mothers.
143
  
 Although initial reform in North Korea attempted to liberate women from the home, 
no legislation or political campaign ever denounced tradition or Confucianism per se, as 
occurred during the Communist Revolution in China when the family was configured as the 
source of women’s oppression, a position that aligned nationalism, feminism, and Marxism 
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against a common enemy.
144
 In North Korea, rather than the family being faulted for 
women’s oppression, the family and the home came to symbolise the Korean nation in the 
revolution.
145
 In this context, motherhood became the primary trope by which to construct not 
only women’s revolutionary subjectivity but also all North Koreans, as everyone was extolled 
to emulate mothers as the sacrificial model citizen. Thus, the distinctiveness of the process 
through which North Korean women’s subjectivity was crafted is in the contradictory 
deployment of tradition, shifting the meaning of “motherhood” and thereby the overall 
gender scheme.
146
 This is different from the masculine representations of revolutionary 
brotherhood in images of the worker or peasant in the Bolshevik and Chinese revolutions. In 
North Korea, the figure of the revolutionary mother became the quintessential icon of female 
subjectivity, melding the old and the new, and incorporating both Japanese and Soviet 
legacies along the way. This remaking of motherhood as a public persona would not have 
been possible without the Korean colonial experience, argues Kim, which served to privilege 
women and the domestic sphere in unprecedented ways.
147
 
 Although these works have offered a good sense of different aspects of North Korean 
society such as its legal system, the representation of women in visual media within North 
Korea, the question of how the government has represented itself to the world, in regards to 
achieving gender equality, has been left largely unanswered. Therefore, this thesis attempts to 
offer some understanding of how the North Korean government has communicated with the 
international community through its reporting to the UN, the CEDAW Committee and in 
English-language magazines about gender, sexuality and achieving gender equality. Next, I 
outline the research focus and objectives of this thesis and the questions I explore.   
  
Research Focus and Objectives  
In this thesis, I focus on the gender ideology of the North Korean government in its 
communication with the international community. The objective of the thesis is to answer the 
following questions: 
 
What gendered views are revealed in the North Korean legal system?  
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How has the North Korean government represented gender in the 
English-language magazine Women of Korea? 
 
How has the North Korean government reported on gender and 
sexuality to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women?  
 
These questions are shaped by the themes of gender, sexuality and international relations that 
recur at various points throughout this study. Below I outline my research methodology and 
then provide a chapter outline.  
  
Methodology  
In this thesis, I have adopted a qualitative methodology, drawing on critical discourse 
analysis. As discussed above, the isolation of the DPRK from the international community 
led to difficulties in accessing reliable information regarding broader aspects of North Korean 
society, especially gender roles in the home and workplace. This meant that those outside the 
country had to rely on available testimonies of North Koreans who had fled the country, the 
writings of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il published by Pyongyang’s Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, and the English-language propaganda magazines, Women of Korea and 
Korea Today. Since the 1990s, there has been an increase in the number of North Koreans 
leaving the country, thus providing a wider range of testimonies. There has also been an 
increase in governmental communication with the world.
148
  
 Despite the fact the North Korean government has increased attempts at 
communication with the rest of the world since the 1990s, news reports in the Euro-American 
and Japanese media assign little credibility to reports released from the DPRK.
149
 The 
                                                     
148
 CEDAW, Initial Report; CEDAW, “List of issues and questions”; CEDAW, “Responses”; CEDAW, “699th 
meeting”; CEDAW, “700th meeting”; CEDAW, Concluding Comments; Amnesty International, Starved of 
Rights; Amnesty International, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Submission to the UN Universal 
Periodic Review (Seoul: Amnesty International, 2009); NKHR, Class and Gender; Young-Hwan Lee, Child is 
King of the Country: Briefing Report on the Situation of the Rights of the Child in the DPRK, Briefing Report 
No. 3 (Seoul: Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, 2009); Young-Hwan Lee, Situation Report on 
the Rights of the Child: NGO Alternative Report the Combined Third and Fourth Periodic Report of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CRC/C/PRK/4 (Seoul: Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human 
Rights and The Asia Center for Human Rights, 2008); Hosaniak, Flowers, Guns and Women; Hosaniak, Status 
of Women’s Rights; Good Friends, Alternative NGO Report; Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and  
Refugees, Human Rights in North Korea and the Food Crisis: A Comprehensive Report on North Korean 
Human Rights Issues (Seoul: Good Friends: Center for Peace, Human Rights and Refugees, 2004). 
149
 “North Korea’s Tightly Controlled Media”, BBC News, 19 December 2011, (accessed 9 February 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16255126; “North Korea’s Digital Underground”, The Atlantic, 
26 
 
popular perception of the DPRK by the international community is one of untrustworthiness, 
unpredictability, and a threat to regional security.
150
 This thesis attempts to address the often 
over-simplified representation of the DPRK in the international community by critically 
analysing sources released by the North Korean government specifically for the world. By 
doing this I hope to add another dimension to the representation of DPRK in world politics, 
with a focus on the North Korea’s contradictory stance on gender relations and equality 
between men and women.  
 When examining English-language sources from the DPRK, though, I have 
considered that the information released by the North Korean government is strictly 
controlled by the state and is information deemed suitable for the international community, as 
the government wants to project a positive image to the world. In the DPRK, it is illegal to 
own a radio or television set which is not adjusted to receive only state-run channels and the 
printed word is largely limited to several state-owned newspapers and books that are 
published by a small number of state-owned publishing houses.
151
 Sonia Ryang reminds us 
that: 
 
Kim’s words are words, that is, rhetoric, and they have to be treated 
as such. His works should be placed on the level of official political 
discourse, constituting the social reality only reflexively, rather than 




In the DPRK, Kim Il Sung’s words carry an immense policy implication for all areas, 
including the state’s gender equality policy, as they are normally regarded as the most correct 
and safest reference point.
153
 Therefore, the works of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and currently 
Kim Jong Un provide a body of official discourse that needs to be further analysed in 
connection to wider aspects of the society, and its effects on specific areas such as gender and 
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sexuality in the DPRK.
154
 I approach North Korean sources by critically analysing the state-
sanctioned discourse presented in English. I have taken care to view the Kim family words as 
rhetorical data that should be cross-referenced with other information as much as possible.
155
 
As I discuss in detail below, the rhetoric deployed by the government provides insights into 
constructions of gender in the DPRK. 
 As suggested by Ryang, previous scholarship on the roles of North Korean women 
and men tended not to support the “empirical” data found in the official words of Kim Il 
Sung with analytical back-up.
156
 Instead, the words of Kim Il Sung were seen as fact or 
reality and not challenged by evidence that suggested otherwise. For example, although 
official North Korean texts claim that Kim Il Sung was responsible for the promulgation of 
the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946 this does not mean that he himself drafted the law 
or that he was committed to achieving gender equality.
157
 Further, when the North Korean 
government proclaims that all women are liberated from their homes, these words should not 
be taken as reality as evidence collected by other sources such as NGOs offers information to 
the contrary.
158
 Therefore, I draw on reporting by the UN and NGOs and position their views 
alongside the information presented by the North Korean government to juxtapose the 
competing perspectives regarding gender and sexuality in the DPRK. 
 Here, I elaborate on the utilisation of critical discourse analysis and the numerous 
primary and secondary sources employed and scrutinised throughout this work. Critical 
discourse analysis is deployed as a method of analysis in the humanities and social sciences 
with the aim of mapping three separate forms of analysis.
159
 These include the analysis of 
written or spoken language, the analysis of discursive practice (processes of text production, 
distribution and consumption) and the analysis of discursive events as instances of socio-
cultural practice.
160
 Fairclough combines the analysis of discourse at the micro, meso and 
macro-level to interpret written and spoken text.
161
 At the micro-level, discourse analysis 
considers the text’s syntax, metaphoric structure and certain metrical devices. At the meso-
level, the analyst studies the text’s production and consumption, focusing on how power 
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relations are enacted; and finally, at the macro-level of inter-textual understanding, the 




 Besides linguistic theory, discourse analysis draws from social theory. Contributions 
to this discipline have been made by Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, Jürgen 
Habermas, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu.
163
 This approach examines ideologies and 
power relations involved in discourse. Fairclough and Holes argue that language connects 
with the social through being the primary domain of ideology, and through being a site of, 
and a stake in, struggles for power.
164
  
 Just as text can be analysed using the methods of critical discourse analysis, visual 
culture can be subjected to similar kinds of analysis. Analysis of visual culture is a field of 
study that includes a combination of cultural studies, art history, critical theory, philosophy, 
and anthropology, by focusing on aspects of culture that rely on visual images. Paintings, 
photographs, posters, fashion and sculptures, to name a few, give insight into the non-literate 
aspects of human culture and can be employed to challenge or validate conclusions drawn 
from written discourse.
165
 Visual culture is presented in the form of visual artefacts, “natural 
forms and ways of thinking” that form perceptions in everyday life.
166
 Visual culture is 
learned and cultivated, and is deeply involved with societies, with the ethics and politics, 
aesthetics and epistemology of seeing and being seen.
167
 In my analysis of the North Korea’s 
English-language magazines, I analyse visual materials as well as more conventional written 
texts.  
 Specific text types analysed in this thesis include: official North Korean statements, 
reports exchanged between the North Korean government and UN bodies such as the 
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CEDAW Committee and North Korean periodicals designed and printed for the international 
English community. These sources outline the North Korean government’s approved 
discourse on gender, sexuality, and achieving gender equality as presented to the world in 
various forms of communication. These sources are especially designed for international 
consumption and represent the country as a place of equal opportunity for North Korean men 
and women. In contrast, information collected by NGOs and the UN, which tends to be based 
on the testimonies of North Koreans who have left the country, provide unique first-hand 
insights into life in the DPRK. In this thesis, I juxtapose the official view presented by the 
North Korean government with information from NGOs and the UN. Below, I expand on the 
North Korean sources and NGO reporting employed in this thesis.  
 
North Korean Sources  
After outlining the official views of gender relations in the North Korean legal system (see 
chapter 3), I then turn to the English-language magazine Women of Korea, which was a major 
means of communicating to the international community about gender relations in the DPRK  
(see chapter 4 and 5). The magazine was modelled after the first Korean-language magazine 
designed specifically for women, Chosǒn Yǒsǒng (Korean Women).
168
 The Korean-language 
magazine was issued under the guidance of the newly-formed government and the Korean 
Democratic Women’s Union (KDWU, Women’s Union) in 1946 and was designed to 
circulate information regarding state policy and gender equality.
169
 Between 1964 and 1992, 
the Working People’s Organisation Publishing House (Pyongyang, DPRK) published the 
English-language version, Women of Korea. This version of the magazine was designed 
specifically to inform the international community of the position of women in North Korean 
society, and the political and economic goals of the government. I focus on the English 
version of the magazine because I am interested in how the North Korean government 
communicates to the world about gender, sexuality and achieving gender equality (see 
chapters 4 and 5). The visual images in Women of Korea are instrumental in portraying a 
positive image of gender relations in the DPRK, adapted from their original purpose of 
portraying positive role models for North Korean women. 
 I also refer to paintings and poster art published in Women of Korea, which represent 
North Korean women in the home and the workplace in different historical contexts. In 
revolutionary societies such as the DPRK, art and culture have a social function and do not 
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function as an isolated entity.
170
 In a society where the government shapes reality, North 
Korean visual culture is far from spontaneous, as it educates, entertains, and mobilises people 
into the workforce.
171
 The North Korean government has strategically placed paintings, 
posters and other forms of visual media about current issues in spaces where the population 
have easy access.
172
 Therefore, in the DPRK, magazines entertain people, inform people and 
are employed to mobilise people to certain government causes, such as women joining the 
social labour force. Internationally, North Korean magazines work to inform the world of 
events happening within the DPRK and to propagate the government’s policies towards 
achieving gender equality, economics, and the reunification of the Korean peninsula.  
 The employment of visual images by the North Korean government was based on 
principles initially employed by the Soviet Union as part of its Socialist Realism 
movement.
173
 In 1932, the Soviet Union abolished all independent art groups and by 1934 
announced Socialist Realism as the only approved form of art. This approach was based on 
the four principles of accessibility of art to the masses, class-consciousness, relevance to 
current political issues and faithfulness to the Party. Although these principles were drawn 
from Marxist-Leninist ideas, Socialist Realism was a creation of Joseph Stalin (1878–1953) 
and was later adopted by China and the DPRK, with national and cultural variations.
174
 
Stylistically North Korean art is more than a mere copy of Soviet Russian Socialist Realism, 
as North Korean art had to accord with Korea’s specific historical conditions and cultural 
traditions.
175
 Kim Il Sung pronounced that Korean painting, the indigenous post-
revolutionary development of traditional ink painting, was the best representative of Korean 
styles and emotions.
176
 Kim Jong Il described Korean painting as characterised by clarity, 
compactness and delicacy, which became the standard characteristics applied to all approved 
art in the DPRK.
177
 This approach to North Korean art became the basis for all art forms 
including paintings and posters, which are distributed among the North Korean people and to 
the international community.  
 I then analyse communication between the North Korean government and CEDAW 
Committee from 2001 to 2005 (see chapter 7). During this period, the DPRK communicated 
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most openly with the UN.
178
 The relationship stalled shortly after 2005 though, due to the 
somewhat hostile relationship of the DPRK with the international community. Although the 
period of communication is short – just a few years – the reports exchanged between the 
DPRK and the UN are important as they demonstrate how the North Korean government 
presents itself to the world, and how it negotiates the gap between the views of gender 
equality presented in CEDAW and the actual conditions in the DPRK. On 11 September 
2002, the DPRK submitted an initial report for consideration to the CEDAW Committee.
179
 
The DPRK’s report is one of the only official sources available for gaining some indication 
of the stance of the North Korean government on women’s rights and reveals the few-
recorded cases where the government acknowledges gender discrimination and stereotyping 
within the country. In February 2005, the CEDAW committee provided a list of issues and 
questions to the DPRK and the North Korean representatives responded.
180
 In July 2005, the 
CEDAW Committee prepared concluding comments and recommendations for the DPRK to 
improve the rights and status of women.
181
 Then, in September 2005, meetings were held 
between the DPRK representatives and the CEDAW Committee where concerns about the 
rights of North Korean women were raised and requests were made for the North Korean 
government to make realistic and attainable changes.
182
 Although communication between 
the DPRK and the UN has not continued since 2005, these documents are a valuable source 
of information as they display the state’s position on the status and rights of North Korean 
women.  
 In comparison to North Korean reporting to the UN, I survey NGO reports and 
compare their findings to the official information offered by the DPRK (see chapters 7 and 
8). NGO reports are based on the personal accounts from North Koreans who have left the 
country and reside in China, South Korea or a third country. In 2004, Amnesty International 
presented the report Starved of Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea),
183
 outlining human rights violations by the North 
Korean government against its people. These violations included no access to food, education 
and healthcare. The report also discusses the role and responsibility of the North Korean 
government and the international community to provide food aid to North Koreans. In the 
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same year, the Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights and Refugees (Good Friends) 
compiled the report Human Rights in North Korea and the Food Crisis: A Comprehensive 
Report on North Korean Human Rights Issues.
184
 The report reflects the voices of North 
Koreans and their experiences in the DPRK and in China.
185
 Through the testimonies of the 
North Koreans, Good Friends has attempted to trace changes in North Korean society, and 
the current human rights situation of North Koreans in China.  
 In 2005, Anti-Slavery International commissioned the author Norma Kang Muico to 
write the report An Absence of Choice: The sexual exploitation of North Korean women in 
China.
186
 The report exposes the vulnerability of North Korean women who have fled to 
China by their own accord or by trafficking. Included in the report is a wide range of case 
studies and testimonies documenting the sexual exploitation of North Korean women, 
including arranged marriages. The report also makes a case for North Korean people who 
reside in China to be considered refugees and not “economic migrants” as the Chinese 
government refers to them. The report concludes with recommendations and actions that need 
to be engaged by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 
Chinese and North Korean governments. 
 In response to the DPRK’s initial report submitted in 2002 to the CEDAW 
Committee, two South Korean NGOs submitted shadow reports to the Committee. The two 
NGO reports submitted outlined concerns about the status of North Korean women inside and 
outside the DPRK. In June 2005, Good Friends submitted a shadow report with concerns 
regarding the food shortage in the DPRK since the mid-1990s and the impact on women.
187
 
In particular, it focused on the trafficking and prostitution of women, their right to access 
healthcare, and the situation of North Korean women in China. In July of the same year, 
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) submitted a shadow report to the 
CEDAW Committee.
188
 Concerns raised by NKHR include: gender-based discrimination 
against women in society and the home, violence against women in North Korean society and 
the sexual exploitation and trafficking of women. In chapter 7, I compare these findings to 
the DPRK’s reporting to the CEDAW Committee.  
 I also refer to three other reports by NKHR. Flowers, Guns and Women on Bikes: 
Briefing Report on the Situation of Women’s Rights in the DPRK (2009) focuses on the rights 
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of North Korean women and addresses the cultural determinants which negatively affect 
women.
189
 The report then introduces the major areas in which North Korean women’s rights 
are violated including: sexual harassment, domestic violence against women, and violence 
against in women detention facilities. There are sections on women’s access to the education 
system, women’s economic rights, and issues related to family planning, and maternal care. 
The report concludes with practical recommendations addressed directly to the DPRK, as 
well as to other governments and UN bodies. The Battered Wheel of the Revolution: Briefing 
Report on the Situation of Violence against North Korean Women (2011), analyses cultural 
and structural practices which are associated with violence against women in various contexts 
including the family, educational institutions, the military, local communities, detention 
centres, and in China and other countries.
190
 The report also asserts the responsibility of the 
North Korean government to eradicate practices that are harmful to women, such as 
trafficking, especially as these practices have thus far avoided national scrutiny and 
intervention. The report then makes recommendations to the North Korean government and 
relevant international organisations on the eradication of practices that are violent against 
women. Status of Women’s Rights in the Context of Socio-Economic Changes in the DPRK 
(2013) outlines the promulgation of the Women’s Rights Act in 2010. The NGO suggests that 
the timing of the new Act was an outcome of North Korea’s involvement at the UN and a 
response to the world’s pressure for change in this area. The objective of the research was to 
document the condition of women’s rights in the DPRK after the adoption of the new 
Women’s Rights Act. The first part of the report analyses provisions of the Act, while the 
second part looks closely at the development in women’s status and rights amid the on-going 
socio-economic changes in the DPRK. The report focuses on trends in North Korean society 
between 2010 and 2012 and outlines valuable information on the status and rights of women 
in recent years, which I refer to in chapter 8.  
  In chapter 8, I also refer to communication between the DPRK and the UN between 
2006 and 2010. Specifically, I refer to two press releases issued by the permanent mission of 
the DPRK to the UN in 2008 and 2010, in response to items discussed during the meetings of 
the UNGA. In 2008, the DPRK participated in the 63rd session of the General Assembly and 
issued a press release in response to Item 56 “Advancement of Women”.
191
 The press release 
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addressed the issue of achieving gender equality and the elimination of customary 
discrimination in the DPRK. Then, in 2010, a North Korean delegation participated at the 
65th Session of the UNGA. In response to Agenda item 28 “Advancement of Women” 
discussed during the session, the North Korean Ambassador issued a press statement 
outlining the DPRK’s concerns about achieving gender equality in the country.
192
  Both press 
releases referred to the historical issue of so-called “comfort women” when addressing 
gender equality in the DPRK.  
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 outlines the historical background of North Korea from 1945 to 1990, paying 
particular attention to the differences between histories retold by North Korean historians as 
compared to academic historical accounts. By highlighting differences in historical accounts, 
it will give those outside the country a better understanding of why the DPRK makes its 
international policy decisions, as well as domestic policy decisions in regard to gender 
relations and achieving gender equality. More broadly, I outline events such as the 
occupation of the Korean peninsula by Japan, the formation of the two Koreas (officially in 
1948), the Korean War (1950–1953), the consolidation of political power in the North by the 
Kim family, and the Juche ideology. This chapter ensures the reader is aware of several 
major historical events between 1945 and 1990 that have shaped the North Korean 
government’s perspectives on gender relations and achieving gender equality.  
  Chapter 3 focuses on the North Korean legal system between 1946 and 2010. From 
as early as 1946, North Korea included provisions in laws that addressed the rights of women 
in the labour force and politics, as well as access to education and healthcare. Key to the 
government’s promotion of gender equality was to bring women out of the home and into the 
workforce. The policy direction of the North Korean government therefore developed 
alongside the economic development of the country. Laws addressed the perceived domestic 
needs of women by legalising the establishment of childcare and pre-packaged food facilities. 
We shall see that issues such as gender discrimination and violence against women in all 
forms have not been addressed fully in the North Korean legal system to date.  
 Chapter 4 looks closely at the representation of exemplary North Korean women in 
the magazine Women of Korea between 1960 and 1970. The visual images published in 
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Women of Korea represent North Korean women in the role of the revolutionary heroine. 
Two prominent exemplary heroines are Kang Ban Sok (1892–1932), mother of Kim Il Sung, 
and Kim Jong Suk (1919–1949), first wife of Kim Il Sung and mother of Kim Jong Il. The 
representations of these women were to promote qualities of loyalty to the Kim family and 
North Korean state, as well as caring and nurturing roles within the home. The domain of the 
battlefield as a space dominated by men was challenged to some extent by the representation 
of the revolutionary heroines. However, this was often undermined when heroines were 
represented performing domestic chores, such as cooking and sewing, as part of their 
revolutionary roles. In contrast, the visual representation of North Korean men as soldiers and 
defenders of the country, as fathers and carers within the home are largely absent in Women 
of Korea. Instead, the ubiquitous image of Kim Il Sung as the “Fatherly General”, who cares 
for all Korean children appears on most pages of the magazines. These representations reveal 
gendered assumptions about the roles of North Korean men and women in the home. I also 
consider the clothing worn by the heroines and their male equivalents. While women are 
dressed predominantly in ethnic Korean clothing (joseonot or hanbok) or feminised military 
uniforms, their male counterparts are clothed in military uniforms or western clothing.  
 Towards the end of the 1970s, the visual imagery of the revolutionary heroines was 
replaced by the representation of ordinary women who performed the roles of loyal and 
supportive wives to husband and family, as well as working outside in the so-called “light 
industries”.
193
 In Chapter 5, I examine the visual and textual representation of  North Korean 
women in the family unit and labour force in Women of Korea from the late 1970s on. During 
this period, the assumptions underlying the North Korean government’s gender equality 
policy are revealed in the pages of the magazine, as the visual images expose the acceptance 
of institutional gender inequality for the purpose of mobilising women into employment 
outside the home.
194
 From this time, visual imagery and state laws emphasised the 
socialisation of childcare and the pre-packaged food industry as a way to lessen the burdens 
of women within the home. This illustrates, however, the government’s assumptions about 
men and women’s roles and responsibilities in the home. Women were seen to be the primary 
carers of children and responsible for domestic chores, while men worked outside the home. 
Close examination of the images in Women of Korea reveals a pattern of gender-segregation 
in the North Korean labour force, as women are represented in the “light industries” and not 
in the so-called “heavy industries”, which were reserved for men. Similarly, there are clear 
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distinctions in the clothing worn by women and men in families and in the workplace, 
highlighting the government’s gendered assumptions. Just as revolutionary heroines were 
represented wearing the hanbok or feminised military uniforms, ordinary North Korean 
women have continued to be represented in ethnic Korean clothing or in simple and modern 
clothing which retains distinctive feminine traits. In contrast, men are not dressed in ethnic 
Korean clothing but Western-style dress, suggesting they have moved forward into modern 
society while women are held in the past.  
 In Chapter 6, historical events in the DPRK during the 1990s are examined in order to 
provide vital background for an understanding of North Korea’s communications with the 
CEDAW Committee in the early 2000s (discussed in chapter 7). Events surveyed in Chapter 
6 include: the collapse of the Soviet Union 1991 and the termination of Soviet aid to the 
DPRK, resulting in a food crisis as the North Korean government was unable to provide food 
to all people. Coinciding with these events, the DPRK experienced widespread famine, 
drought, and floods during the mid-1990s.
195
 Without adjusting the economic policy to the 
rapidly changing circumstances, the North Korean government instead reduced the daily food 
rations distributed through the Public Distribution System (PDS).
196
 Then, on 8 July 1994, 
Kim Il Sung died, leaving the country in uncertainty until his son Kim Jong Il officially took 
power three years later. Initially, the North Korean government did not share openly with the 
world the full extent of the food crisis and instead isolated the country further. Although 
NGOs were allowed to work in the country, they were heavily monitored and were only 
allowed into selected areas of the country to distribute aid. From this time, an increased sense 
of responsibility was placed on women by both the government and society. In most cases, 
women shouldered the double burden of household chores and earning a living in the 
unofficial economy to support their families. 
 In chapter 7, I consider how the DPRK constructs a particular history of the country, 
which is depicted as having demonstrated a continuous and unbroken commitment to gender 
equality. In this chapter, I focus on the relationship between the North Korean government 
and the CEDAW Committee between 2001 and 2005. In North Korea’s reporting, the state 
maintains that discrimination against women in all forms, verbal and physical, was abolished 
after the end of Japan’s occupation of Korea and with the promulgation of state laws under 
the new regime. In other words, gender discrimination in the DPRK is generally relegated to 
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the colonial period. However, a close examination of North Korea’s reporting also reveals the 
extent to which gendered stereotypes underpin the government’s views of the roles of women 
and men, even while it promotes a commitment to gender equality to the international 
community. I argue that despite the assertion of legal gender equality, the North Korean 
government still operates according to a binary model of gender, which shapes the 
opportunities for both men and women’s participation in society and the home, although 
expectations have been challenged in practice through long years of economic recession and 
famine.  
 Chapter 8 analyses the communication between the DPRK and the UNGA, as well as 
other UN bodies, in regards to the state’s policies on achieving gender equality within the 
country. I examine communication between the DPRK and the UN between 2006 and 2011, 
referring to two press releases issued by the permanent mission of the DPRK to the UN in 
2008 and 2010, in response to items discussed during the UNGA. Both press releases confirm 
the DPRK’s commitment to gender equality, but also raise concern about the attitude of 
Japan on the issue of so-called “comfort women”. In the press releases, the DPRK asserts that 
until all pending issues of the past are recognised and clearly settled it is impossible to 
achieve the advancement of North Korean women for the present and the future. The 
government has taken the position that achieving gender equality in the DPRK is 
fundamentally tied to the occupation of the peninsula by Japan and therefore is seen as a 
historical rather than contemporary issue. In this chapter, I also examine how pressure from 
the international community has forced the North Korean government to amend existing state 
laws to include provisions for the greater protection of women’s rights. In 2010, sixty-four 
years after the promulgation of the Law on the Equality of the Sexes, the DPRK adopted the 
Women’s Rights Act. For the first time, the DPRK addressed contemporary issues faced by 
North Korean women and included provisions in the Act to protect their rights with respect to 
domestic violence, female infanticide and the protection of pregnant women who face 
execution. This final chapter takes us to the end of the regime of Kim Il Sung’s son, Kim 
Jong Il. 






2. Historical and Political Background 
(1945–1990) 
 
A man who is ignorant of the history and culture of his 
nation can have no pride in his nation nor can he [sic] 
become a true patriot. 





In this chapter, I outline the historical and political background of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) from 1945 to 1990. Events in the DPRK after 1990 
will be outlined in chapter 6. The current gender ideology of the North Korean government is 
explicated with reference to the historical experiences of the Korean people so I recount 
events such as Japan’s occupation of Korea (1910–1945), the division and formation of the 
two Koreas, the Korean War (1950–1953), and the consolidation of political power in the 
North by the Kim family. This chapter provides details of the major historical and political 
events that have helped to shape the North Korean government’s perspective on gender 
relations and achieving gender equality within the country.  
 According to historian Yŏng-ho Ch’oe, after Japanese colonial rule ended on the 
Korean peninsula in 1945, there was a “far more militant” nationalist tone in North Korean 
historical scholarship compared to South Korean historiography.
2
 Before the 1950s, North 
Korean scholarship concerned itself with fitting Marxist historiography to Korean history.
3
 
After this time, though, class analysis was abandoned in favour of nationalistic categories, in 
accordance with the Juche idea.
4
 While Marxism-Leninism is still important in the DPRK, 
Juche has superseded this doctrine as the official state ideology, as will be discussed further 
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 Many important historical facts were omitted from the North Korean version of 
national history, while many “facts” were (re)invented or exaggerated to push audiences 
toward the politically-prescribed nationalistic conclusion.
6
 For example, the North Korean 
leader Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) commissioned historians as propagandists to glorify his own 
involvement in the anti-Japanese struggle in Manchuria (now the northeast of China).
7
 All 
Koreans were to imagine Kim Il Sung’s role in liberating the Korean peninsula from Japanese 
imperialism. The reinterpretation of North Korean history not only strengthened Kim Il 
Sung’s political control over the country but also created a narrative around the entire Kim 
family, including his mother Kang Ban Sok (1892–1932) and first wife Kim Jong Suk (1919–
1949). The representations of these women as revolutionary heroines in English-language 
publications will be discussed in chapter 4.  
 Andrei Lankov provides three reasons why the North Korean government has 
manipulated national history. First, the government wants the North Korean people to believe 
that Korean history is more “ancient” than the history of other societies.
8
 This will ensure that 
it appears that there have been no influences from other countries, thus reinforcing Korean 
cultural practices and history. This leads to the second point that the DPRK wants to play 
down or deny foreign influences on Korean history. Finally, by establishing a long history 
which is not influenced from other countries this ensures the North Korean government is 
able to demonstrate that it has always played the decisive role in shaping Korean history and 
society.
9
 Therefore, when reading North Korean documents that recount historical events it is 
necessary to be attentive to this historical shaping by the state. While this has helped to shape 
the loyalty of the North Korean people, it has also driven a wedge between the DPRK and the 
international community, in particular with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK, South 
Korea) and the United States of America (USA). It is thus important to highlight the 
differences between what is written by the international community and what has been 
constructed by North Korean historians. This gives a better understanding of why the DPRK 
makes its political and policy decisions in regards to different aspects of society, including 
gender relations and achieving gender equality.  
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 In this chapter, I begin by focusing on Japan’s occupation of the Korean peninsula 
between 1910 and 1945. It is important to highlight the significance of this event in Korea’s 
history as the North Korean government continues to draw on this period when discussing the 
current status of Korean women. I then move on to two events that have continued to shape 
relations between North and South Korea as well as the way in which the North Korean 
government communicates with the world, that is the division of Korea into two states (1948) 
and the Korean War (1950–1953). Finally, I examine the consolidation of power by the Kim 
family, the establishment of the Juche philosophy under the guidance of Kim Il Sung and the 
further development of this philosophy into “Socialism of Our Style”. As the safest reference 
point when developing state policies is to reference the words of the Kims and the Juche 
philosophy, this section ensures a deeper understanding of the power held by the Kim leaders 
in North Korean society. When recalling North Korean history and more generally Korean 
history, I highlight differences between the state rhetoric of North Korean historians with 
other more accepted historical works.  
 
Japan’s Occupation of Korea (1910–1945) 
There had always been encounters between Korea and the outside world, through invasions 
or relationships with other countries including the Chinese, Japanese, Mongols, Manchus, 
and French. Each of these powers contested for political control in Korea, as they sought to 
expand their influence in Asia.
10
  From the late nineteenth century, the Japanese government 
notified the Korean state of its intention to establish a stronger diplomatic and economic 
relationship between the two countries.
11
 Initially, the Korean Empire did not respond 
favourably to this request so Japan threatened to dispatch warships to the peninsula. Faced by 
an imminent war the unprepared Korean government signed the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity 
on 26 February 1876 under intense political pressure. Korean historians refer to the treaty as 
the Treaty of Kanghwa.
12
 The treaty forced Korea to accept the new economic and political 
ties with Japan, which was the main beneficiary of the agreement.
13
 Under the Treaty three 
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Korean ports were opened to Japanese use, tariffs paid by Japan in Korea lowered, 
extraterritorial rights were granted to Japanese citizens living in Korea, and the Korean 
government was forced to proclaim its independence from China.
14
 The Sino-Japanese War 
(1894–1895) resulted in Japan ending Korea’s tributary relationship with China by formally 




From 1905, under intense political pressure from Japan, the Korean government was 
forced to sign additional treaties. The DPRK states that Japan illegally fabricated several 
treaties to assume total diplomatic rights over the Korean peninsula.
16
 On 17 November 1905, 
the Eulsa Treaty or Japan–Korea Protectorate Treaty was signed between Japan and Korea 
and then the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1907 (24 July 1907) was formally recognised by both 
states. North Korean historians refer to the treaties as the Ulsa 5-Point Treaty and the Jongmi 
7-Point Treaty respectively.
17
 Each agreement led to greater control of the Korean peninsula, 
until Japan finally held all political and economic power over Korea on 22 August 1910, with 
the signing of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty, referred to as the Korea-Japan 
Amalgamation Treaty by North Korean historians.
18
 On 29 August 1910, the treaty was 
proclaimed to the public, thus officially starting the period of Japanese colonial rule in Korea.  
 From 1910, Japan formally declared Korea to be a colony, ending its monarchy and 
insisting on the allegiance of the Korean people to the Emperor of Japan.
19
 Japan imposed 
various modernising reforms in matters of social, administrative and economic organisation.
20
 
The results of Japan’s modernisation process on the peninsula were characterised by patterns 
of development and underdevelopment. The question of whether Japan ultimately assisted 
Korea in its development remains highly contested.
21
 During the colonial period, Koreans 
were prohibited from speaking the Korean-language and were made to adopt Japanese 
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 Currently all Koreans regardless of which region they live in have overwhelmingly 
viewed the colonial experience as negative and brutal.
23
 
  Secret societies and patriotic cultural movements within Korea and independence 
movements outside of Korea all played important roles in Korea’s struggles for independence 
from Japan. Most notable is the March First Independence Movement of 1919.
24
 Students and 
other Koreans against Japanese colonial rule were prompted to protest in several Korean 
cities, including Seoul (now the capital of ROK) and Pyongyang (now the capital of 
DPRK).
25
 Approximately 2,000,000 Koreans participated in the protest and more than 1,500 
demonstrations took place across numerous cities and towns in Korea.
26
 The uprising was one 
of the earliest public displays of resistance by the Koreans. It was also in response to the 
former US President Woodrow Wilson’s (1856–1924) speech, “Fourteen Points”, presented 
at the Paris Peace Conference on 8 January 1919.
27
 The speech outlined the right of national 
self-determination, free trade, open agreements and democracy; declared that World War I 
(1914–1918) had been fought for a moral cause; and called for post-war peace in Europe. 
Although not directly referring to the situation of Korea, after hearing Wilson’s speech, 
Korean students studying in Tokyo published a statement demanding freedom from Japanese 
colonial rule in Korea. Coinciding with these events the former Korean Emperor Gojong 
(1852–1919) died on 21 January 1919 amid widespread suspicion that he had been poisoned.  
 In the early morning of 1 March 1919, the movement’s core activists met at a 
restaurant in Seoul and read the Korean Declaration of Independence which had been drawn 
up by the historian Choe Nam-seon (1890–1957).
28
 The Declaration outlined Three Open 
Pledges as:  
 
Our action today represents the demand of our people for justice, 
humanity, survival, and dignity. It manifests our spirit of freedom and 
should not engender anti-foreign feelings.  
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To the last one of us and to the last moment possible, we shall 
unhesitatingly publicise the views of our people, as is our right.  
All our actions should scrupulously uphold public order, and our 




The leaders of the movement signed the document and sent a copy to the Japanese Governor 
General, Count Hasegawa Yoshimichi (1850–1924).
30
 The leaders of the movement then 
telephoned the central police station in Seoul to inform them of their actions. The organisers 
were arrested soon after. Massive crowds assembled in Pagoda Park (now known as Tapgol 
Park, Seoul) to hear the student, Chung Jae-yong (dates unknown), read the Korean 
Declaration of Independence publicly. The gathering then formed into a peaceful procession 
but the Japanese military police attempted to suppress the movement. The size and intensity 
of the movement stunned the Japanese who had assumed that their brutal policies would 
eventually break the Korean national spirit, not strengthen it.
31
 As the number of protesters 
grew, suppression by the Japanese police force and army turned to violence, which resulted in 
the killing of Koreans.
32
  
 The ensuing suppression of the Korean people and the pursuit of activists by the 
Japanese police resulted in the expatriation of many Korean leaders into Manchuria, 
Shanghai and other parts of China where they continued their activism. As a result, the 
movement was a catalyst for the establishment of the Provisional Government of the 
Republic of Korea in Shanghai on 13 April 1919.
33
 Despite renewed Japanese efforts to end 
political resistance, Korean nationalists and communists continued to agitate against Japan in 
scattered movements throughout the country.
34
  
 According to the DPRK, the March First Independence Movement failed due to the 
lack of leadership by an outstanding leader.
35
 It is said that the anti-Japanese liberation 
movement was not victorious until the leadership of Kim Il Sung’s father Kim Hyong Jik 
(1884–1926), who personally founded the largest underground anti-Japanese revolutionary 
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organisation at home and abroad, the Korean National Association (KNA) in Pyongyang on 
23 March 1917.
36
 While working to advance the anti-Japanese struggle, the Japanese police 
arrested Kim Hyong Jik and imprisoned him. While in jail Kim Hyong Jik is said to have 
heard the news of the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, and the seizure of state power by 
urban workers and revolutionaries.
37
 In light of this information, Kim Hyong Jik is said to 
have reviewed the anti-Japanese movement in Korea, and determined that the only valid way 
to achieve national independence and win freedom and liberation for the Korean people was 
to rely on a proletarian revolution.
38
 In October 1918, upon his release from prison, Kim 
Hyong Jik shifted the KNA to the northern part of Korea near the border. It was from this 
time that the guiding principles of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the 
future Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union, USSR) shaped the thinking of Kim 
Hyong Jik and his son Kim Il Sung. The influence of the Soviet Union weighed heavily on 
Kim Il Sung in particular, so much so that it led to the formal establishment of a socialist 
DPRK in 1948.   
 From 1926, on the death of his father, it is said that Kim Il Sung took over the 
responsibility to liberate the Korean peninsula from Japan.
39
 On 5 May 1936, in opposition to 
the Japanese occupation of Korea, the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland 
(ARF) was said to be personally established by Kim Il Sung to unite anti-Japanese forces 
within Korea and abroad. While leading the preparation for the foundation of the Association, 
Kim Il Sung is said to have personally drafted the Ten-Point Programme of the Association 
for the Restoration of the Fatherland (see Appendix 3) and the Declaration of the Association 
for the Restoration of the Fatherland (see Appendix 4).
40
 Based on this preparation, Kim Il 
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Sung called a meeting of military and political cadres of the Korean People’s Revolutionary 
Army to Donggang (Fusong County, Jilin, China) from 1 to 15 May 1936. At the meeting, 
both the Programme and the Declaration of the Association for the Restoration of the 
Fatherland were made public. These documents embodied North Korea’s thoughts on the 
social and political rights of all people, with particular focus on the rights of Korean women. 
The provisions included in these documents would become key principles in the first DPRK 
Constitution in 1948. Laws, policy reform, and the first Constitution promulgated during the 
revolutionary period will be discussed in detail in chapter 3. Under the guidance of Kim Il 
Sung the ARF is said to have continued to fight back against the Japanese colonisers until 
Korea was liberated in 1945.  
 In November 1943, in anticipation of Japan’s defeat, the Allied Powers at the Cairo 
Conference set out an agreement for the independence of Korea.
41
 Then US President 
Franklin Roosevelt (1882–1945), British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1874–1965) and 
China’s Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) met at the Conference in part to discuss 
what should happen to Japan’s colonies once the Second World War ended. They agreed that 
Japan should lose all territories it had conquered by force, including Korea. After the 
conference, a joint statement affirmed that, “[t]he aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the 
enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become 
free and independent”.
42
 For some Korean nationalists who wanted immediate independence, 
the phrase “in due course” caused great dismay. Any further discussion about Korea among 




The Establishment of Two Koreas 
Two days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, the Soviets invaded 
Manchuria.
44
 The American leaders, though, worried that the whole Korean peninsula might 
be occupied by the Soviet Union, and feared this could lead to a Soviet occupied Japan. On 
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10 August 1945, two American colonels, Dean Rusk (1909–1994) and Charles Bonesteel 
(1909–1977), proposed the 38th parallel as the administrative line for the two opposing 
armies of the US and Soviet Union.
45
 The officers’ plans for Korea were incorporated into 
General Order No. 1 on the administration of post-war Japan.
46
 More interested in obtaining 
the territories north of Hokkaido, the then Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (1922–1952) agreed to 
the dividing line. This action resulted in the division of the Korean peninsula, which would 
be governed by two rival provisional administrations. In the north, the country was under the 
administration of the Soviet Union and in the south by the US. Soon after the division of the 
country mistrust grew rapidly between competing administrations and no agreement could be 
reached on how to reconcile competing provisional governments. The US continued to be 
concerned that the Soviet Union would not stop at the 38th parallel, and would try to occupy 
the entire Korean peninsula.
47
 Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945, and was occupied by 
the Allies until 1952. 
 With the abrupt departure of Japan from the Korean peninsula, many Koreans were 
displaced. It is estimated that by 1945, 20 per cent of all Koreans were moved, with 11 per 
cent outside of Korea.
48
 There were approximately 2.4 million Koreans in Japan, 2 million in 
China and about 200,000 in the Soviet Union.
49
 During the colonial period, Japan had 
instigated major industrialisation on the peninsula as part of its war effort and much of the 
Korean population were uprooted from its agrarian base. Koreans were sent to labour in 
factories in the northern part of the peninsula and in Manchuria and to mines and other 
enterprises in Japan. Many of the labourers worked under terrible conditions, and a large 
number of Korean men and women were conscripted as forced labour. Consequently, with 
the defeat of Japan in 1945, millions of displaced Koreans sought to return home while others 
stayed behind in Japan, China and the Soviet Union.
50
 The legacy of this forced displacement 
includes substantial minority populations of Koreans in Japan and northern China.
51
   
                                                     
45
 They used a small National Geographic map of Asia to decide on the 38th parallel, dividing the country in 
half while leaving the capital Seoul under American control.  James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the 
Korean War. Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Untied States Army, 1972), pp. 8–11. 
46
 On 17 August 1945, General Order No.1 was prepared by the US military Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved 
by the then US President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972). 
47
 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2003), p. 41.  
48 
Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and Emergence of Separate Regimes 
1945–1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 25. 
49
 Charles K. Armstrong, The Koreas (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 95–101. 
50
 Ibid., pp. 108–111. 
51 
Ibid.   
47 
 
 On 13 October 1945, the North Korean Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea 
(North Korean Bureau) was established.
52
 Historians debate the initial meeting of the 
Communist Party and claim it was held on 10 October and not 13 October as the early date is 
regarded as the “Party Foundation Day” in the DPRK.
53 
 Nevertheless, although technically 
under the control of the Seoul-based Communist Party, the North Korean Bureau had little 
contact with Seoul and instead worked closely with the Soviet Union.
54
 The first chairperson 
of the Party was Kim Yong-bom (dates unknown), who had been sent to Korea by the 
Communist International (also known as the Third International or Comintern, 1919–1943) in 
the 1930s to conduct underground activities.
55
  
 In December 1945, the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the US and United 
Kingdom (UK) met in Moscow where they agreed to a joint trusteeship of Korea for five 
years. Nationalists across Korea staged rallies against the decision. At the same time, Kim Il 
Sung, who had been a member of the North Korean Bureau, replaced Kim Yong-bom as 
chairperson. North Korean historians seek to downplay the roles of the early communist 
leaders other than Kim Il Sung and his family members and dispute Kim Yong-bom’s 
involvement in the Party. Instead, it is claimed, Kim Il Sung was promoted to the position of 




 In spring 1946, the Communist Party of Korea was renamed the Communist Party of 
North Korea.
57
 By July 1946, the Party merged with the New People’s Party, a party 
composed mostly of Korean Communists who had been exiled to China during the 
occupation of Korea.
58
 On 28 July 1946, a special commission between the two parties 
ratified the merger, and on 29 July 1946, the merger became official.
59
 One month later, from 
28 to 30 August 1946, the new party held a founding conference and established the 
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Workers’ Party of North Korea (WPNK).
60
 At the conference, Kim Tu-bong (1889–1958) 
(the leader of the New People’s Party) was elected the first Chairperson of the WPNK, while 
Kim Il Sung was appointed Deputy Chairperson.
61
 Despite his formal downgrading in the 
party hierarchy, Kim Il Sung remained the party’s unofficial leader.
62
 Official North Korean 
documents deny the position held by Kim Tu-bong and instead insist that Kim Il Sung was 
the first Chairperson of the WPNK.
63
 It is said that under the guidance of Kim Il Sung, the 
Party carried out reform in all aspects of Korean society in the aim of building a socialist 
state. This included developing laws on agrarian reform, on nationalisation of industries, 
transport, communications, and banks, reform on labour, and on gender equality. At the same 
time, various steps were taken to reform the judicial and educational systems and cultural 
affairs. These democratic reforms and the involvement of Kim Il Sung in the process of state 
reform as presented by historians other than North Koreans will be discussed in chapter 3.   
 On 17 September 1947, the USA brought the issue of governance on the Korean 
peninsula before the United Nations General Assembly. The Soviet Union opposed the 
United Nations’ (UN) involvement in any issue on the peninsula because Koreans had not 
been asked to participate. On 14 November 1947, the UN passed Resolution 112 (II), 
officially establishing the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to 
supervise government elections in both North and South Korea, with a view to developing a 
single national government.
64
 The resolution also aimed to assist in the withdrawal of the 
occupying forces, and guide the new political entity of Korea to full independence. The 
commission soon found that the communist administration in the north would not allow it to 
operate to its full potential in the northern region. The Soviet Union argued that UNTCOK 
should be boycotted and any election non-binding. As UNTCOK could not carry out its 
mandate in the north, it subsequently recommended that elections be held in the south and 
that the winner be recognised as the sole legitimate Korean government. 
 On 10 May 1948, a general election was held in South Korea and Syngman Rhee 
(1875–1965) was elected President of the ROK.
65
 Both the UN and the US supported his 
presidential candidacy. The report of UNTCOK, approved by a United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 195 (III) on 12 December 1948, stated that a lawful election 
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had been held only in the south of the country.
66
 The same resolution also created the United 
Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) to replace UNTCOK. UNCOK was established to 
help Korea move towards unification, as well as to observe the activities of military forces on 
the peninsula. UNCOK was able to assist in the departure of the occupying forces, but had 
little success when it came to furthering Korean unification and, indeed, on 25 August 1948 
elections were held in the north electing deputies to the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). 
North Korean historians state that in the north 99.97 per cent of voters took part in the 
election and that in the south 77.52 per cent of the electorate participated.
67
 As a result, 572 
candidates were said to be elected to the SPA. The first session of the SPA was then held in 
Pyongyang on 9 September 1948, which announced to the world the foundation of the DPRK 
and the election of Kim Il Sung as the Premier of the Cabinet and the head of the new state in 
what was described as an uncontested election.
68
 Since the election of Kim Il Sung to his 
position of political power, political opposition to the government has not been permitted, 
and anyone expressing opinions contrary to the state risks punishment and imprisonment.
69
  
Nine months after the first election was held in the DPRK, the ruling party, the 
Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) was established on 30 June 1949. At the time, the Workers’ 
Parties of North and South Korea merged to create one Party and Kim Il Sung was promoted 
to the position of General Secretary (Party Chair). Knowing that he had the support of the 
WPK and the Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung removed people who did not support his political 
position.
70
 From this time, the Soviet Union withdrew its administration and military forces 
from the DPRK.  
 
The Korean War (1950–1953)  
Between 1945 and 1948, the 38th parallel turned into a heavily guarded border, while both 
sides of the divided peninsula contemplated the use of military force to achieve 
reunification.
71
 During 1949, the war of words between the two Koreas escalated, and 
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infiltration and clashes along the border increased. As a result the UN changed UNCOK’s 
mandate via Resolution 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949, adding the task of observing and 
reporting on any developments “which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in 
Korea”.
72
 In March 1950, UNCOK requested additional military observers to monitor the 
situation on the peninsula. In mid-1950, tensions along the Korean border reached breaking 
point. In the early hours of 25 June 1950, the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel 
and invaded South Korea. North Korean historians assert, though, that it was the USA’s 
armed invasion of the DPRK that initiated the war.
73
 On the same day that the north invaded 
the south, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met to discuss the situation and 
adopted Resolution 82.
74
 The resolution noted the DPRK’s attack on South Korea and called 
upon the immediate withdrawal of North Korean troops.  
 The Soviet delegation to the UNSC did not attend the meeting as they were 
boycotting the UN for recognising Chiang Kai-shek’s (1887–1975) government in Taiwan as 
the official government for China whilst ignoring Mao Zedong’s (1893–1976) communist 
regime in Beijing. Therefore, the expected use of the veto by the USSR did not occur. At the 
meeting, the USA claimed that the DPRK had broken world peace by attacking South Korea. 
America called on the DPRK to withdraw to the 38th parallel and nine out of the eleven 
countries in the UNSC supported this view.
75
 Two days later on 27 June 1950, the USA 
called on the UN to use force to get the DPRK out of South Korea as the North Korean 
government had ignored the Security Council’s resolution of 25 June. The resolution was 
voted on, but again the Soviet Union did not use its veto as it was still boycotting the UN, and 
Yugoslavia abstained. From this meeting Resolution 83 was adopted, recommending that 
member states of the UN assist the ROK to “repel the armed attack and restore international 
peace and security in the area”.
76
  
 Once member states voted for the UN to intervene in Korea, the UN had to formulate 
its plan. Sixteen UN member states provided troops under a UN Joint Command, which 
would fight alongside the South Korean Army.
77
 The Joint Command was dominated by the 
                                                     
72
 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), The Problem of the Independence of Korea, 293 (IV), (General 
Assembly, fourth session, 21 October 1949), pp. 15, 16. 
73
 KFA, Modern Korea. 
74
 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, S/RES/82 
(473
rd
 meeting of the Security Council, 25 June 1950), p. 4.  
75
 The Soviet Union did not vote and Yugoslavia abstained from voting. 
76
 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, S/RES/83 
(474
th
 meeting of the Security Council, 25 June 1950), p. 5. 
77
 The UN Joint Command is the command structure for the multinational military forces supporting South 
Korea during the Korean War. The US, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Colombia, Ethiopia, South Africa, New Zealand, Turkey, Greece, Thailand, Philippines and Luxembourg sent 
51 
 
USA under the command of General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964).
78
 On 15 September 
1950, UN troops landed at Inchon, South Korea. The UN effectively cut the North Korean 
army in half and pushed them out of South Korea. Under the leadership of General 
MacArthur, Allied troops then advanced into the DPRK, despite warnings from the DPRK’s 
ally, China. This resulted in a Chinese attack on UN troops and between November 1950 and 
January 1951, the Chinese managed to push back the UN force. After a clash with the then 
US President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972), General MacArthur was sacked and the war 
degenerated into a stalemate with neither the UN nor the Chinese managing to gain the upper 
hand. While not directly committing forces to the conflict, the Soviet Union provided 
material aid to both the North Korean and Chinese armies.   
 Despite the outbreak of fighting, UNCOK remained in existence and its task 
continued to be to submit reports to the UN, observe the mandate of North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the south, and to keep the UNSC informed of the progress of its resolution. 
UNCOK was officially terminated on 7 October 1950 when the UNGA created the United 
Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) under 
Resolution 376(V).
79
 UNCURK consisted of representatives from Australia, Chile, 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey and assumed the functions of 
UNCOK.  
  On 27 July 1953, the fighting finally ended on the Korean peninsula, when a ceasefire 
was agreed upon between the USA, North Korea and China at Panmunjom (Gyeonggi 
Province, ROK), which has continued to this day. The Korean Armistice Agreement was 
signed by the then US Army Lieutenant General William Harrison Junior (1895–1987), 
representing the UN Command, North Korean General Nam Il (1915–1976), representing the 
North Korean People’s Army, and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. The document was 
designed to “insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea 
until a final peaceful settlement is achieved”.
80
 The Armistice agreed on the permanent 
establishment of a three-mile wide buffer zone, known as the Demilitarised Zone (or DMZ), 
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between the two countries;
81
 put into force a cease-fire, and finalised the repatriation of 




 In the DPRK, the Korean War is far from forgotten and stories of war sacrifices were 
used to bolster the narrative of Kim Il Sung’s “forging of the nation”.
83
 The authorised 
history of North Korea remains that the Fatherland Liberation War was started by the USA, 
and that Kim Il Sung not only defended the nation but wrought devastation on the American 
military.
84
 This rhetoric has continued to date. For example, food aid from the USA provided 
during the famine of the 1990s was reportedly explained to the population as war reparations. 
In both North and South Korea, there remains fear of invasion and infiltration. In the DPRK, 
this fear has been instrumental in maintaining a state of emergency invoked to justify harsh 
governmental rule and its accompanying human rights violations.
85
 In this context, perceived 
political dissidents have been branded as spies in the service of foreign powers and shortages 
in food and other essential means of survival have been blamed on a hostile outside world. 
Nevertheless, with the end of the Korean War in 1953, both the North and South Korean 
governments were left to rebuild. In South Korea the state was supported by the USA, while 
the rebuilding of the DPRK was possible due to the extensive financial and agricultural 




Consolidation of Power by Kim Il Sung 
While Confucian principles have remained enmeshed in Korean culture, in the North they 
were in many ways instrumental to Kim Il Sung’s effort to consolidate his authority and that 
of the WPK under his control.
87
 The relationship between sovereign and subject that is 
expressed as a mutually binding one under Confucian principles has been stretched to one of 
absolute obedience to the North Korean leader. Within the North Korean context, this 
principle is articulated in the Suryong (Supreme Leader) system established by Kim Il Sung 
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and carried on by his son Kim Jong Il (1941–2011) and grandson Kim Jong Un (1983–).
88
 
The Suryong system positioned Kim Il Sung and his heir apparent as unchallenged rulers due 
to their proclaimed wisdom and benevolence under which the general population would live 
in a prosperous and righteous society.  
 In 1953, whilst rebuilding the DPRK after the Korean War, Kim Il Sung sought to 
consolidate further his political power by eliminating anyone perceived to be a threat to his 
position.
89
 Those perceived as threats were imprisoned or exiled to remote agricultural and 
mining villages. Up until this point, North Korean politics had been represented by four 
factions: the Yan’an faction made up of returnees from China, the Soviet Koreans, native 
Korean communists, and Kim Il Sung’s own loyal followers who had fought against Japan in 
the 1930s and 1940s. Kim Il Sung and his followers had the advantage of appearing as 
national heroes due to their resistance against the Japanese and there was no question about 
their patriotism. By contrast, the Yan’an and Soviet Korean groups tended to appear as the 
representatives of other nations.
90
 South Korean communist sympathisers who had defected 
to the North were also accused of espionage and other crimes, and subsequently killed.  
 During a visit to Moscow in 1955, Kim Il Sung was criticised by the Soviet Union for 
practising a Stalinist style cult of personality. On 29 May 1956, at meetings held between 
Soviet officials and the North Korean ambassador to the Soviet Union, Li Sangjo (dates 
unknown), the outspoken North Korean representative, encouraged the Soviet Leader Nikita 
Khrushchev (1894–1971) to criticise Kim Il Sung during their upcoming visit to Moscow.
91
 
Previously, on 25 February 1956 Khrushchev had denounced Joseph Stalin and the “Stalin 
cult” in a speech to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
92
 The 
speech sent shock waves through communist countries, such as the DPRK, Albania, and 
China. In the North Korean context, Li Sangjo criticised Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality, 
the post-war reliance on heavy industry, and the party’s ideological work.
93
 He also charged 
Kim Il Sung with rewriting history to appear as if his guerrilla faction had single-handedly 
liberated the Korean peninsula from the Japanese, completely ignoring the assistance of the 
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 While Kim Il Sung was visiting Moscow to personally meet 
with Khrushchev in June 1956, the Soviets recommended that Kim Il Sung discard the 
personality cult, adhere to the ideas of collective leadership, remove falsified history accounts 
from textbooks, and work towards improving the living standards of the Korean people, 
which remained poor and below pre-war standards. 
 During Kim Il Sung’s visit to Moscow a group of his opponents tried to seize control 
of government in the DPRK.
95
 They denounced Kim Il Sung as a tyrant who practised 
arbitrary, one-man rule and criticised his Stalinist rule. When Kim Il Sung hastily returned 
home, the brief attempt at political liberalisation of the DPRK ended when General O Chin-u 
(1917–1995) dispatched troops to the streets of Pyongyang to prevent any further protests in 
favour of reform.
96
 A series of purges followed from 1956 to 1958, and by 1961 the last 
remaining opposition to Kim Il Sung had disappeared.
97
 In order to sustain the large-scale 




 With the aftermath of the failed 1956 coup and the continued presence of the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army in the DPRK, there was a growing nationalistic mood in 
Pyongyang. Relations with China were strained because of the continued presence of the 
Chinese military following the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.
99
 The army increasingly 
came to be seen as occupation forces but by 1958 the last of the Chinese forces had 
withdrawn from the country. Aside from the presence of Chinese troops in the DPRK, the 
leadership in Beijing was nearly as unenthusiastic about Kim Il Sung as the Soviets. The 
former Chinese leader Mao Zedong criticised Kim Il Sung for having started the whole 
“idiotic war”, referring to the Korean War, and for being an incompetent military commander 
who should have been removed from power.
100
 In the end, however, Kim Il Sung remained in 
power partly because the Soviets turned their attention to the Hungarian Uprising (23 
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October–10 November 1956) and because both the Soviet Union and Chinese governments 
were unable to stop the inevitable purge of Kim Il Sung’s opponents.
101
 From this time, 
relations with both the Soviet Union and China deteriorated. In the case of the Soviet Union 
this was because of the elimination of the pro-Soviet Koreans and in China’s case because of 
the regime’s refusal to acknowledge Chinese assistance in either the liberation of Korea from 
Japan or the Korean War.
102
  
 The gradual rift between China and the USSR that developed in the early 1960s 
caused the DPRK to pursue a delicate balancing act between the two countries but by 1963 
this balance clearly tipped towards Beijing.
103
 The North Korean government joined the 
Chinese in criticising Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Joseph Stalin and for being too 
soft on the USA.
104
 It was said that a “complete agreement of positions” was reached between 
the DPRK and China on all major issues.
105
 Perceived racial, cultural, and historical ties also 
pulled the DPRK closer to China. However, Kim Il Sung eventually decided that he was 
moving too far towards the Chinese government. China was comparatively unindustrialised, 
and could not provide the technical and military assistance Pyongyang sought. Kim Il Sung 




 The fall of Khrushchev from power in 1964 proved advantageous for the DPRK as it 
allowed the North Korean government to pull away from Chinese dominance.
107
 While 
Khrushchev had maintained personal control over Soviet foreign policy the new Soviet 
leadership of Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982) and Alexei Kosygin (1904–1980) had little 
experience and knowledge of international affairs. It was in this situation that Kim Il Sung 
easily convinced them to supply greater financial assistance in several economic ventures, all 
                                                     
101
 The Hungarian Uprising or Revolution was a spontaneous nationwide revolt against the government of the 
Hungarian People’s Republic and its Soviet imposed policies. Despite the failure of the uprising, it was highly 
influential, and ultimately came to play a role in the downfall of the Soviet Union decades later. For further 
information see Christopher Adam, Tibor Egervari, Leslie Laczko and Judy Young (eds), The 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2010).  
102
 Person, “North Korea in 1956”, pp. 448, 471, 494, 505, 515. 
103
 In November 1963, Beijing and Pyongyang signed an agreement to settle their boundary dispute. The 
agreement seems no longer valid today. Daniel Goma, “The Chinese–Korean Border Issue: An Analysis of a 
Contested Frontier”, Asian Survey, 46 (6) (2006), p. 873. 
104
 Goma, “The Chinese–Korean Border Issue”, p. 877. 
105
 Ria Chae, “East German Documents on Kim Il Sung’s Trip to Beijing in April 1975”, North Korea 
International Documentation Project, e-Dossier 17 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 2012), p. 4.  
106
 Charles K. Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations”, North Korea International 
Documentation Project, Working Paper 1 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 2009), pp. 1–4.  
107
 “1964: Khrushchev ‘retires’ as head of USSR”, BBC News, 15 October 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/15/newsid_3797000/3797887.stm (accessed 21 April 2014).  
56 
 
of which the new leadership in Moscow readily agreed to despite their scepticism over Kim Il 
Sung’s domestic and foreign policies.
108
 The Soviet Union believed it to be their duty as a 
fraternal socialist state to keep the DPRK out of the reach of China. In this sense, the Soviet 
Union could feel quite satisfied at the DPRK’s divorce from China after 1964 as well as Kim 
Il Sung’s condemnation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1969).
109
 Kim Il Sung, 
though, did not want to become a Soviet puppet any more than he wanted to become a 
Chinese puppet and so he hurried to restore ties with Beijing as soon as the chaos of the 
Cultural Revolution subsided.
110
 By 1970, most of the instability created by the Cultural 
Revolution had passed and relations with China returned to normal. At the same time, the 
Soviets were again criticised by both Chinese and North Korean officials for being too soft 
on the USA. 
 Meanwhile, the Korean peninsula remained divided and relations with South Korea 
and the USA bitterly hostile. When the US government became engaged in the Vietnam War 
(1956–1975), Kim Il Sung saw an opportunity.
111
 Inspired by the actions of the Communist 
Vietnamese, he began employing his own guerrilla squads to infiltrate the ROK, spread 
propaganda, and commit sabotage. North Korean agents went south between 1966 and 1969, 
creating disruption, but ultimately failing to win over the South Korean population.
112
  
 In July 1972, the first formal summit meeting between Pyongyang and Seoul was held 
but cautious talks did not lead to better relations between the two Koreas.
113
 With the fall of 
South Vietnam to the North Vietnamese on 30 April 1975, Kim Il Sung began to feel that the 
USA had shown its weakness and that reunification of Korea under his regime was finally 
possible. He visited Beijing in May 1975 in the hope of gaining political and military support 
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for his plan to invade South Korea again, but China refused.
114
 Despite public proclamations 
of support, Chinese leaders privately told Kim Il Sung that China would be unable to assist 
the DPRK this time because of the lingering after-effects of the Cultural Revolution 
throughout China, and also because China had recently decided to restore diplomatic 
relations with the USA.
115
 Relations between the DPRK and China remained on an even 
course after the death of Mao Zedong on 9 September 1976, and the North Korean 
government continued its usual balancing act between the Soviet Union and China. 
 Over the coming years Kim Il Sung reduced contact with the Soviet Union and East 
European socialist states and economic assistance from these countries, which had been 
substantial, began to dwindle.
116
 At the same time, Kim Il Sung expanded his cult of 
personality and set out a policy of self-reliance and extreme nationalism known as Juche.   
 
The Juche Ideology  
Initially, North Korea adopted Marxist-Leninist principles in the name of socialism and 
liberating the oppressed Korean people from Japanese colonial rule. Between the 1950s and 
1970s, though, Kim Il Sung and party theorist Hwang Jang-yop (1923–2010) elaborated the 
Juche idea into a set of principles.
117
 The first known reference to Juche was in a speech by 
Kim Il Sung on 28 December 1955, entitled “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and 
Establishing Juche in Ideological Work” (see Appendix 5).
118
 In the speech, Kim Il Sung 
sought to develop his own version of Marxism-Leninism into a North Korean creed.
119
 The 
speech focused on the importance of education and learning Korean history. 
 
To make revolution in Korea we must know Korean history and 
geography as well as the customs of the Korean people. Only then is 
it possible to educate our people in a way that suits them and to 
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It was believed that educating the working people in the North Korean version of the history 
of Korea would “stimulate their national pride and rouse the broad masses to revolutionary 
struggle”. Kim stressed significant past events and how certain outcomes could have been 
prevented in Korean history such as the occupation of the country by Japan.  
 The speech also attempted to justify Kim Il Sung’s purge of political opponents, 
similar to the earlier Yan’an Rectification Movement in China (1942–1944).
121
 The Yan’an 
Rectification Movement was the first ideological mass movement initiated by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and took place at the communist base of Yan’an, a remote area in 
northern Shaanxi Province. More than 10,000 Chinese were killed during the restructuring 
process, as the CCP made efforts to attack intellectuals and replace the culture of the May 
Fourth Movement (4 May 1919) with that of Communist culture.
122
 In the DPRK, from the 
mid-1950s, as Kim Il Sung steered the country away from the influence of the Soviet Union, 
his decision was hastened by news of de-Stalinisation in Moscow, as discussed above.
123
 Kim 
Il Sung saw the new Soviet policies as potentially threatening to his own personal power. It is 
also quite likely that he and the people around him felt a genuine ideological contempt for 
Khrushchev-style socialism, which emphasised individual well-being and material 
prosperity.
124
 In this situation, from 1956 to 1959, Kim Il Sung purged the local pro-Soviet 
officials. Many of these officials had taken part in the unsuccessful 1956 coup.
125
  
 Well into the early 1960s, the political speeches and writings of Kim Il Sung were 
filled with the terminology of Marxism-Leninism but as his own interpretation of socialism 
(the Juche idea) evolved, references to the past ideological system declined. The principles of 
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Juche are quite different to Marx’s socialist ideas. Marx argued for urban workers to unite in 
a global struggle against capitalist exploitation, overthrow landowners, and launch the 
socialist phase of history.
126
 Marx envisioned the eventual weakening of the state and the 
dissolution of all social and economic classes and predicted that humanity would achieve an 
egalitarian utopia without government or social and economic distinctions.
127
 In contrast, 
Kim Il Sung saw the state as an all-encompassing and benevolent defender of nationalism, 
and positioned himself as the national leader of the masses. These principles turn Kim Il Sung 
into an absolutist, supreme leader, while the working class are not to think for themselves, but 
instead to think through him.
128
 Kim Il Sung is positioned at the top of the working class, 
meaning that he is their only legitimate representative and the safest reference.
129
 Class 
struggle in the DPRK context can only be realised therefore through Kim Il Sung and 
difficult tasks and revolutionary changes can only be introduced through and by Kim Il Sung 
himself.
130
 Consequently, Kim Il Sung is the leading force of the working class and is 
represented as a flawless human being, who never commits mistakes, is always benevolent, 
and always rules for the masses.
131
  
 On 14 April 1965, Kim Il Sung outlined the three fundamental principles of the Juche 
idea in his speech “On Socialist Construction and the South Korean Revolution” at the 
Academy of Social Sciences of Indonesia.
132
 The three principles included: “political 
independence”, “economic self-sustenance” and “self-reliance in defence”. “Political 
independence” refers to the society’s sacred right to assert its sovereignty to protect itself 
from alleged imperialist exploitation and ideological suppression.
133
 There is no room for 
individual independence or freedom, as individuals are required to assimilate fully into 
society’s collective whole and to submit to the common good. “Economic self-sustenance” 
was proclaimed by Kim Il Sung when the nation’s grain production was still yielding 
surpluses, exports of minerals were flowing steadily to the Communist bloc and heavy 
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industry was turning the North Korean military into a highly mechanised and mobile force.
134
 
An independent North Korean economy was to distinguish itself from a capitalist economy 
by aiming to meet the demands of the country and by generating personal profit.
135
 Heavy 
industry was to be the cornerstone of the economy while light industry and agriculture were 
less important because they did not contribute directly to the production of arms and 
ammunitions.
136
 “Self-reliance in defence”, is a fundamental principle of an independent 
state, while imperialism is its key villain.
137
 The best defence against the imperialist war of 
aggression is the perpetual preparedness to counter its violence with violence. In this context, 
the entire North Korean population was mobilised to support the nation’s defence. From this 
time, the Songun or “military first” era began when a young Kim Jong Il, together with his 




 For the Juche principles to function uncontested, a unitary ideological system had to 
be in place.
139
 In 1970, Kim Jong Il organised the Fifth Party Congress of the KWP, which 
proclaimed Juche as the monolithic ideology of the DPRK and further enhanced his father’s 
cult of personality, thereby setting in motion the process for his own succession. The “Ten 
Principles for a Monolithic Ideological System” (see Appendix 6) set out ten principles and 
65 clauses which establish standards for governance and guidance for the population’s 
behaviour. 
140
 The Monolithic Ideological System emerged in the context of internal policy 
debates within the WPK and the external challenges posed by the Sino-Soviet split (1960–
1989).
141
 Kim Il Sung implemented the system in order to suppress internal dissent and 
cement his family’s dominance over the North Korean political system.
142
 The Ten Principles 
have come to supersede the state Constitution as announcements by the WPK and in practice 
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serve as the supreme law of the country.
143
 The principles must be memorised by every 
citizen and they call for absolute loyalty and obedience to the Kim dynasty.
144
 The principles 
are integral to the political and daily lives of the people and are to be exercised through daily 




 From the 1970s, Juche was transformed into a highly elaborate and structured belief 
system based on the semi-deification of Kim Il Sung and his family.
146
 As the North Korean 
government exercised total control over all aspects of society, this was used to perpetuate a 
cult of personality surrounding the Kims.
147
 It was also during this time that Kim Jong Il 
mentioned the term “Kimilsungism” and not long after the “Kimilisungismisation of the 
Whole Society” campaign was launched.
148
 This campaign strengthened and legitimised the 
position of Kim Jong Il within the WPK.
149
 According to political analyst Jae-cheon Lim, 
“Kimilsungism” refers to the thoughts of Kim Il Sung and is interchangeable with the Juche 
idea.
150
 In 1976, in a speech “On Correctly Understanding the Originality of Kimilsungism”, 
Kim Jong Il said that Kimilsungism comprises the “Juche idea and a far-reaching 
revolutionary theory and leadership method evolved from this idea”.
151
 In the past, Kim Il 
Sung’s thoughts had been described by the official media as “contemporary Marxism-
Leninism”, but by calling it “Kimilsungism”, Kim Jong Il was trying to elevate it to the same 
level as Maoism, Hoxhaism, and Stalinism.
152
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 Kim Jong Il argued that Kim Il Sung’s thoughts had evolved, and therefore deserved 




Kimilsungism is an original idea that cannot be explained within the 
frameworks of Marxism–Leninism. The idea of Juche which 
constitutes the quintessence of Kimilsungism is an idea newly 









The revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a revolutionary theory, 
which has provided solutions to problems arising in the revolutionary 
practice in a new age different from the era that gave rise to 
Marxism–Leninism. On the basis of Juche (idea), the leader gave a 
profound explanation of the theories, strategies and tactics of national 
liberation, class emancipation and human liberation in our era. Thus, 
it can be said that the revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a 




The ideas of Juche and Kimilsungism were, in essence, the “expressions of North Korean 
particularism over supposedly more universalistic Marxism–Leninism”.
157
 In many ways, it 
signalled a move from socialism to nationalism.
158
 This was made clear in the speech of 
1982, when the DPRK celebrated Kim Il Sung’s 70th birthday, where love for the nation 
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came before love for socialism.
159
 This particularism gave birth to such concepts as “A theory 
of the Korean nation as number one” and “Socialism of Our Style”, discussed below.
160
  
 Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality became an important instrument of Kim Jong Il’s 
consolidation of his own succession, as his father was the main source of his legitimacy to 
rule the nation.
161 
Kim Jong Il spent twenty years preparing for his succession and was able to 
sideline his uncle and win the confidence of his father, particularly through his efforts to 
expand the cult of personality of the Kim family.
162
 In 1980, Kim Jong Il was appointed to 
the Presidium of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission.
163
 At this stage, he was 
officially ranked fifth in the North Korean leadership system. At this time, only Kim Il Sung 
and Kim Jong Il held positions in all three of the Party’s leadership bodies (the Politburo, 
Secretariat and Central Military Commission). While Kim Il Sung’s highly personalised 
approach to running the country had involved the Party in decision-making and governance 
processes, Kim Jong Il adopted a highly centralised, top-down leadership style that often 
relied on informal channels. Kim Jong Il subsequently shifted decision-making on all policies 
and personnel appointments from the Politburo to the Party Secretariat Office, his base of 
power.
164
 This move helped to strengthen his support base and his legitimacy to succeed his 
father.   
  
The “Socialism of Our Style” Ideology  
On 27 December 1990, Kim Jong Il introduced the ideological concept of “Socialism of Our 
Style” in his speech “Socialism of Our Country is a Socialism of Our Style as Embodied by 
the Juche idea”.
165
 The speech was delivered to the Senior Officials of the Central Committee 
of the KWP. In the speech, Kim Jong Il stated that: 
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the experiences of the Soviet Union in socialist construction is, in 
every point, the reflection of the then historical conditions and the 




The experiences of the Soviet Union however, can “hardly accord fully with the specific 
situation of other countries”.
167
 Speaking about communist regimes in the Eastern Bloc (but 
not the Soviet Union), Kim Jong Il claimed that it was because these countries “transplanted 
Soviet-style socialism on their lands” that socialism did not “display its advantages to the 
full” and thus led to the failure of the system within their countries.
168
 These countries had 
failed to understand that the Soviet experience was based on specific historical and social 
circumstances, which could not be used by other countries aside from the Soviet Union 
itself.
169
 It was within this context that Kim Jong Il explicitly stated that the DPRK survived 
because of its own style of socialism.
170
  
 Kim Jong Il is said to have stated that North Korea was “once a backward, colonial 
semi-feudal society” but when the communists came to power in 1945, the interim 
government “could not literally accept the Marxist theory which had been advanced on the 
premises of the socio-historical conditions of the developed European capitalist countries or 
the Leninist theory”.
171
 The government, therefore, had to find an ideological solution to the 
country’s own socio-historical conditions. Kim Jong Il states that it was immediately after the 
liberation of Korea that the interim government started to build a country guided by its own 
ideological thought of Juche.
172
 The situation in the DPRK was seen to be more complex than 
that of the Soviet Union as Korea was divided into North and South and the North was in 
“direct confrontation with the US imperialists”.
173
 Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are said to 
have addressed these concerns by putting “forward original lines and policies suited to our 
people’s aspirations and the specific situation of our country”.
174
 By reflecting on the 
“people’s desire and demand for independence”, Kim Il Sung is said to have personally 
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created the Juche idea, thus providing a new guiding ideology for the DPRK.
175
 This was to 
become the foundation for “Socialism of Our Style”.  
 In stating that “Socialism of Our Style” was “a man-centered [sic] Socialism”, Kim 
Jong Il breaks away from basic Marxist–Leninist thought which argues that material forces 
are the driving force of historical progress, not people.
176
 The DPRK considers human beings 
in general as the driving force in history, which is summarised as the “popular masses are 
placed in the center of everything, and the leader is the center of the masses”.
177
 Therefore, 
“Socialism of Our Style” was presented as an organic socio-political theory, using the 
language of Marxism–Leninism, although no reference is made to Marxist–Leninist thought, 
instead containing populist and organic nationalist concepts. Kim Jong Il describes this in his 
speech “Socialism of Our Country is a Socialism of Our Style as Embodied by the Juche 
idea”. 
 
The political and ideological might of the motive force of revolution 
is nothing but the power of single-hearted unity between the leader, 
the Party, and the masses. In our socialist society, the leader, the 
Party, and the masses throw in their lot with one another, forming a 
single socio-political organism. The consolidation of blood relations 
between the leader, the Party and the masses is guaranteed by the 
single ideology and united leadership.
178  
 
Within the socio-political organism, the “monolithic ideology” of Juche is realised based on 
the leader’s ideas and the DPRK’s unified leadership, which is ensured by the leader’s 
guidance.
179
 The DPRK has “established the monolithic ideological system firmly through 
the Party and society and consolidated and developed it from generation to generation”.
180
 
Kim Jong Il states that the leadership and WPK have been able to achieve unbreakable unity 
and cohesion of the Party based on the Juche ideology.  
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Kim Il Sung held the position of General Secretary of the WPK until his death in July 1994, 
simultaneously holding the office of Prime Minister from 1948 to 1972 and the office of 
President from 1972 to 1994. With the death of Kim Il Sung the presidential post was written 
out of the 1998 DPRK Constitution, and Kim Il Sung was designated the country’s “Eternal 
President” (Preamble). Three years after the death of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il assumed 
official power in 1998. It is unclear why Kim Jong Il waited to take power after his father’s 
death but if he had assumed power hastily, it could have exhibited greed, insecurity in his 
legitimacy, and a lack of respect for his (and the nation’s) father.
181
 To this day, the 
sanctification of Kim Il Sung and his family remains a legacy in North Korean society as the 
written and spoken words of the Kims are the safest reference point for the people.
182
 As a 
result, the political discourse of the Kims, in particular Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and in 
more recent years Kim Jong Un,  affect the construction of a wide range of social issues from 
the judicial system to the rights of Korean women and gender relations.
183
  
Events in the DPRK during the 1990s, such as the influence of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1992, the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 and the economic and food crisis in 
the mid-1990s will be discussed in detail in chapter 6. These events not only influenced the 
political dynamics of the country as power was handed from Kim Il Sung to his son Kim 
Jong Il, they also influenced the roles of North Korean men and women. In particular, the 
economic and food crisis challenged, to some extent, the roles of men and women in the 
home and North Korean society.  
  In the following chapter, I trace the promulgation of North Korean laws between 
1945 and 2010 with a specific focus on women’s rights and gender relations. I focus on three 
broad periods: the revolutionary period (1945–1950), the Juche period (1951–1990), and the 
period 1991–2010, known as “Our Style”. Initially, the key to the government’s promotion of 
gender equality was to bring women out of the home and into the labour force. It can be seen 
in the North Korean legal system that the government’s policies on women’s rights 
progressed as the construction efforts and economic development of the country advanced. 
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Although state laws socialised childcare and housework, these laws also assumed that 
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3. North Korea’s Legal System and Gender 
Equality (1946–2010) 
 
By the enactment of the Law on Sex Equality, Korean 
women came to have equal rights in all areas of political, 
economy, culture and social life... Of course, the 
enactment of this law does not guarantee women’s 
emancipation completely. We have still many things to do 
for women’s substantive equal rights. 






In 1946, the Provisional People’s Committee of North Korea (the interim government in the 
northern region of Korea) reformed the legal system in the north of Korea under the guidance 
of the Soviet Union.
2
 For the first time in Korean history, the North Korean government 
included provisions in state laws that addressed and promoted gender equality. The 
Committee institutionalised a series of interconnected laws on labour, the family and 
marriage, health care, education, nursing and childrearing.
3
 It was through these laws that the 
government promoted the importance of women exercising equal rights and fundamental 
freedoms.
4
 The North Korean government maintains that Korean men and women are 
guaranteed equal rights before the law and that both genders are entitled to equal protection 
by the state.
5
 The role of the government, therefore, is to ensure that women have the 
conditions to advance, through legislative, administrative, and other appropriate measures to 
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provide basic freedoms and rights of citizens in political, economic, social, and cultural life. 
The government maintains that it has taken practical legal measures so that all North Koreans 
can realise their rights and that as a result “all female citizens find themselves in the position 
of masters of the State and society”.
6
 The government also states that due to state legislation, 
gender equality policies and preferential treatment of North Korean women, they now have 
“a strong position in society and are contributing vigorously to the social and economic 
development of the country”.
7
  
 In this chapter, I focus on gender equality provisions in the North Korean legal 
system. The chapter is divided broadly into three sections. First, I examine the revolutionary 
period (1945–1950), when gender equality was emphasised. It is said that during this time 
Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) focused on the “women’s question” by promoting their right to 
participate in all aspects of society. Next, I examine the Juche period (1951–1990), and the 
government’s focus on women’s roles in the home. I then examine the period from 1991 to 
2010 or the “Our Style” period, which includes when the DPRK communicated with the 
United Nations (UN). This is also the period of famine and extreme economic problems in 
the DPRK. The analysis of North Korean laws and policy statements between 1945 and 2010 
reveals the assumptions of the North Korean government concerning the role that men 
perform in the home as primary financial providers and women as primary carers. State laws 
and policies also ensure that women are able to return to the workforce to fill a labour 
shortage. However, this is achieved by the socialisation of household chores, which the North 
Korean government assumes are tasks that women perform.   
 
The Revolutionary Period and North Korean Laws (1945–1950) 
Shortly after the liberation of Korea in 1945, the Provisional People’s Committee of North 
Korea, under the guidance of the Soviet Union officials and military, revoked all existing 
laws from the Japanese colonial period.
8
 Some laws had to be reinstated, though, to maintain 
public order until new laws could be promulgated.
9
 Internationally, during June 1945 the 
Charter of the United Nations (UN) was signed at the conclusion of the UN Conference on 
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International Organisation. The Charter entered into force on 24 October 1945, after being 
ratified by the original five permanent members of the Security Council—the Republic of 
China (later replaced by the People’s Republic of China), France, the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom, the US and a majority of the other signatories. Article 1 of the Charter 
protects the rights of men and women by stating: “To achieve international co-operation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, 
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” Also in 1945, during the Allied 
Occupation of Japan, the Japanese electoral law was revised allowing women over the age of 
twenty the right to vote. French women were able to vote from 1946. 
Within North Korea, the new legal code introduced in 1946 included revised 
provisions from the colonial period and a Soviet-based judicial structure. North Korea 
followed the Soviet pattern in terms of court structure and the offices of public procurators.
10
 
Soviet advisors to the Provisional People’s Committee also had a role in drafting the 1948 
DPRK Constitution.
11
 Despite the influence of the Soviet Union on the early development of 
the North Korean state, the North Korean government did not adhere to the early Soviet idea 
of limiting the enjoyment of rights to the proletariat at the expense of the bourgeoisie.
12
 Only 
those categorised as opponents to North Korea, primarily those who had earlier collaborated 
with the Japanese occupying forces, were deprived of rights.
13
 The North Korean government 
imprisoned or purged those deemed “hostile” to the state. By gathering the support of 
underprivileged groups, Kim Il Sung consolidated his power.
14
 Previously, the Korean 
communists who had spent years in China attempting to mobilise resistance groups had also 
employed this method as a way to consolidate political power.
15
 
 From 1946, the North Korean interim government aimed to improve the lives of 
underprivileged groups and mobilise these people into large social organisations in support of 
new policies for nation building. Land reform helped to establish support among the poor 
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peasant majority of society,
16
 while gender equality reforms established support among 
women. The support of these groups, particularly in the early years of the country, was 
essential in ensuring the new government’s survival. The Kim Il Sung regime deemed it 
necessary to embrace as many people as possible in an effort to make North Korea strong and 
resist the threat of foreign intervention. This meant that rights were said to be applicable to 
the vast majority of the populace irrespective of factors such as gender and social class. By 
gathering many of the underprivileged groups in support of the regime rather than focusing 




 Welfare rights such as equal access to healthcare, education and land to work were an 
important part of the early development of the North Korean legal system. This can be seen 
in the promulgation of the Law on Agrarian Reform in North Korea  (1946), the Labour Law 
for Factory and Office Workers in North Korea (1946), and the Law on the Equality of the 
Sexes (1946).
18
 The importance placed on these rights stems primarily from the practical 
realities confronting new socialist regimes such as North Korea.
19
 Marx had envisaged the 
gradual reduction of any need for rights in his materially abundant post-revolutionary society, 
which was to be based on the egalitarian principle of “from each according to his ability, to 
each according to his need”, but the reality of post-liberated North Korea was quite 
different.
20
 On coming to power, socialist regimes, including North Korea, are often faced 
with conditions of social and economic deprivation, usually in a post-colonial or a war-torn 
context and sometimes both.
21
 Within this context the North Korean government stressed 
welfare rights to ensure people were able to work, to foster rapid social and economic 
development and to raise the living standards of the people.  
 Although welfare provisions in state laws are a common feature of socialist states, 
North Korean rights thinking also refers to the Confucian idea that the provision of welfare is 
the principal obligation of the government.
22
 The Confucian element in North Korea’s 
development and the emphasis on welfare rights is in accordance with the teachings of the 
Confucian disciple Mencius (most accepted dates: 372–289BCE), and the notion of 
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“benevolent government”, which imposed a sacred obligation on the ruler to govern 
exclusively in the interests of the populace.
23
 The legitimacy of the ruler was deemed to be 
contingent upon the ability to guarantee the sustenance and livelihood of the people. In the 
case of North Korea, the “benevolent leader” (Kim Il Sung) provides rights to those who are 
loyal to the state and the Kim family.   
  The principles of socialism and Confucianism can be seen in the laws promulgated 
from 1946, which aimed to protect vulnerable groups such as Korean women, whilst also 
encouraging loyalty to the state.  
 
The Twenty-Point Platform (1946) 
In March 1946, the interim government drafted the Twenty-Point Platform  as a short-term 
measure to protect the rights and interests of the North Korean people (see Appendix 7).
24
 
The North Korean historian Baik Bong describes the Platform as a nationalistic document 
that was a “brilliant political program of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic 
revolution, a thoroughly Juche creative programme”.
25
 The Platform made a clear delineation 
between people who were entitled to rights and the “enemy”, who were not.
26
 The latter 
group were described as “reactionaries”, “fascists” and “anti-democratic forces”, who had 
been involved with pro-Japanese elements and had collaborated with the Japanese authorities 
during the colonial period.
27
 The Twenty-Point Platform encompassed a broad range of 
human rights, including equal legal rights for all (Article 5), the guarantee of an eight-hour 
working day for workers and the guarantee of a standard minimum wage (Article 14), a 
compulsory education system (Article 16) and free medical treatment for the poor (Article 
20).
28
 However, the Platform did not directly address the rights of Korean women.  
Below I outline three key laws promulgated by the North Korean government in 1946 
that addressed the situation of North Koreans, particularly women.  
 
The Law on Agrarian Reform in North Korea (1946) 
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On 5 March 1946, as part of the reform process to dismantle the Japanese colonial social 
structure, the Law on Agrarian Reform in North Korea was promulgated. Article 1 stated that 
all “land previously belonging to Japanese and Korean property owners will be confiscated” 
(Article 1) and then redistributed amongst households based upon labour ability and the 
number of family members, regardless of gender (Article 15).
29
 The Law was important for 
Korean women who were heads of households, as they would never have previously enjoyed 
land ownership under the old patriarchal system. The Law was also a critical part of the 
nation-building process as it gave peasants the rights to land.
30
 With the land reform, the 
traditional class structure in Korean society was challenged as the ruling class, made up of 
property owners, capitalists and religious institutions, lost all ownership of their land, 
livestock and houses without any monetary compensation.
31
 Disadvantaged peasants were 
given their own land to cultivate according to the number of family members and labour 
capacity.  
Those who had previously owned a large amount of land did not agree with the 
government’s decision to confiscate their property and redistribute it based on equality and 
not wealth. Therefore, during the land reform there were random acts of violence in 
opposition to the government’s decision but nothing like the bloodshed that accompanied the 
land reforms in the Soviet Union, China, or the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam).
32
 In 
each of these countries, thousands of people were wrongly accused of being landowners and 
were killed by each respective government. In the case of North Korea, the land reform 
process was rapid and implemented successfully with little violence.
33
 Close to 673,000 
households of landless peasants, smallholding peasants, agricultural labourers, and relocated 
ex-landlords received the newly distributed lands.
34
 By the end of 1949, the newly-
established agricultural class represented 74.1 per cent of the entire North Korean 
population.
35
 The Law on Agrarian Reform successfully dismantled the old feudal society in 
North Korea and created a new society under the control of the new socialist regime. 
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The Labour Law for Factory and Office Workers in North Korea (1946) 
Three months after the implementation of the land reform, the Provisional People’s 
Committee promulgated the Labour Law for Factory and Office Workers in North Korea 
(Labour Law) on 24
 
June 1946. The Law was adapted from the Soviet Union’s Labour Codes 
of 1912 and 1922, as well as the Twenty-Point Platform which had been established just four 
months earlier.
36
 While the Platform listed the tasks needed to end workforce practices from 
the colonial period and listed the ways to establish democratic rule for workers,
37
 the Labour 
Law validated the working rights of all North Korean people. Beneficiaries of the law 
included labourers and office workers of national organisations, corporations, individual 
entrepreneurs, and business institutions.
38
 The government focused primarily on factory 
workers, as there was a sizable urban working class already within the country.
39
 The 
Japanese colonial government, from the late 1920s and into the 1930s, had concentrated 
efforts to develop and expand the industrial base in Korea. This was especially true in the 
areas of heavy industry, such as chemical plants, steel mills and arms production.
40
 The 
Japanese military felt it would be beneficial to have production closer to the source of raw 
materials and closer to potential front lines for a future war with China.
41
 Therefore, the 
working class in North Korea had already increased significantly during the industrialisation 
of the country in the colonial period.  
 The Labour Law stipulates that all workers should have an eight-hour working day 
(Article 1), but those aged between 14 and 16 years would have a six or seven hour working 
day (Articles 2 and 3). No one under the age of 14 years was to work (Article 4). All workers 
should receive equal pay for equal work (Article 7). The Law also included for the first time 
provisions for pregnant women and working mothers. Article 15 prohibits assigning pregnant 
or nursing women overtime or night work, and stipulates transferring a pregnant woman to 
easier work with equal pay. Nursing women are also allowed to take baby-feeding breaks 
with pay (Article 16). There is also provision for seventy-seven days of maternity leave with 
full pay (Article 18). Although these provisions were an advance, the North Korean 
government defined the primary role of women as mothers, with no recognition that male 
workers may also be fathers. No provisions have been included in the Law to suggest that 
men are a part of the childrearing process or need assistance to fulfil their roles in society. 
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Further, the Labour Law does not include provisions to protect working women who may not 
be mothers. For instance, there is no mention of unfair dismissal on grounds other than being 
a mother. 
 
The Law on Equality of the Sexes (1946) 
One month after the promulgation of the Labour Law, Kim Il Sung is said to have personally 
promulgated the Law on the Equality of the Sexes on 30 July 1946.
42
 At the time, some 
members of the Yan’an group expressed their apprehension towards the institution of gender 
equality, as they believed that addressing gender equality was an attack on the deep-seated 
patriarchal values in Korean society.
43
 North Korea claims to be the first country in Asia to 
address discrimination against women in its legal system.
44
 However, provisions were 
included in the 1930 Chinese Civil Code by the Nationalist government (1927–1948) during 
the Republic of China (1912–1949). The Chinese Civil Code regarded men and women as 
individual persons, equal in status, rights and obligations. In particular, daughters obtained 
equal rights to inherit their fathers’ property, wives gained mostly equal rights to marry and 
divorce and men and women shared nearly equal rights over their children.
45
 Nevertheless, 
the Chinese Civil Code was hardly adopted or implemented due to the chaotic political 
situation and the brief rule of the Nationalist government.
46
 In the DPRK, similarities in 
provisions to ensure gender equality can be seen between the North Korean Law on the 
Equality of the Sexes and the earlier 1936 Soviet Constitution, which are discussed below. 
The Law on the Equality of the Sexes included provisions on the protection of 
women’s welfare rights and rights during marital relationships. Article 1 of the Law was 
closely modelled after Article 122 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution which stipulates equal 
rights for women in all spheres of economic, social, cultural and political life. The North 
Korean Law includes provisions for women to vote and be elected to local and supreme 
organs (Article 2), have equal access to labour, pay, social insurance and education (Article 
3), and to own or inherit land (Article 8). The law provides equal rights for women to marry 
and divorce freely (Article 4 and Article 5); and the legal age for females to marry is set at 17 
years and for males 18 years (Article 6). Although the North Korean government officially 
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recognises divorce in this provision, the state took measures from the mid-1950s to 
discourage divorce.
47
 The government states in its report to the United Nations Committee on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, however, that the 
comparatively small number of divorces in the DPRK is not due to any legislation that makes 
divorce difficult but because since “olden times, it has been a traditional national custom 
peculiar to the Korean people for a married couple to live together until they die”.
48
 Divorce 
from spouses branded “bad elements” is granted comparatively easily to either gender and, in 
fact, is often strongly encouraged by the government.
49
  
According to Jiyoung Song, the main purpose of the Law on the Equality of the Sexes 
was to embrace women as former victims of human rights violations experienced under 
Japanese colonial rule, in order to mobilise them as a solid labour force for the process of 
nation building.
50
 This can be seen in Article 9 of the Law, which stipulates, “[a]long with the 
promulgation of this law the Japanese imperialist laws and regulations relating to the rights of 
Korean women shall be nullified”. This can also be seen in Article 7 of the Law, which 
protects women against violations such as polygamy, trafficking, concubinage, licensed or 
unlicensed prostitution and the Kisaeng system.
51
 This was a repudiation of the recent 
memory of the exploitation of Korean women by the Japanese colonists in the licensed 
prostitution system and in the enforced prostitution/military sexual slavery system of the 
Second World War (1939–1945).
52
 As we shall see below, the North Korean government 
stated in 2002 that the “traffic in women and prostitution [of women] are regarded as the 
most shameful crime” and claimed that there has been no reported case for many years.
53
 
Instead, the government points to the colonial period, stating, “[t]here used to be the systems 
of licensed or unlicensed prostitution, Kisaeng, and traffic in women in the days of the 
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 The government insists that immediately after the liberation of 
Korea in 1945, the strict legal prohibition against the prostitution and trafficking of women 
was recognised in Article 7 of the Law on the Equality of the Sexes.
55
 
 Even though the Law on Equality of the Sexes was the first legal document in Korea 
to outline the rights of women to participate in society, to vote, and receive equal pay, social 
insurance, and education, the North Korean government did not address many issues faced by 
Korean women. Issues not addressed include discrimination against Korean women in society 
and the continual description of their roles as mothers without the equal responsibility of men 
within the home to care for children. It can be said, therefore, that this law was intended to be 
an initial foundation for future laws. However, it would be another sixty-four years before the 
North Korean legal system once again addressed the rights of women in the Women’s Rights 
Act (2010), discussed below.  
 
The DPRK Constitution (1948) 
In April 1947, the first Constitution of North Korea was drafted at the Second Party Congress 
of the Democratic Party.
56
 The structure of the proposed Constitution was based on the 
Twenty-Point Party Platform (see Appendix 7).
57
 The draft Constitution was then presented 
at a Provisional People’s meeting on 6 February 1947. It was not immediately instituted as 
the draft needed to be approved by the Soviet Union, which was overseeing the initial nation 
building stage. Several recommendations were made before the final approval of the 
Constitution at the first Supreme People’s Assembly on 8 September 1948.
58
 Internationally, 
on 10 December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the 
United Nations General Assembly. For the first time, fundamental human rights were 
universally affirmed. Under Article 2 of the Declaration everyone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth, without distinction of any kind according to race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status. Under the Declaration the right of women to marry freely (Article 16), to own 
property (Article 17), and the right to participate in government was also protected. Some of 
these provisions had been included in the Law on the Equality of the Sexes, as noted above. 
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Within the DPRK, the procedure employed to establish the 1948 Constitution closely 
followed the Soviet model.
59
 For example, Article 31 of the 1948 North Korean Constitution 
was closely modelled after Article 123 of the 1936 USSR Constitution, which stipulates 
“[e]quality of rights of citizens of the USSR irrespective of their nationality or race in all 
spheres of economic state, cultural, social and political life is an indefensible law”. Article 31 
of the 1948 DPRK Constitution stipulates, “The national minorities who have the citizenship 
of the DPRK are guaranteed equal rights with Korean citizens”. The protection of ethnic 
minority rights though, was less of a social issue in the relatively homogeneous North Korea. 
As a result, the North Korean government deleted Article 31 from its 1972 Constitution.
60
 
North Korea’s first Constitution was not replaced until 1972.
61
  
 In the first Constitution, the list of rights was extremely broad-ranging and many were 
lifted directly from the Ten-Point Programme of the Association for the Restoration of the 
Fatherland (see Appendix 3) and the Twenty-Point Platform.
62
 Both the Programme and 
Platform ensured the social and political rights of all people with particular focus on women 
and vulnerable groups. The 1948 DPRK Constitution also reaffirmed provisions in existing 
laws, which guaranteed the welfare rights of people regardless of gender. For example, 
Article 22 stipulates that women “in the DPRK are accorded equal rights with men in all 
spheres of government, political, economic, social, and cultural activity” (Article 22). There 
are also provisions on the advancement of women’s access to education, training, and 
employment (Article 15 and Article 18), which would also be elaborated upon in laws and 
regulations in the following years.
63
 The Constitution also provided what it calls special 
protection to mothers and children (Article 22), and marriage and the family (Article 23).
64
 
This “protection” of the family also features in the 1972 DPRK Constitution and each of the 
1992 and 1998 amended Constitutions stipulating, “[m]arriage and the family shall be 
protected by the State”. Although the 1948 DPRK Constitution confirmed provisions for 
women included in previous laws such as equal rights with men in all spheres of political, 
economic, social and cultural activity, the North Korean government also awarded “special 
protection” to mothers and children. The government reinforced gender stereotypes of the 
division of labour in the home with provisions for women based on their roles as mothers. 
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 Internationally, two years after the DPRK promulgated the state’s first Constitution, 
the new Communist government of the People’s Republic of China promulgated the New 
Marriage Law on 1 May 1950. The Chinese leader Mao Zedong is said to have personally 
established this law.
65
 The New Marriage Law challenged the patriarchal marriage traditions 
of arranged or forced marriage and concubine. Before the promulgation of this Law Chinese 
women could not seek a divorce.
66
 The New Marriage Law became an essential part of the 
Chinese land reform as women in rural communities stopped being sold to land owners. By 
this time the DPRK had already addressed the rights of women in marriage in the 1946 Law 
of Equality of the Sexes. It would be several years later in 1990 though, that the North 
Korean government would return to address in detail women’s rights within marriage in the 
Family Law, which is discussed below.  
 In the following section, I will examine the influence of the Juche ideology and the 
legal protection of gender equality in the DPRK between 1951 and 1990.  
 
The Juche Ideology and North Korean Laws (1951–1990) 
While Marxism-Leninism is still important in the DPRK, Juche has superseded this ideology 
as the official state ideology, as we have seen above.
67
 Kim Il Sung is said to have 
progressively developed Juche into a nationalist ideology, resting on three pillars of political 
sovereignty, an independent economy and military self-defence.
68
 Juche is not limited to the 
spheres of politics, economics or defence, though, as the ideology permeates all aspects of 
North Korean society, including the state’s development of gender equality laws. As part of 
the North Korean government’s aim to develop an independent economy, it emphasised the 
need for women to join the labour force. It became clear that the government was less 
interested in women’s rights than ensuring that there was a large enough labour force to build 
the country. The government insisted that by promulgating laws to protect women’s rights 
and encouraging them to join the labour force as paid workers the groundwork for women’s 
liberation was achieved. It was within this context that the government socialised childrearing 
and the pre-packaging of food to encourage more women to leave the home to participate in 
the official economy. Laws such as the Law on Nursing and Upbringing of Children  (1976) 
and the Family Law  (1990) ensured working mothers better working conditions. However, 
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there was an assumption that all North Korean women were mothers or would be in the 
future. North Korean laws during this time focused on the role of women as the primary 
carers and never considered that men could share household chores.
69
 As a result, women 
continued to suffer from the double burden of being responsible for the majority of household 
chores while being directed to relatively low status and low paying occupations in the 




The DPRK Constitution (1972) 
The North Korean government adopted the amended Constitution at the Fifth Session of the 
Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) on 27 December 1972. This action brought the old 
Constitution of 1948 into line with the political system and state ideology of Juche. Although 
Marxist-Leninism had been the primary doctrine for the early formation of the North Korean 
state and legal system, in 1972 the Juche philosophy officially replaced this ideology in the 
Constitution.
71
 The later Constitution confirmed provisions in the 1948 Constitution, such as 
eight-hour work days (Article 30), free education and training for all North Koreans (Article 
45 to Article 47), and free medical services (Article 56). The amended Constitution also 
emphasised the mobilisation of female workers by protecting the rights of working mothers.
72
 
Article 77 stipulates special protection of mothers and children by providing maternity leave, 
reduced working hours for mothers with many children, providing a wide network of 
maternity hospitals, crèches and kindergartens, and other measures. Article 49 of the 1972 
DPRK Constitution stipulates that the state “shall maintain all children of preschool age in 
crèches and kindergartens at State and public expense”. This provides women with facilities 
to care for their children while they are working in the official economy. The North Korean 
government has continued to define the role of women as mothers and then by their 
contribution to society. These provisions are not equally provided to men, who may also be 
working parents. Instead, the government’s gendered lens has tied women to gendered 
stereotypes. 
 
The Law on the Nursing and Upbringing of Children (1976) 
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On 29 April 1976, the North Korean government promulgated the Law on the Nursing and 
Upbringing of Children.
73
 The Law provides for all North Korean children to be cared for in 
nurseries and kindergartens at state and public expense (Article 2); or parents are free to raise 
their children in their homes, instead of sending them to nurseries (Article 3). Childcare is 
provided for children from the ages of 3 months to 4 years in nurseries and from 5 years to 7 
years in kindergartens. The Law includes provisions to maintain a high standard of feeding 
and encourage the physical development of children, as well as assuring hygiene and 
epidemic prevention in childcare facilities (Article 6, Article 7 and Article 28). Operationally, 
social cooperative organisations are obliged to maintain the material conditions of nurseries 
and kindergartens at levels determined by the government (Article 12 and Article 15). The 
Law also makes a commitment to the care of women during pregnancy and after childbirth by 
providing maternity benefits (Article 20). The nurseries and kindergartens are under the 
direct control of the central education and public health organs and the local power organs 
(Article 47). Each city (or district) or county also has a food-processing factory or workshop 
to help lift the burden of housework (Articles 54 to Article 56). The Law on Rearing and 
Education of Children includes new provisions such as the right for working mothers to 
access nurseries and kindergartens at state expense, once again defining women as mothers. 
The Law confirms the government’s gendered view that the home is a woman’s primary 
workplace and thus provides provisions to ensure they are able to join the labour force. The 
law does not address the responsibility of men in the home but instead reinforces the sexual 
division of labour. 
 
The Family Law (1990) 
The North Korean government promulgated the Family Law on 24 October 1990. This 
addresses several areas of men and women’s lives from marriage and divorce to childrearing 
and parental responsibility. The Law stipulates that the “State shall provide material 
conditions for mothers to bring up and educate children soundly” (Article 6). This Article 
shows that childrearing responsibilities rest firmly on the shoulders of women and that the 
government does not recognise the equal responsibility of men to care for their children. 
Articles 27 and Article 28 stipulate that both parents “have the same obligation to educate 
and the daily care of health and growth of their children”, but the Law does not elaborate or 
provide material conditions for fathers “to bring up and educate children soundly” as seen in 
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Article 6 which refers only to women. Due to this lack of explanation on the role of fathers, it 
could be said that the government views the role of men in the home as less important than 
that of women. By enforcing this gendered view in state laws it only perpetuates the problem 
of gender stereotyping in the DPRK, as the gendered division of labour in the home is left 
untouched.  
 Article 18 of the Family Law stipulates that a husband and wife “shall have equal 
rights within the family”.
74
 Further, “marriage is recognised legally and protected by the State 
only after it is properly registered at a registry office and married life is forbidden in cases 
where the marriage is not registered” (Article 11). The government awards special protection 
to couples who marry, as the family unit is considered central in North Korean society, 
reflecting the continued influence of Confucianism.
75
 From as early as 1948 the DPRK 
Constitution stipulated that “marriage and the family are under the protection of the state” 
(Article 23). The Article does not provide details on what is meant by equal rights within the 
family. It could be assumed though, that the government prefers couples to be married and 
care for each other, as this would help eliminate state responsibility for providing food and 
facilities to its people. If a married couple wants to divorce in the DPRK, it “may be granted 
if a marriage cannot be continued because one party has been guilty of gross infidelity to 
conjugal love and trust” (Article 21). Article 22 of the Family Law stipulates that the custody 
of children in the case of divorce is “decided according to mutual agreement and in 
consideration of the interests of the children”. When no agreement can be reached between 
the couple, the matter is settled by the court (Article 22). No reference is made in the Article 
to who has preferential custodial rights when a couple divorces, suggesting that North Korean 
men and women have equal rights.  
 In the following section, I examine the influence of “Our Style” philosophy on the 
development of legal protection of gender equality in the DPRK.  
 
The “Our Style” Ideology and North Korean Laws (1991–2010) 
From the 1990s, there were significant social changes in the DPRK due to the collapse of 
both the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. To add to this instability there were also natural 
disasters, which decreased agricultural production and adversely affected the economy and 
society. The North Korean government maintains, however, that social benefits such as the 
free education system and universal free medical care remained at normal levels during this 
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 In reality, as the industrial economy began to implode from the withdrawal of 
subsidies from the Soviet Union, Russia and then China, and the misguided effort of the 
government to pursue a strategy of self-sufficiency,
77
 a number of North Korean women 
stopped going to their official workplaces as they searched for food and money in alternative 
places.
78
 In this context, the government still sees women as primarily responsible for 
carrying the burden of family chores and childrearing. Although social changes have 
encouraged women to become financially independent, it has also increased their burdens, as 
they are now in many cases financially responsible for their families.  
 In 1995, Kim Jong Il used the phrase “our style of human rights”.
79
 “Our Style” 
focused more on conservative values such as those of the family and the military.
80
 The 
Marxist notion of class rights was de-emphasised and entitlement to rights was now much 
more dependent upon an individual’s loyalty to the nation and its leaders.
81
 While collective 
interests remained highly pertinent to North Korean thinking, they were now expressed in 
more Juche-specific terms, such as the right to national sovereignty and the right to national 
self-determination. A distinct feature of “Our Style” is the emphasis on the protection of the 
human rights of people in need, in correlation with the image of a caring, fatherly leader able 
to protect and take care of them.
82
 This idea refers to a particular governing style of Kim Jong 
Il as the sole benevolent ruler of the DPRK, acting exclusively to safeguard and protect the 
interests of the nation.
83
 In this situation, only those people who are loyal to the virtuous 
leader enjoyed rights. At the same time, rights can be withheld or withdrawn by the North 
Korean government from those who are not seen to be loyal to the state and Kim family.
84
 
This reinforces a patriarchal relationship between the Kim dynasty and the North Korean 
people. 
 In the following section, I examine revisions made to the DPRK Constitution in 1992 
and 1998. 
 
The DPRK Constitution (1992) 
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After the 1972 DPRK Constitution, the SPA adopted an amended Constitution in April 1992. 
The revisions aimed to legitimate the achievements and experiences of the country since the 
previous Constitution.
85
 The revisions were also a result of a build-up of external events in 
the 1980s, which culminated at the beginning of the 1990s with changes to the geopolitical 
world order and the end of the Cold War.
86
 The Soviet Union and Eastern European states, 
which formed the Communist bloc, fell into decline and later collapsed. China also continued 
on its path of transformation, incrementally enacting measures in order to adopt a market 
system. This new post-Cold War period that began in the 1990s drove the DPRK into 
desperation as the country was forced to try to find its own way to survive in a new, radically 
altered international environment.
87
 All of these external events had a huge impact on the 
North Korean economy and political survival and the amendments made to the 1992 
Constitution. Perhaps the most notable change to the DPRK Constitution was the elimination 
of the expression of Marxism-Leninism and its replacement with the terminology of the 
Juche ideology. Article 3 of the revised Constitution stipulates that the “DPRK is guided in 
its activities by the Juche idea, a world outlook centred on people, a revolutionary ideology 
for achieving the independence of the masses of the people”. Provisions to protect the rights 
of women who were mothers and worked in the labour force (Article 49 and Article 77) 
continued in this revised version of the Constitution.  
 
The DPRK Constitution (1998) 
On 5 September 1998, the SPA again amended the DPRK Constitution. Just as the previous 
Constitutions included provisions to protect the rights of the North Korean people, the 1998 
Constitution also guaranteed these rights. For example, those who work “are provided with 
stable jobs and working conditions” (Article 70) and it stipulates “fixed working hours, the 
provision of holidays [and] paid leave” (Article 71). The Constitution states that the 
government is to provide “accommodation at health resorts and holiday homes at the State 
expense and by a growing number of cultural facilities” (Article 71). All North Koreans are 
also guaranteed free medical care under Article 72, which stipulates, “an expanding network 
of hospitals, sanatoria and other medical institutions, State social insurance and other social 
security systems” (Article 72). Finally, all North Koreans are guaranteed an “advanced 
educational system” (Article 73).  
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 The amended 1998 DPRK Constitution continued to state the principle of special 
protection for women. Paragraph 2 of Article 77 stipulates: 
 
The State shall afford special protection to mothers and children by 
providing maternity leave, reduced working hours for mothers with 
many children, a wide network of maternity hospitals, crèches and 
kindergartens, and other measures. The State shall provide all 
conditions for women to play a full role in society (1998 DPRK 
Constitution). 
 
This provision reinforces the state’s gendered view of women, which has not altered since the 
early gender equality laws of the post-revolutionary period. Women have continued to be 
defined by the North Korean government as mothers and thus subject to provisions that are 
seen to lessen their burdens within the home. Until this time, the North Korean government 
has not addressed gender stereotyping in state laws.  
 Next, I briefly outline the DPRK’s relationship with the Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereafter “CEDAW 
Committee”), as this relationship has influenced the amendment and promulgation of laws 
since 2005. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) (see Appendix 1) will be discussed in detail in chapter 7.  
 
The DPRK and the CEDAW Committee 
In February 2001, the DPRK agreed to the guidelines and procedures outlined in CEDAW.
88
 
The timing of the DPRK’s action suggests that it was an outcome of its involvement with the 
UN over previous issues such as the famine in the mid-1990s and in response to international 
pressure for improvement of the state’s human rights record. An initial report for 
consideration to the CEDAW Committee was submitted by the DPRK on 11 September 2002 
and the DPRK continued communication with the Committee until 2005.
89
  The North 
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Korean government has offered no reason as to why communication stalled with the 
CEDAW Committee. To date the CEDAW Committee continues to request further 
information from the DPRK concerning gender equality within the country. The Committee 
has also requested that the North Korean government sign the Optional Protocol to CEDAW 
but to date the country has neither signed nor ratified the Optional Protocol.
90
  
 In the DPRK’s initial report, the government states that “the idea of the inferiority or 
the superiority of either of the sexes or the stereotyped roles for men and women have nearly 
been eliminated” so “discrimination based on the outmoded customs is no longer a big issue 
of social concern”.
91
 Then again, the North Korean government states that customary 
discrimination exists within society and households, as in the following example: 
 
Calling a man the outer householder and a woman the inner 
householder in a family, a man becoming the head of a family, the 
community employing mostly females in the jobs like restaurant 
reception, switchboard operation, typing and the like, regarding a 





Within this context, the North Korean government has tried to “enhance the consciousness of 
respecting women among the new generations and to thoroughly prevent the discriminatory 
conception and happening occasionally witnessed among the old generation”.
93
 The DPRK is 
said to encourage active education in the idea of respecting and caring for girls and women 
from school age and through mass media and the promulgation of the state Constitution, 
laws, regulations, and rules.
94
 However, guaranteeing equal rights in law did not liberate 
women from the patriarchal system embedded in North Korean culture, as North Korean 
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women continued to be assigned to stereotypical roles in the home and to gendered work in 
the labour force.   
 The CEDAW Committee noted with concern the persistence of customary 
assumptions and attitudes in respect to the roles and responsibilities of women and men, 
which are primarily discriminatory against women and influence all areas of their lives.
95
 In 
particular, the Committee is concerned about the perception of women as caregivers and 
homemakers and their assignment to areas such as education and employment based on 
spheres suitable to their perceived ability. The Committee states that these expectations of 
women have serious consequences, preventing North Korean women from accessing rights 
and entitlements on an equal basis with North Korean men and creating a dependency on 
men, husbands, and family for housing, food entitlements, and other services.
96
 
Communication between the DPRK and CEDAW will be detailed further in chapter 7.  
The North Korean government addressed some of the concerns of the CEDAW 
Committee in new and amended laws after communication stalled. This is particularly 
evident in the Women’s Rights Act promulgated on 22 December 2010 (see Appendix 8). 
This was the first law since the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946 to address 
discrimination against women in all forms. In the following section, I examine amendments 
to the 2009 DPRK Constitution and provisions included in the Women’s Rights Act.  
 
The DPRK Constitution (2009) 
The SPA adopted the revised DPRK Constitution on 9 April 2009. To date the content of the 
revisions has not been made public by the North Korean government but in late September 
2009, Radio Free Asia reported that revisions were made to the 1998 version of the 
Constitution.
97
 The revised Constitution strengthened the legitimacy of Kim Il Sung’s legacy 
in the preamble, stating that he was the “great leader and founder of the DPRK and the father 
of socialist Korea”. Further, it states that the immortalisation of the “Great Leader” is held in 
high esteem by the KWP and the Korean people, as Kim Il Sung will always be known as the 
“Eternal President”. The term communism was removed from the revised 2009 Constitution 
and replaced with “military-first politics”. During the North Korean food crisis in the mid-
1990s, “military-first politics” was born from the idea that the human rights of the North 
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Korean people were fully protected by the “Great Leader” and party. In return, the people 
defend the North Korean leader and country by endless loyalty and filial piety. The role of 
the North Korean armed forces under the guidance of “military first politics” is to protect 
both the state and the working people. Article 59 of the 2009 amended Constitution states that 
the “mission of the armed forces is to carry out the military-first revolutionary line in order to 
protect the nerve centre, safeguard the interests of the working people, defend the socialist 
system and the country from foreign aggression”.  
 The 2009 North Korean Constitution also included for the first time the terminology 
of human rights. Article 8, paragraph 1 stipulates, “The social system of the DPRK is a man-
centred [sic] social system whereby the working popular masses are the masters of 
everything, and everything in society serves the working popular masses”. The government 
“safeguards” the human rights of the North Korean people under Article 8, paragraph 2 of the 
Constitution.  
 
The state shall safeguard the interests of, and respect and protect the 
human rights of the working people, including workers, farmers, 
soldiers, and working intellectuals, who have been freed from 
exploitation and oppression and have become the masters of the state 
and society. 
 
The previous version of the Constitution, adopted in 1998, had vowed to “defend and protect 
the interests” of the same groups. Under Article 63 of the 2009 Constitution, though, the 
rights and responsibilities of citizens are based on the collectivist principle of “One for All, 
All for One”. Further, the state guarantees all citizens democratic rights and freedom, and 
happy material and cultural lives (Article 64). Article 64 continues that, in the DPRK, “the 
rights and freedom of citizens shall be further expanded with the consolidation and 
development of the socialist system”. Previously, the protection of human rights in the DPRK 
was only mentioned in lower-level laws, such as the Criminal Procedure Law (2006). It could 
be assumed that changes made to the state Constitution were a result of the DPRK’s 
engagement with the UN and from international pressure. It is unclear, though, to what extent 
the UN and international community has influenced amendments to existing laws or the 
promulgation of new laws, as the DPRK does not share this information when reporting to 
UN bodies.  
89 
 
 As in previous Constitutions, the rights of all North Koreans are provided for in the 
revised 2009 version regardless of gender. For example, Article 70 stipulates, “Citizens shall 
have the right to labour”, free medical care (Article 72) and an education (Article 73). The 
rights of North Korean women were also offered “special protection” by provisions in Article 
77 of the 2009 Constitution. 
 
Women shall be entitled to the same social status and rights as men. 
The state shall provide special protection to mothers and children by 
guaranteeing maternity leave before and after childbirth, reducing 
working hours for mothers with many children, and expanding the 
network of maternity hospitals, nurseries, and kindergartens, and by 
implementing other measures. The state shall provide every possible 
condition for women to participate in society.  
 
In this provision though, the North Korean government has addressed gender equality as the 
ability of women to leave the home and participate in the labour force. To achieve this aim 
the state stipulates the provision of maternity hospitals, nurseries, and kindergartens (Article 
77). Again these provisions reinforce the gender stereotype that women are carers in the 
home.  
 
The Women’s Rights Act (2010) 
In recent years, one of the most important laws to be promulgated was the Women’s Rights 
Act on 22 December 2010. The announcement of the Act suggests that the DPRK has 
responded to the international attention by organisations like the UN and the CEDAW 
Committee, who have focused on its poor human rights record.
98
 This was the first law since 
the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946 to address discrimination against women in all 
forms. While the Act reiterates women’s equal right to own property (Article 36), equal rights 
to marriage (Article 44 and Article 45) and divorce (Article 47), and the rights of working 
mothers (Article 28 to Article 29) it also addresses discrimination against women in other 
forms such as domestic violence (Article 46), rape and trafficking (Article 39). However, the 
language employed by the North Korean government on the role of women has not changed 
significantly, as the government continues to stress the importance of their roles in the home. 
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This can be seen in Article 3 of the Women’s Rights Act, which states that women “play an 
important role in the welfare of the family and the development of the society”. The wording 
of this Article implies that the role of women is first within the family and then in society, as 
noted by the non-governmental organisation Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human 
Rights (NKHR).
99
 The language employed by the North Korean government on gender 
equality has changed little since its accession to CEDAW in 2001. The fact that it is the 
“Women’s Rights Act” rather than, say, the “Gender Equality Act” reveals that the North 
Korean government still does not question men’s roles in society or the home. 
 Although the rights of women in marriage (Article 44) and divorce (Article 42) have 
continued to be protected under the Women’s Rights Act what has changed (to some extent) 
since the DPRK’s accession to CEDAW is the actual role of men and women within the 
home. Since the famine of the 1990s, North Korean women are often absent from their 
families, as they are away searching for food, trading in distant places, or peddling goods 
across the country.
100
 This has led to disharmony within marriages and family breakdowns. 
The growing financial independence of women has also created conflict between married 
couples and women have started to demand more rights within the home.
101
 In this situation, 
some North Korean men have responded with violence. The DPRK has addressed violence 
within families for the first time in Article 46 of the Women’s Rights Act, which stipulates 
that there must not be any form of domestic violence against women in the family. Although 
the Article attempts to act as a preventive measure against domestic violence, it does not 
provide any legal protection for victims of spousal violence.
102
 This is a step forward in the 
DPRK’s legal system as previous laws did not address domestic violence at all. Instead, 
violence within the home was seen as a private matter and incidents often went unreported.
103
 
The Korean Institute of National Unification reports that many defectors have testified in 
recent years that incidents of domestic violence are widespread in the DPRK.
104
 It is difficult 
to clarify the number of cases of domestic violence, as the North Korean government has not 
provided statistical data to the UN in its reporting.  
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 In the DPRK, labour in the official economy is the responsibility of all people, 
because it is not seen as an individual benefit but is based on the collectivist principle to 
benefit everyone.
105
 Therefore, the right to work is not a right but a duty to respond to the 
mobilisation of labour, and thus the North Korean government has long promoted the 
participation of women in work.
106
 The Women’s Rights Act states that women have equal 
rights with men in labour and that Municipal People’s Committees and relevant organs are to 
guarantee the equal rights of women to take part in labour (Article 26). Article 37 states that 
to ensure women are able to leave the home relevant institutions, corporate associations, and 
organisations should establish day-care centres, kindergartens and other facilities. This idea, 
however, rests on the belief that women are primarily responsible for the care of their 
children. For women who do not have access to these facilities because they work in the 
unofficial economy childcare is an added responsibility. Further, it is evident that the 
government’s thinking on women’s roles has hardly changed since the promulgation of the 
Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946 or the state’s accession to CEDAW in 2001.  
 It has been a long-held practice for the North Korean government to assign women 
between the ages of 16 and 55 years to specific positions in the labour force. Therefore, 
discrimination against women in the workplace has emerged in the forms of differentiated 
pay scales and the type of work women are assigned to. Article 28 of the Women’s Rights 
Act highlights this view. 
  
Institutions, corporate associations and organisations, except for 
those professions or departments that are not appropriate for women, 
are not allowed to not take in women or restrict them for reasons such 
as gender, marriage, pregnancy, and childbirth.  
 
The exception made in the Article to “professions or departments that are not appropriate for 
women” shows that the DPRK deems some occupations unsuitable for women. The Act does 
not elaborate on what occupations are considered “not appropriate” but Article 30 states that 
the “supervising organ for labour administration determines which fields and professions are 
prohibited for women”. Consequently, men are assigned to important and higher paying jobs, 
while women are assigned to relatively less important and lower paying jobs,
107
 in the so-
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called “light industries”, such as agriculture, communications, health and education.
108
 This 
does not give North Korean women the right to choose their own profession or employment 
but confirms their assignment to certain roles in the North Korean gendered labour force. The 
Women’s Rights Act will be discussed further in chapter 8.  
   
Conclusion  
The North Korean government has repeatedly stated its support for the principle of women’s 
rights but many aspects of gender equality are not adequately addressed in the DPRK’s legal 
system. Since the promulgation of the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946, North Korean 
rhetoric has emphasised that the role of women was to turn to productive work in society to 
help build an independent socialist country. To achieve this goal North Korean laws have 
stated the principal of protecting the economic, social, and political rights of women. 
However, these legal documents did not include provisions for preventing gender 
discrimination, altering the division of labour in the home, or consider the needs of women 
without children. Instead, the rights of women have often been secondary to the 
government’s economic goals and promotion of family unity. At times women’s rights have 
been held back to assure a harmonious society, a stable family unit,
109
 and work units. As the 
North Korean government has focused on bringing more economic resources into society 
through the efforts of women, childrearing and food preparation have been socialised. Then, 
once women have left the home to work in the economy, the government has claimed that 
women have achieved liberation since the groundwork for gender equality had been instituted 
by the state.
110
 Discriminatory practices still exist in North Korean society and are even 
promoted by the government to ensure stability. For example, the government still assumes 
that women are primarily responsible for the care of their children. Any changes that have 
occurred to the roles of men and women since the mid-1990s and the DPRK’s accession to 
CEDAW in 2001 have taken place independently of the state and the North Korean legal 
system. Rather, changes to gender roles are an effect of the ongoing socioeconomic 
transformation of the DPRK.  
 In the next chapter, I examine how the DPRK presented women’s rights and gender 
relations to the world in the medium of its English-language propaganda magazines. From the 
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1960s, the government promoted the images of revolutionary heroines and expected ordinary 
Korean women to emulate their qualities in their daily lives, while promoting an image of 
gender equality to the world. Within the country, the heroic portraits of the Kim family 
matriarchs, Kang Ban Sok (1892–1932) and Kim Jong Suk (1919–1949) were held up as 
exemplary women for all Korean women to emulate. These women were represented as being 
able to excel in all forms of housework, such as childcare, tailoring, and cooking, even on the 
battlefield. They performed these chores while armed with the revolutionary idea to defend 
the country and help their husbands who also worked for the revolution as soldiers.
111
 When 
these images were disseminated internationally, this was presented as proof of the success of 
the Korean revolution and the achievement of gender equality within the country. At the 
same time, Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) was represented as the father of all Korean people, who 
are expected to praise and show filial piety towards him just as they would their own fathers. 
The depiction of gender roles in these propaganda magazines is revealing of the gendered 
assumptions of the North Korean regime, in ways that are not so evident in the regime’s 
official statements about gender equality.  
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4. The Revolutionary Kim Family in 
Women of Korea 
 
During the anti-Japanese armed struggle, ... the fine 
working women of Korea fought as bravely as men for the 
country’s liberation and the people’s honour, and for 
their social emancipation and freedom.  





Following the liberation of the Korean peninsula from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the 
peninsula was divided into North and South, temporarily entrusted to the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR, Soviet Union) and the United States of America (USA) 
respectively. Before the permanency of the separate states in 1948, socialist reforms were 
implemented in northern Korea by the North Korean interim government under the policy 
influence of the Soviet Union.
2
 As we have seen, from 1946 the North Korean government 
implemented state laws to encourage gender equality in social and family institutions. 
Initially, the reform process as well as the creation of large-scale social organisations were 
directed towards underprivileged groups in Korean society, particularly peasants, workers, 
women, and youth.
3
 During the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1897) and then the colonial 
occupation of Korea (1910–1945) these groups had lived in oppressive situations. Society 
adhered to a rigid social hierarchical order based on age, sex, and class, which encouraged 
women to follow Confucian ideals and attain Confucian virtues. A virtuous woman obeyed 
men throughout her life: in youth, she obeyed her father; when married, she obeyed her 
husband; and if her husband died she was subject to her son. However, legally there was great 
potential for the rights of North Korean women to improve significantly during the initial 
stages of state formation.  
                                                     
1
 Exact date unknown but speech attributed to Kim Il Sung during anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle. “Eternal 
‘Women Warrior’”, Women of Korea, 2 (110) (1986), p. 16. 
2
 Sonia Ryang, “Gender in Oblivion: Women in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)”, 
Journal of Asian and African Studies, 35 (2000), p. 330. 
3
 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945– 1950 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2003), p. 71. 
95 
 
From 1946, the visual image of the revolutionary heroine appeared frequently in the 
Korean-language magazine, Chosŏn Yŏsŏng (Korean Women). This magazine was designed 
specifically for North Korean women. Then, from 1964, the English-language version of the 
magazine, Women of Korea, disseminated to the international community topics concerning 
Korean women’s roles in society. In both magazines, government rhetoric and art promoted 
gender equality through the visual image of revolutionary heroines fighting equally alongside 
fellow male revolutionary soldiers on the battlefield. These images challenged, to some 
extent, the battlefield as a masculine domain, but other roles performed by women alongside 
their fellow comrades were not so different to their domestic roles in the home. Ultimately, 
this exposed the view of the North Korean government that women were to leave the home 
and defend the country but this was to be done by performing the roles of mother and wife, 
cook and tailor.  
In this chapter, I focus specifically on the representation of the Kim family and state 
rhetoric in Women of Korea.
4
 Official North Korean historiography, assisted by paintings and 
photographs, cultivated the idea that the Kim family epitomised national purity through their 
resistance to Japanese aggressors.
5
 I focus on the English-language version of the magazine 
because I am interested in how the North Korean government communicates with the 
international community about gender relations and the rights of women. In the visual images 
and text, two exemplary women are prominent, Kang Ban Sok (1892–1932), the mother of 
Kim Il Sung (1912–1994), and Kim Jong Suk (1919–1949), the first wife of Kim Il Sung and 
the mother of Kim Jong Il (1941–2011). Both Kim women are depicted as uniquely feminine 
revolutionary subjects who were capable of caring for their families and the nation.
6
 They are 
represented performing the roles of mother and wife and educator, and demonstrating skills in 
domestic chores on the battlefield. Both women set the standard of skills that the government 
deemed necessary for ordinary Korean women to emulate in the building and defending of 
the country. Internationally, these women presented a picture of achieving gender equality in 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). Both women also 
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represented exemplary mothers who supported their families but stood in supportive roles to 
their male counterparts. This suggests a contradiction in the government’s aim to emancipate 
women from outdated customary practices. In contrast, the representations of ordinary men as 
soldiers and defenders of the country, as fathers and carers in the home are largely absent in 
Women of Korea. Instead, Kim Il Sung is ubiquitously represented as the “Fatherly General”, 
who cares for all Korean children and thus the entire nation.
7
 These gendered representations 
of the Kim family members reinforce assumptions about the roles of ordinary men and 
women in North Korean society.  
When examining the visual representations of the Kim family in this chapter, I have 
also considered the difference in clothing worn between revolutionary heroines and their 
male counterparts. The clothing worn by these heroic men and women reveals the gendered 
lens of the North Korean government. Therefore, when examining the visual images of the 
Kim family in Women of Korea, the analysis of fashion is an important indicator of official 
attitudes towards gendered roles in society and the change from the colonial modernity of the 
Korean nation to a nationalistic North Korea. 
 First, I begin by discussing briefly the Korean-language magazine Chosŏn Yŏsŏng and 
then the English-language version, Women of Korea.  
 
The Chosŏn Yŏsŏng Magazine 
Just weeks after the promulgation of the Law on Equality of the Sexes in September 1946, 
the first Korean-language magazine designed specifically for women, Chosŏn Yŏsŏng, was 
published.
8
 The magazine was issued under the guidance of the Korean Democratic Women’s 
Union (KDWU, Women’s Union) and was designed to circulate information approved by the 
newly-formed North Korean government.
9
 Although the magazine was intended for North 
Korean women it is unclear on what basis the magazine was distributed and to what extent 
women were exposed to the magazine. They were likely distributed during meetings and 
study sessions conducted by the Women’s Union and through the local government offices 
and cultural institutions rather than women buying individual copies.
10
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Chosŏn Yŏsŏng covers a wide range of topics from reports on economic development 
to the social and domestic responsibilities of North Korean women. The magazine also 
includes an editorial section, a column on homemaking, educational material, and an arts and 
literature section. As we shall see below, the English-language version of the magazine 
follows this format. The earliest versions of Chosŏn Yŏsŏng were influenced by the Soviet 
Union and included a small section on news about Soviet women and the Soviet state. 
Anticipating the end of the Soviet occupation in the northern region of Korea, the North 
Korean government attempted to form a more independent view of North Korean society and 
the role of an independent North Korean government within the magazine.
11
 By April 1948, 
the formal section on the Soviet Union in the magazine was excluded, with only the 
occasional article on Soviet women and culture.
12
 The focus shifted to aspects of Korean life 
and the rights of Korean women. The theme that emerged in Chosŏn Yŏsŏng was the ability 
of women to combine their duties as wives and mothers with their new positions as workers 
outside the home.
13
 This theme has continued in the magazine to date and has also influenced 
content published in the English-language version. Throughout the history of both magazines, 
articles also promoted the government’s role in promulgating gender equality laws.  
 
The Women of Korea Magazine 
The Working People’s Organisation Publishing House in Pyongyang published the English-
language magazine Women of Korea between 1964 and 1992. The magazine was designed 
specifically to inform the international community of the position of Korean women in 
society, and the political and economic goals of the North Korean government. Each edition 
of Women of Korea follows the same format as Chosŏn Yŏsŏng. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
the magazine emphasised stories and visual images of revolutionary heroines,
14
 the history 




 and North Korean arts and literature.
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From the early days of its formation, the North Korean government promoted women as 
revolutionary fighters ready to sacrifice their own life for the nation, as well as fulfilling their 
duties in the home through the imagery of the revolutionary heroine. Stories and visual 
imagery of these heroines emphasised the domestic virtues of women as mothers and wives 
who participated in the revolutionary cause on the battlefield.
18
 The representation of these 
revolutionary women to the international community promoted a positive image of women’s 
equal rights in the DPRK.  
Below I discuss the role of the “Revolutionary Heroine” Campaign in North Korean 
society as a background to the visual images and text published in Women of Korea from the 
1960s to the 1970s.  
 
The “Revolutionary Heroine” Campaign 
The second wife of Kim Il Sung, Kim Song Ae (1928–2011?), initiated the “Revolutionary 
Heroine” Campaign and it was built upon by Kim Il Sung’s son Kim Jong Il in later years.
19 
Once Kim Jong Il took a prominent role within the Propaganda and Guidance Department of 
the government, Kim Song Ae’s involvement in the campaign decreased. Instead, Kim Jong 
Il promoted his own family members, such as his mother and grandmother, to important 
positions with the campaign as revolutionary heroines. North Korean historiography 
surrounding the family cultivated the idea that each Kim member epitomised national purity 
through their resistance to Japanese colonisation of the Korean peninsula.
20
 While Kang Ban 
Sok and Kim Jong Suk have long been celebrated as the foremost examples of heroines, 
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purity and anti-imperialist spirit, they obtained their status through their relationship to Kim Il 
Sung.
21
 Neither woman ever held any real power within North Korean decision-making 
bodies but they were given a special place in the state’s official historiography.
22
  
In the 1960s, Kim Song Ae became vice-chairperson of the Women’s Union and was 
the chairperson from the mid-1970s until 1998.
23
 During her appointment, she expelled 
several Women’s Union officials who had close ties to Kim Il Sung’s first wife, Kim Jong 
Suk. It was also during this time that the visual images and accounts of Kim Jong Suk as a 
revolutionary heroine were gradually removed from exhibitions and printed materials. Kim 
Song Ae did not want to favour her predecessor. Instead, Kim Il Sung’s mother, Kang Ban 
Sok was promoted as the primary revolutionary heroine for others to emulate.
24
 The emphasis 
by Kim Song Ae on the mother of Kim Il Sung as the dominant revolutionary heroine is 
prominent in Women of Korea during the 1960s. In the following decade, though, this would 
change as Kim Jong Il took up his position within government. 
From October 1970, North Korean art underwent a major revolution under the 
guidance of Kim Jong Il, who was promoted to the position of deputy director in charge of 
culture and arts in the Propaganda and Guidance Department of the government.
25
 In 
September 1973, at the seventh plenary session of the fifth Central Committee of the 
Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK), Kim Jong Il was promoted to party secretary in charge of 
propaganda. As part of the artistic reform process, Kim Jong Il systematically promoted the 
representation of his own mother, Kim Jong Suk, as the primary revolutionary heroine for 
ordinary women to follow. Kim Jong Il’s campaign to promote the visual imagery of Kim 
Jong Suk also ensured a legitimate connection was made between himself and his 
revolutionary parents as he was to succeed his father as leader of the DPRK.  
 The North Korean government intended ordinary women to feel a strong degree of 
empathy when viewing or reading about the roles of revolutionary heroines. Initially, it was 
difficult for the North Korean government to encourage ordinary women to become like these 
heroines, as they had to master a new and unfamiliar role and take up arms to defend the 
country. In the early editions of both Chosŏn Yŏsŏng and Women of Korea visual images and 
stories of unknown revolutionary women who had worked as revolutionary fighters and as 
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members of the revolutionary sewing group were published (see figure 4.1, Hun Yong 
Kang’s painting “Members of the Sewing Group”).
26
 However, no matter how intensively 
these visual images were promoted in North Korean society, they presented a difficult 
challenge for ordinary women because of the gap between themselves and these heroines.
27
 
For this reason, the North Korean government needed an intermediary procedure that would 
enable everyday women to identify with the persona of the revolutionary heroine. By 
employing exemplary women from real life, such as Kang Ban Sok and Kim Jong Suk, they 
attempted to convince viewers that such women and their courageous stories existed.
28
 The 
government promoted the ideal woman through the careful invention of the legendary tales of 
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Figure 4.1 Hun Yong Kang, “Members of the Sewing Group”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. 
Women of Korea, 5 (24) (1966).  
 
 
 Below, I discuss the visual and textual representation in Women of Korea of Kang 
Ban Sok and Kim Jong Suk as part of the revolutionary Kim family. In the DPRK, these 
heroines were presented as models for ordinary women to follow. In the international context, 
these exemplary women were presented as proof of the success of the North Korean 




Kang Ban Sok, “Mother of Korea”  
In the 1960s, numerous articles in Women of Korea describe the life achievements of Kang 
Ban Sok.
30
 These stories recount her life from birth to death through the different stages of a 
woman’s life, from a child to mother to wife. Her most famous role was that of mother of 
Kim Il Sung, which eventually extended to metaphorically include the entire North Korean 
population.
31
 Thus, she became known as the “Mother of Korea”.
32
 The article “Glorious life 
of Kang Ban Sok, Mother of Korea”, explains that Kang Ban Sok was born on 21 April 1892 
into a patriotic Korean family who fought against the occupation of Korea by Japan.
33
 Her 
revolutionary spirit was said to be awakened under the guidance of her father, Kang Don Uk 
(dates unknown) and younger brother Kang Jin Sok (dates unknown), an educator and 
revolutionary fighter respectively.
34
 Kang Ban Sok married Kim Il Sung’s father, Kim Hyong 
Jik (1894–1926), a supposed founding leader in the anti-Japanese liberation movement. Kang 
Ban Sok is said to have helped her husband in his revolutionary work. Kang Ban Sok’s 
revolutionary work, though, involved caring for her family, as she was conscious of her 
husband’s commitment to his work. In this context, Kang Ban Sok is said to have “managed 
[the] domestic affairs of her family of twelve [members] by her own efforts”.
35
 This implies 
that Kang Ban Sok’s role was in the home performing the role of mother and wife, who cared 
for her family dutifully and not with her husband fighting actively against the Japanese. 
Therefore, it could be said that Kang Ban Sok was not equal to her husband on the battlefield 
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but confined to the role of mother.
36
 This is reinforced in visual images and articles published 
in Women of Korea.  
 In the painting captioned, “The Respected and Beloved Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung 
Receiving a Patriotic Education from His Mother” (see figure 4.2), a young Kim Il Sung sits 
at a desk and his mother Kang Ban Sok sits alongside him, guiding and teaching him in his 
work.
37
 In addition to helping her son, Kang Ban Sok is sewing or mending clothing. Here I 
draw attention to the space in which the figures are sitting, the home, and the role performed 
by Kang Ban Sok, as educator. In the DPRK, the education of children has predominantly 
been considered women’s work, either within the home or in the school setting. From the 
initial stages of state formation, North Korea relied on women to hold together the very fabric 
of society, as sacrificing mothers, who would reproduce and educate future generations as 
model communist citizens, while contributing to the developing economy as dedicated 
workers and citizens of the new revolutionary regime.
38
 The North Korean government 
believed that children were the reserve in the revolutionary struggle, the future of the 
revolution and the destiny of the country, which depended on the upbringing of the children 
by their mothers.
39
 The representation of Kang Ban Suk in this image reinforces the gender 
stereotype that women belong in the home caring for both children and housework. 
In the painting, both figures are dressed in ethnic Korean clothing for women 
(joseonot/hanbok) and are positioned in the domestic sphere, a space usually reserved as a 
woman’s place of work. As Rosemary Roberts states, “[d]espite its seemingly superficial 
nature, dress is an important site for cultural enquiry”,
40
 for clothing conveys culturally 
determined meanings about the bodies of men and women. Suk-Young Kim argues that, from 
a socio-political point of view, the way people dress is a worthy subject of scrutiny as fashion 
is a domain in which self-perception and taste manifest, where the desires for beauty and 
consumption materialise, and a site that contests the ground where social hierarchy is 
articulated through individual spontaneity and state control.
41
 In the North Korean context, it 
is interesting to look closely at how revolutionary heroines are dressed compared to their 
male counterparts as this reveals the gendered lens of the government. Suk-Young Kim states 
that, during the revolution, state regulation dominated everyday life, including fashion 
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 North Korea is a highly fashion-conscious nation where political leaders are 
preoccupied with how people dress. They impose rigid regulations, including uniforms for 
various social sectors, and systematically recommend certain designs to civilians.
43
 
Therefore, when reading Women of Korea, clothing styles are an important indicator of 
official attitudes to male and female positions in North Korean society. The ideal clothing 
style for North Korean women is found in the officially sanctified domestic history of the 
Kim household and Kang Ban Sok was the ideal standard for women’s behaviour and 
appearance.
44
 Nevertheless, as these magazines were produced from the 1960s on, they 
represent an idealised version of revolutionary dress, rather than a literal image of behaviour 
and dress during the anti-Japanese struggle and the establishment of the North Korean state. 
In visual images of Kim Il Sung as a child he is almost always dressed in the ethnic 
Korean clothing for males, consisting of a jacket (jeogori), a vest (jokki) and trousers (baji). 
Children’s clothing is the same as that of adults but with appropriate adaptations.
45
 In 
contrast, Kang Ban Sok is seen only in the ethnic Korean clothing for women, consisting of 
the skirt (chima) and jacket (jeogori). This configuration of women’s clothing often resulted 
in a triangular silhouette, which deemphasises the upper torso of the wearer,
46
 but draws 
attention to the wearer’s exposed legs if the length of the skirt is modified. The clothing worn 
by Kang Ban Sok is not usually modified, unlike the clothing worn by her successor Kim 
Jong Suk who is depicted mostly on the battlefield, as we shall see below.  
The North Korean book, Korean Folk Customs (1990), by Hwan Ju Pang, outlines 
clothing worn by Korean men, women and children. 
 
Korean costume is the product of a long historical process which had 
close bearing on the constitution of Koreans, the mild climate of 
Korea, their principal occupation in agriculture, their living in the 
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In the Three Kingdoms period (37BCE–935CE) upper, lower, and outer garments already 
existed.
48
 In the Koryo (or Goryeo) period (918–1392) and the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1897), 
improvements were made to clothing worn by both genders.
49
 There were slight alterations in 
length and width of skirts and jackets and the outer garments varied depending on gender, 
age, occupation, and social status.
50
  
 As noted above, Kim Il Sung is clothed in the traditional jacket, vest and trousers. On 
long journeys men often wore leggings under the trousers to ensure brisk movement.
51
 The 
colour of men’s clothing was mostly white but sometimes grey, jade-green or other muted 
colours. Alternatively, Korean women wore the ethnic clothing, the female hanbok, and 
sometimes an overcoat (turumagi).
52
 Pang states that there are two kinds of skirts in North 
Korea, a long wrap skirt and a cylindrical skirt (see figure 4.3).
53
 The long wrap skirt had 
wide pleats to encircle the body from the waist down, while the seamless cylindrical skirt is a 
rounder shape and resembles the skirt style worn today in the DPRK. The long wrap skirt is 
made wide and is so long that its hem trails along the ground. When walking, it is held up by 
the wearer. The seamless cylindrical skirt has been designed for ceremonial or gala 
occasions, is longer than that for ordinary use, and its length differs according to the wearer’s 
age.
54
 Material used in the making of skirts is colourful and changes according to the 
season.
55
 In contrast to the men’s jacket, the jacket worn by women is characterised by curves 
and the edge of the neckband and outer collar is rounded (see figure 4.4).
56
 Rich colours and 
patterns are also features of the female jacket. Today North Korean women wear the ethnic 
Korean clothing for holidays and on special occasions.  Various transformations of Korean 
dress can be seen in the pages of Women of Korea. 
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Figure 4.2 “The Respected and Beloved Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung Receiving a Patriotic 
Education from His Mother”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. “Great Women”, Women of 






Long Wrap Skirt and Cylindrical Skirt (Left to Right) 
 
 
Figure 4.3 “Long Wrap Skirt and Cylindrical Skirt”. Hwan Ju Pang, Korean Folk Customs 








Figure 4.4 “Korean Jacket”. Hwan Ju Pang, Korean Folk Customs (Pyongyang: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1990), p. 8. 
 
 
With the arrest and imprisonment of Kang Ban Sok’s husband, Kim Hyong Jik, by the 
Japanese police in 1917, Kang Ban Sok is depicted as moving from just caring for her son 
and family to caring for the entire Korean nation. Kang Ban Sok’s new role will be discussed 
further below. First, it is said that Kim Hyong Jik was arrested because of his role in the 
establishment of the Korean National Association (KNA) on 23 March 1917. In the prison, he 
is said to have mapped out a new plan for the higher phase of the revolutionary struggle. His 
109 
 
plan was to develop the anti-Japanese national liberation movement from a nationalist one to 
a proletarian one. After one year of imprisonment, he was released in October 1918. Kim 
Hyong Jik left Mangyongdae for the northern border area on Amnok River, where he 
regrouped and reinforced the KNA organisation. Kang Ban Sok is shown taking care of the 
household and continuing the revolutionary activities of her husband during his 
imprisonment. With the death of her husband in 1926, Kang Ban Sok is shown working 
alongside her son in battle against the Japanese.
57
 While Women of Korea includes 
representations of women joining their male counterparts on the battlefield, Kang Ban Sok’s 
role is limited to the representation of a caring mother. This is seen in the painting captioned 
“Kang Ban Sok Encouraging the Men of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army Founded 
by the Great Revolutionary Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung” (see figure 4.5).
58
 Kang Ban Sok 
is represented as a mother figure to Kim Il Sung and the fellow soldiers whom she comforts 
before they enter battle.
59
 Kang Ban Sok has placed her hand on one soldier’s chest, 
encouraging him in his revolutionary work, symbolising her role as a nurturing mother figure 
to the soldiers and thus the Korean nation. While she inspects and consoles the soldiers in the 
Korean People’s Revolutionary Army, a young Kim Il Sung stands to the left of his mother 
and looks in the direction of the figures, surveying the scene.  
 The clothing style worn by Kang Ban Sok, the only female figure in the painting, is an 
important indicator of the view of women’s position in North Korean society. While the male 
figures are dressed in military uniforms consisting of jackets, trousers, knee-high socks, and 
hats, Kang Ban Sok is dressed in a pale coloured ethnic Korean dress. Suk-Young Kim 
suggests that the ideal clothing for women found its prototype in the representation of Kang 
Ban Sok dressed in the female hanbok.
60
 However, as Suzy Kim points out, many Korean 
women had always worn ethnic Korean dress and never fully accepted Western clothing, so 
that state reform was not needed by the North Korean government to promote this dress 
code.
61
 During the occupation of Korea by Japan, the ethnic national dress for women had a 
nationalist meaning, when modernity for females meant wearing Westernised clothing.
62
 
Within the masculine domain of the battlefield, the female hanbok signifies that Kang Ban 
Sok stands equal to her son and fellow revolutionary fighters but retains feminine qualities.  
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 The pale colour of the dress makes Kang Ban Sok’s figure stand out from the dark 
background and from the men that surround her. As the ethnic Korean clothing has not been 
modified in length in this painting, it reflects the ideal of modesty, achieved by concealing 
the female form.
63
 In other paintings, particularly of Kim Jong Suk, to be discussed below, 
the length of the skirt and jacket are shorter, revealing the wearer’s legs and the shape of the 
waist. Modifications made to the female hanbok ensured the wearer was able to move more 
easily but also sexualised the female figure, drawing the male gaze to the revolutionary 
heroines. In comparison, the revolutionary men are never depicted wearing ethnic Korean 
clothing in Women of Korea.
64
 Instead, revolutionary men are always depicted wearing 
unaltered military uniforms and carrying guns ready to defend the country by force. It could 
be said that even the revolutionary female is confined by the assumptions of the North 








                                                     
63
 Kyung Ja Lee and Lee Mi Ryang, Traditional Korean Costume (Kent: Global Oriental, 2003), p. 181. 
64






Figure 4.5 “Kang Ban Sok Encouraging the Men of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army 
Founded by the Great Revolutionary Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung”. Date unknown. Oil 
Painting. “The Mother of Korea”, Women of Korea, 2 (70) (1976), pp. 9–11. 
 
   
Kang Ban Sok is said to have put the revolutionary cause before herself even when 
severely ill. Towards the end of 1932, when a young Kim Il Sung was leaving for south 
Manchuria to expand the guerrilla unit to which he was a member, he learned that his mother 
was critically ill. Due to the news of his mother’s health, Kim Il Sung decided to return home 
to visit her. Kang Ban Sok however, reprimanded him for leaving his revolutionary work so 
Kim Il Sung left his mother’s house and walked through dense forests and across rough 
mountains to reach his destination.
65
 After covering some distance, Kim Il Sung is said to 
have stopped to rest and take off his shoes. There in the bottom of his boots was Kang Ban 
Sok’s hair spread out to cushion his steps and stop his feet from freezing.
66
 Stories such as 
this exemplify Kang Ban Sok’s sacrifice for her son and the revolutionary cause. Qualities 
such as a loving, caring, and thoughtful mother, who puts the needs of her children and the 
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revolutionary cause before herself, were all characteristics ordinary North Korean women 
were encouraged to emulate. In 1932, at the age of forty, Kang Ban Sok passed away. She is 
described as an ardent communist and a prominent member of the early women’s movement 
in Korea.
67
 This self-sacrificing image of revolutionary heroines, who exemplify qualities of 
loyalty, caring and nurturing continued to be illustrated in visual images of Kim Il Sung’s 
first wife Kim Jong Suk.  
From the late 1970s, the North Korean government attempted to meld the old and new 
images of women in Women of Korea through the figures of women participating in the 
revolutionary struggle as tailors, cooks, and fighters as well as mothers. This change in the 
representation of heroic women suggests that the old way was represented through the images 
of Kang Ban Sok and her ethnic Korean clothing, while the new role of women was 
represented in Kim Jong Suk in her modified military uniform. In the following section, I 
discuss the representations of these two women and the promotion of revolutionary heroines 
to the world.  
 
Comrade Kim Jong Suk  
In Women of Korea, numerous articles and visual images represent the life and achievements 
of Comrade Kim Jong Suk.
68
 The representation of Kim Jong Suk was developed far beyond 
that of her mother-in-law Kang Ban Sok. Kim Jong Suk is shown as defending the “Fatherly 
General” and performing domestic duties on the battlefield. While Kang Ban Sok is shown in 
a supportive motherly role to her son and other revolutionary soldiers, the visual imagery of 
Kim Jong Suk was extended to include her role as a revolutionary fighter, a domain usually 
dominated by males. Kang Ban Sok’s revolutionary work also extended to gathering and 
                                                     
67
 It is claimed that Kang Ban Sok established the Korean Women’s Anti-Japanese Society in December 1926.  
“Glorious life”, p. 19. 
68 
“Comrade KIM JONG SUK, Indomitable Revolutionary Fighter Boundless and Faithful to the Leader”, 
Women of Korea, 3 (67) (1975), pp. 16, 17; “Only for the Sake of the Leader”, Women of Korea, 1 (69) (1976), 
pp. 14–16; “Only for the Sake of the Leader”, Women of Korea, 2 (70) (1976), pp. 13, 14; “Paragon of the 
Bodyguards”, Women of Korea, 1 (89) (1981), pp. 7–9; Gwang Yon Chang, “A Foot Of Historic Osan Hill”, 
Women of Korea, 4 (92) (1981), pp. 31–33; “A Permanent Bodyguard”, Women of Korea, 2 (94) (1982), pp. 45, 
46; “Kim Jong Suk, an indomitable revolutionary fighter, giving sincere care to her sick revolutionary comrade 
in a secret camp”, Women of Korea, 2 (70) (1976), p. 36; “For the Future of Revolution”, Women of Korea, 3 
(103) (1984), pp. 10, 11; “A Real Star Embroidered on Military Cap”, Women of Korea, 4 (80) (1978), pp. 29, 
30; “Standard-bearer of Devotion”, Women of Korea, 3 (87) (1980), pp. 18, 19; “Comrade Kim Jong Suk, 
indomitable revolutionary fighter, take maternal care of the pupils of the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School”, 
Women of Korea, 2 (90) (1981), pp. 17, 18;  “Our Mother Kim Jong Suk”, Women of Korea, 1 (93) (1982), p. 1; 
“Everlasting Revolutionary Historical Fighter”, Women of Korea, 1 (93) (1982), pp. 21, 22; “Mothers Answer”, 
Women of Korea, 1 (97) (1983), pp. 45, 46; Hun Yong Kang, “Members of the Sewing Group”, Women of 
Korea, 5 (24) (1966); “Anti-Japanese Women’s Association and Its Assistance to Guerrillas”, Women of Korea, 
3 (91) (1981), pp. 40, 41; “In the Sacred War”, p. 5; “On First Democratic”, pp. 19, 20; “Helping Women Take 
Their Share in Nation-Building”, Women of Korea, 3 (91) (1981), pp. 20, 21.  
113 
 
educating Korean women, and performing domestic duties in the middle of battle. Kim Jong 
Suk is described as a revolutionary fighter faithful to Kim Il Sung and an outstanding female 
revolutionary activist, nurse, cook and tailor.
69
 Kim Jong Suk is shown negotiating the worlds 
of the domestic and nationalist femininity,
70
 as seen in the different roles she performs and in 
her clothing. In visual images, a young Kim Jong Suk continues to wear clothing similar to 
Kang Ban Sok, the ethnic Korean clothing for women (hanbok), but in later artworks she is 
seen in a feminised military uniform.  
 The article “Only for the Sake of the Leader” states that Kim Jong Suk was born on 
24 December 1917 to a poor peasant family in Hoeryong County in North Hamgyong 
Province (present day northeast DPRK).
71
 With her family, Kim Jong Suk fled Korea to 
Yanji (Jilin Province, China) around 1922. By 1935, when she was 18 years old, all members 
of her family had died. The Chinese village in which her mother and sister had lived is said to 
have been attacked by the Japanese military and the two women were killed. Kim Jong Suk’s 
elder brother, Kim Ki Jun (dates unknown) was arrested by the Japanese authorities, jailed 
and died whilst imprisoned. Her younger brother, Kim Ki Song (dates unknown) died for 
unreported reasons in December 1933. The article continues that with “bitter grief in her 
heart”, Kim Jong Suk set out on the road in search of Kim Il Sung, the leader of the Korean 
revolution.
72
 In early 1935, Kim Jong Suk met Kim Il Sung for the first time, at Xiongzhiying 
in Sandaowan (Jilin Province, China). It was at this location that a secret guerrilla camp had 
been established by Koreans who were fighting against the occupation of the country.
73
 After 
the meeting, Kim Jong Suk is quoted as saying, “He [Kim Il Sung] is really a great man... I 
will fight only for General Kim Il Sung at any time and at any place”.
74
 Since this initial 
meeting, Kim Jong Suk was a loyal follower of Kim Il Sung and the revolutionary cause, and 
she did not waver until her death in September 1949.  
In visual images, Kim Jong Suk is represented as a revolutionary soldier, ready to 
sacrifice herself for both Kim Il Sung and the Korean nation.
75
 This is evident in the image 
captioned, “Dauntless Revolutionary Fighter Comrade Kim Jong Suk Guards the Great 
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Leader at the Risk of Her Life” (see figure 4.6).
76
 Suk-Young Kim suggests that North 
Korean artworks and their captions work in tandem to contain and redirect the dual roles of 
women, as housewives and revolutionary fighters, towards each other.
77
 She notes that the 
military space dominates paintings such as this one while the caption draws attention to the 
domestic role of Kim Jong Suk.
78
 This is demonstrated in the following paintings that 
represent Kim Jong Suk performing domestic chores whilst on the battlefield. Accompanying 
this painting (see figure 4.6) the article “Anti-Japanese Heroine” states:  
 
Sometimes, shielding the great leader with her [Kim Jong Suk’s] own 
body, she shot down enemies one by one at a stroke at the critical 
moment for the great leader owing to the secretly approaching enemy 
soldiers and sometimes she saved the Headquarters of revolution and 





Kim Jong Suk stands in front of Kim Il Sung, lovingly protecting her husband from enemy 
fire and apparently ready to give her own life to the anti-Japanese cause and husband, 
therefore illuminating the role of loyal and self-sacrificing wife. The two main figures, Kim 
Jong Suk and Kim Il Sung, stand in the centre of the painting, while other revolutionary 
soldiers surround them in less prominent positions. No eye contact is made between the 
revolutionaries as they look out of the painting. The artist has highlighted the importance of 
the two main figures by centring them in the artwork and creating a halo effect around them, 
a painting technique also employed in Christian religious art. A white cloud also floats 
around the Kims to ensure their dark military clothing stands out from the dark background. 
In the painting, Kim Il Sung is elevated in this painting, so the viewer’s eye is drawn first to 
his face. He stands confidently with one hand placed on the rock and the other holding a 
pistol.  
The dark brown military uniform of Kim Il Sung is similar to that worn by Chinese 
revolutionaries. Initially, the suit was named the Sun Yat-Sen suit after the Chinese Leader 
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Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925) and later the Mao suit after Mao Zedong (1893–1976).
80
 Shortly 
after the founding of the Republic of China (1 January 1912–10 March 1912), Sun Yat-Sen 
introduced the style as a form of national dress. The suit though, had a distinctly political and 
later governmental implication. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, the suit became widely worn by males and government leaders as a symbol of 
proletarian unity. From this time, the suit was known by the name Mao suit after Mao 
Zedong’s affinity for wearing them in public. Thus, the garment became the symbol of the 
Chinese leader and the Chinese communist movement. In the North Korean context, Kim Il 
Sung is always shown wearing this suit when fighting the revolutionary cause. 
 In the painting, “Dauntless Revolutionary Fighter Comrade Kim Jong Suk Guards the 
Great Leader at the Risk of Her Life” (see figure 4.6), the other male revolutionary soldiers 
are dressed in uniforms similar to that worn by Kim Il Sung.
81
 The colour of the soldiers’ 
uniforms, though, is a dull green and the jackets have collars, unlike the style worn by Kim Il 
Sung. These men hide behind rocks and the long grass, indicating to the viewer that they are 
less important than the two central figures and perhaps less brave then the two Kims. Each of 
the soldiers holds a gun ready to defend the country against the enemy. These men are 
vigilant and dedicated to the struggle against Japan but appear in this painting in a supportive 
role to the Kims. In Women of Korea, it is not common for male revolutionary soldiers to 
appear in such revolutionary paintings, as this magazine tends to emphasise the importance of 
revolutionary female soldiers and the role of the Kim men in defending the country.
82
  
Kim Jong Suk stands confident in the battlefield and depicts characteristics of 
devotion, strength and courage. Her military uniform is a vibrant green colour, a symbol of 
the revolutionary heroine, and is a feminised version of the male uniform. This styling 
difference ensures viewers know that while equal on the battlefield there are expectations as 
to how a North Korean woman should dress and behave. To exemplify further the differences 
between genders, Kim Jong Suk wears a knee-length skirt rather than trousers, while full-
length white socks cover her legs. By dressing the female revolutionary solider in a military 
skirt, it suggests that this clothing was adopted to mark women’s supportive role to their male 
comrades. Kim Jong Suk’s jacket is drawn in tightly at the waist by a belt, showing the shape 
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of her body and thus sexualising the figure. Suk-Young Kim argues that feminised military 
uniforms signified women’s participation in social and economic structures, but at the same 
time, their feminine shape was a constant reminder of the different positions held by men and 
women in the public sphere.
83
 
Retaining patriarchal ideals of a male-centred society, North Korea’s leaders have 
perceived women’s and men’s dress as separate national projects, forging different corporeal 
practices for the two genders.
84
 In the visual images of female revolutionary soldiers, North 
Korean official artists have selected clothing for women which they consider to be 
appropriately feminine. Suk-Young Kim argues that North Korean leaders have regulated 
gendered bodily practices through the production and consumption of women’s fashion from 
the 1960s to the 1970s.
85
 It was during this formative period in North Korea’s history that 
Juche (self- reliance) and national purity governed everyday life under the leadership of Kim 
Il Sung.
86
 While the military uniform in paintings signified women’s participation in social 
and economic structures, at the same time it highlighted gender differences on the battlefield 
and in the public sphere. The techniques employed by the artists to both gender and sexualise 
the female figure remind us that the progress of gender equality in the DPRK is limited 
because of the patriarchal practices and structure of the North Korean government. As a 
result, paintings such as “Only for the Sake of the Leader” are a reminder of the different 
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Figure 4.6 “Dauntless Revolutionary Fighter Comrade Kim Jong Suk Guards the Great 
Leader at the Risk of Her Life”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. “Only for the Sake of the 
Leader”, Women of Korea, 2 (70) (1976), pp. 13, 14. 
 
 
Below I discuss the representation of Kim Jong Suk negotiating domestic 
responsibilities and public responsibilities on the battlefield. Close examination of the visual 
images reveals that these two domains are not separate but are in fact intrinsically linked as 
Kim Jong Suk is depicted performing domestic chores on the battlefield. In the following 
three paintings, the representation of Kim Jong Suk as a mother figure, a cook and a tailor is 
taken from the domestic sphere to the front line, suggesting a new realm for domestic 
labour.
87
 The visual imagery of Kim Jong Suk marks the transition from the ideal traditional 
woman who performs her duty to her family above all else (as seen in the representation of 
Kang Ban Sok) to the new role of woman as defender of the country. For Kim Jong Suk the 
two spheres are not mutually exclusive but coexist harmoniously and form a feminine virtue 
that is much more complicated than the depictions of Kang Ban Sok.
88
 This complication 
arises from trying to meld together the roles of women in and outside of the home. While the 
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government attempts to encourage ordinary women to join the labour force, it also restricts 
them to stereotypical gender roles in the home.  
 The role of North Korean women as primary food preparers and cooks is seen in the 
visual images and articles about revolutionary heroines in Women of Korea.
89
 The article 
“Iron Pot” depicts Kim Jong Suk preparing food for the soldiers of the revolutionary cause. 
According to the article, one autumn day in 1934, Kim Jong Suk was preparing lunch in an 
iron pot for the revolutionary fighters when suddenly the Japanese enemy attacked.
90
 The 
food was boiling hot but she did not want to leave it behind, as the soldiers would have gone 
hungry. She is said to have placed a handful of dry grass on her head and then the boiling pot 
upon it. Kim Jong Suk then climbed up a hill following the revolutionary soldiers, with 
bullets flying past her ears, while carrying the boiling pot on her head, and successfully 
delivered the food to her fellow comrades. Stories of Kim Jong Suk’s determination and 
courage in defending the nation and performing domestic duties on the battlefield are 
common in the magazine.
91
   
 In the accompanying painting captioned, “Comrade Kim Jong Suk, an Indomitable 
Revolutionary Fighter, Climbs Up a Height Carrying a Boiling Gruel Pot on Her Head for the 
Sake of Her Comrades-In-Arms” (see figure 4.7), the main figure looks into the distance.
92
 A 
cloud floats behind her and accentuates her importance. This technique also highlights the 
body shape of the revolutionary heroine and the feminine characteristics of the figure. In the 
distance, an unidentified woman follows Kim Jong Suk. The hairstyle of the main figure is 
new and modern, cut short, unlike Kang Ban Sok, who wears her hair long and tied behind 
her head. During the colonial period, cutting one’s hair represented a gesture of revolt from 
Confucianism as it had previously been banned in any public place as a social offence, 
regardless of gender.
93
 During the twentieth century, short hair for women in many East 
Asian countries strongly signalled feminism.
 
 
 Unlike the earlier painting of Kim Jong Suk (see figure 4.6) as a revolutionary fighter, 
here she wears the hanbok, with the skirt (chima) shortened to below the knee and the waist 
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drawn in with a belt.
94
 These modifications would have made it easier to move and work, but 
in the visual representation this also highlights the figure’s gendered body.
95
 The transition 
from the modified longer length hanbok to shorter skirts and longer length jackets (jeogori) 
occurred at a slow pace across Korea.
96
 A number of Korean women viewed the modified 
hanbok as a wonderful change and adopted it to wear whilst working but continued to wear 
the longer length in the home.
97
 Korean women living in rural areas continued to wear the 






Figure 4.7 “Comrade Kim Jong Suk, an Indomitable Revolutionary Fighter, Climbs Up a 
Height Carrying a Boiling Gruel Pot on Her Head for the Sake of Her Comrades-In-Arms”. 
Date unknown. Oil Painting. “In the Sacred War for National Liberation”, Women of Korea, 
3 (107) (1985), p. 5. 
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Visual images and stories representing Kim Jong Suk in the role of mother taking care 
of young children appear frequently in Women of Korea.
98
 In the article, “For the Future of 
Revolution”, Kim Jong Suk is described as a member of the Committee of the Bagou Young 
Communist League and an instructor of the Children’s Corps, who worked in a guerrilla base 
camp along the Tuman River and helped to establish a school for children whose parents 
were revolutionary fighters.
99
 At the school, young Korean children were educated in the 
words of Kim Il Sung. Kim Jong Suk is also said to have fed, clothed, and nursed these 
children, taking on the responsibility of nurturing the children in the absence of their own 
mothers. Here, the representation of the young Kim Jong Suk fulfils a similar role to Kang 
Ban Sok as “Mother of Korea”. While Kang Ban Sok was mother to Kim Il Sung and fellow 
revolutionary fighters and thus the entire Korean population, Kim Jong Suk took on the role 
of mother figure to the future of the revolution and country. It was as though all hope of 
succeeding in the revolution was the responsibility of these women. This responsibility was 
then to be transferred to the lives of ordinary women who were expected to care for and raise 
their children according to the teachings of Kim Il Sung. Thus, along with their childrearing 
responsibilities, the burden of North Korea’s future was now on women, who were to raise 
their children according to the revolutionary thought of the Kim family.  
 The article, “For the Future of the Revolution”, depicts events in November 1935, 
when the Korean guerrilla base in Chechangzi (Jilin, China) was dissolved because of 
fighting in the area. In this context, the question arose as to how to deal with the Children’s 
Corps members and how to move them to a new location.
100
 Revolutionary heroine Kim Jong 
Suk is said to have taken responsibility for the children’s safety and led them to a safer place. 
The story of moving the Children’s Corps members to a new location is captured in the 
painting “Indomitable Revolutionary Fighter Comrade Kim Jong Suk Carrying Bullets to 
Height Together With the Children’s Corps Members” (see figure 4.8).
101
 Kim Jong Suk is 
represented as the carer and protector of several children, as well as a revolutionary soldier as 
she carries bullets for her comrades.
102
 In the accompanying article, Kim Il Sung is quoted. 
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Comrade Jong Suk gave much loving care to children in her lifetime. 
Whether she fought in the mountain or she came back to the liberated 




This statement confirms the gendered view of the government that the role of women is to 
care for children combined with their duty to fight for the revolutionary cause.  
 In the painting, Kim Jong Suk leads a small group of children through the snow to 
safety. She looks back in the direction of the children to make certain all are following her. 
The two boys in the lead look forward and out of the picture, while the other children look in 
the direction of Kim Jong Suk. In particular, one young girl looks up towards the 
revolutionary heroine waiting for further instructions and seemingly pleading with her not to 
stop. Kim Jong Suk has placed a hand on the girl’s shoulder to comfort her. It is said that, on 
the journey, Kim Jong Suk comforted the children with the warmth of her body while they 




The viewer is drawn first to the most important figure in the painting, Kim Jong Suk, 
because of her height compared to the children. The clear background draws the viewer’s 
attention to her face and body shape. The figures of the children, by contrast, tend to blend in 
with their surroundings as they all stand at the height of the forest. Kim Jong Suk does not 
wear the ethnic Korean dress or military uniform. Instead, her clothing style appears to be a 
mixture of both and consists of a modified jacket and skirt. The jacket does not fit closely to 
her body but is large and tends to hide her figure.  
During the colonial period, the movement to reform the old-style ethnic clothing into 
a more functional dress code was motivated not only by the practical suggestion that 
Western-style dress offered better mobility but also by a symbolic order in which wearing 
Western clothing was a gesture toward civilising the self in a globalising world.
105
 Western-
influenced fashion codes gradually became popular during the period of Japanese occupation 
amongst younger Korean women and educated upper-class women, while older women still 
preferred to wear the ethnic dress.
106
 Underwear, slips, socks, and shoes were not replaced 
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but remained the same ethnic Korean style.
107
  However, with the introduction of Western 
clothing during the Japanese colonial period many Koreans saw it as compromising national 
purity.
108
 The North Korean government later labelled Western clothing as oppressive and 
bourgeois because the so-called “New Women” of the colonial period took part in the new 
material culture often through their wealthy families.
109
 Therefore, in the new North Korean 
state, Western-influenced fashion was eradicated from women’s wardrobes as representing 
remnants of the colonial past and the cultural traits of the enemy class, the bourgeoisie.  
New socialist clothing norms arose as alternatives to the Western-style garments that 
had been brought to Korea through what was seen as a corrupting Japanese influence.
110
 
Unlike China, which designed a national dress code for both men and women based on the 
clothing worn by their revolutionary leader Mao Zedong,
111
 the DPRK did not promote 
androgynous clothing. In China from the 1950s to the 1970s women dressed in sympathy 
with the proletariat and wore loose-fitting trouser suits, lacking in ornamentation.
112
 The 
difference in clothing between genders was in the styling of the collar and pockets. In the 
Korean context, there was a strong return to Korea’s past before colonisation as the 
traditional hanbok was approved by the state for women to wear. Korean men, however, wore 
modified Western-style suits (similar to the suits worn in Communist China, as noted above). 
The longer one examines North Korean artwork representing men and women it becomes 
unquestionable that North Korea’s leaders and official artists have perceived women’s and 
men’s dress as separate national projects. As in many other colonial and post-colonial 
contexts, it is women who are the carriers of national identity through their dress.
113
  
In, “Indomitable Revolutionary Fighter Comrade Kim Jong Suk Carrying Bullets to 
Height Together With the Children’s Corps Members”, the female Korean children wear a 
light coloured jacket closely resembling the traditional Korean jacket (jeogori) over a 
shortened version of the traditional Korean skirt (chima). The two young girls also wear 
scarves as protection from the cold. In comparison, the two young boys are dressed in long 
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trousers, jackets, and hats. The boys also wear scarves. The triangular red scarf is said to 
represent a corner of the Communist flag, dyed red from the blood of martyrs.
114
 The clothing 
worn by the children resembles uniforms worn by Chinese Young Pioneers. In both North 
Korea and China, children were regarded as the hope and future in each respective country. 
The clothing styles of these children are clearly gendered, suggesting that gendered 
expectations start from an early age in official discourse in the DPRK. 
 
Figure 4.8 “Indomitable Revolutionary Fighter Comrade Kim Jong Suk Carrying Bullets to 
Height Together With the Children’s Corps Members”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. “For the 
Future of Revolution”, Women of Korea, 3 (103) (1984), pp. 10, 11. 
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Alongside her role as revolutionary fighter, Kim Jong Suk is also represented in 
Women of Korea as performing domestic duties such as sewing on the battlefield.
115
 The 
article, “It Is Honourable Either to Live or to Die for the sake of Comrade Commander”, 
relates that in autumn 1939, Kim Il Sung assigned the task of making military uniforms for 




Upholding the orders of the great leader, she [Kim Jong Suk] together 
with some women guerrillas made 600 suits of military uniform with 
a single sewing machine within 20 days and brilliantly carried out the 
underground political work in the area covered with the forest of 




In this story, due to her loyalty to both Kim Il Sung and the struggle against the Japanese 
aggressors, Kim Jong Suk went to a secret camp where the tailor corps was located. She 
appealed to the women to complete the task of making all 600 military uniforms in less than a 
month.
118
 All women are said to have worked hard to fulfil this request. Only women 
compose the tailor corps, and there is no representation in any story or visual image of men 
sewing alongside the women on the battlefield. This reinforces the ideology that women 
should perform duties that are customarily deemed to be household chores and that North 
Korean men do not. Kim Il Sung is quoted as recognising how difficult it was going to be to 




Needless to say, it is not an easy job for the few tailor corps 
members, to make 600 uniforms in a short time. But, in order to bring 




The success of the fight against the Japanese fell on the shoulders of Kim Jong Suk and other 
revolutionary heroines and not just on the men fighting on the frontline. Further, it is implied 
that without these uniforms the male revolutionary soldiers would have been unable to 
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perform their military duties. Under so much pressure to produce 600 military uniforms, the 
women worked day and night but in the final stages, the sewing machine needle broke.
121
 
Faced with this situation, Kim Jong Suk was forced to sew the remaining military uniforms 




 Visual images such as “She Produced Military Uniforms During the March” (see 
figure 4.9) ensure women can identify with exemplary women capable of achieving all state 
goals.
123
 The painting captures the story of the tailor corps making the military uniforms on 
the battlefield in the middle of a forest. In the centre of the painting, Kim Jong Suk sits at a 
sewing machine, with one hand on the fabric and the other on the machine. The viewer’s gaze 
is first drawn towards Kim Jong Suk as she dominates the painting by her large scale. In the 
background, two female revolutionary soldiers support the work of Kim Jong Suk by 
preparing the material for the military uniforms. One woman carries cloth, while the other is 
sewing by hand. Each woman wears a feminised version of the military uniform, comprised 
of a hat, a jacket, a skirt and long socks or stockings. The uniforms are modest and do not 
reveal the female form, conforming to the virtues of modesty and purity. As noted above, 
whilst including women in the revolutionary struggle the modified uniforms ensured that 
women could participate and be recognised in a male dominated domain. The uniform, 
though, also clearly highlights differences in roles based on gender. It can be said that while 
men participated in combat, women were defined by duties that were perceived to be 
acceptable for women – sewing and cooking. In other words, women were portrayed as 
contributing to the revolution by carrying out duties that were typically associated with 
women’s work within the home. In the painting, Kim Jong Suk and her female comrades also 
have short haircuts, representing modernity. While intended to show to the international 
community the success of integrating women in the revolutionary struggle, these images 
rather demonstrate the contradictory elements of the North Korean government’s plan to 
liberate women from the home while promoting the idea that men and women are equal. 
Although women are represented outside the house working alongside their male 
counterparts, they are stereotyped to certain gendered roles usually associated with the 
domestic sphere.  
 














Figure 4.9 “She Produced Military Uniforms During the March”. Date unknown. Oil 
Painting. “Sewing Machine”, Women of Korea, 4 (112) (1986), p. 16.  
 
 
Kim Il Sung and his male family members are represented in visual images and 
stories which capture ideal masculine qualities of strength and loyalty, ready to defend the 
country. Below I discuss the symbolism of Kim Il Sung as a father figure in visual images 
published in Women of Korea. The representation of Kim Il Sung went far beyond the 
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The “Fatherly General” Kim Il Sung  
Since the 1970s, the stereotypical gender roles of men and women have been reflected in the 
patriarchal political culture of the DPRK.
125
 This can be seen in the approved North Korean 
visual media such as the magazine Women of Korea, and the representation of Kim Il Sung as 
the “Fatherly General” or “The Father Leader” and the WPK as the “Mother Party”.
126
 The 
political power within the DPRK personified the “Fatherly General” and the “Mother Party” 
under the justification of a stable patriarchal political system governed by a paternalistic 
leader.
127
 These representations of Kim Il Sung and the WPK impacted on all aspects of 
North Korean society including the roles of ordinary men and women.
128
 
In Women of Korea, it is said that North Korean children grow up happily with no 
worries under the warm fatherly care of Kim Il Sung and that he never forgot the children of 
the revolutionary soldiers in the busy days when he led the anti-Japanese armed struggle to 
victory.
129
 The painting “The Fatherly Leader General Kim Il Sung Embracing the Members 
of the Children’s Corps in Mt. Maan-sha’n” (see figure 4.10), represents Kim Il Sung with 
young children, similar to Christian paintings and suggests that Kim Il Sung himself is a God-
like figure and saviour or liberator of the Korean people.
130
 Religious language and painting 
techniques are regularly employed when referring to Kim Il Sung and his family members 
and many comparisons could be made with depictions of religious figures such as Christ.
131
 
Paintings of Kim Il Sung often represent him surrounded by children, like traditional 
religious paintings of Jesus (see figure 4.10) or they show him standing on top of a mountain 
or hill bathed in light (see figure 4.6). In “The Fatherly Leader General Kim Il Sung 
Embracing the Members of the Children’s Corps in Mt. Maan-sha’n” (see figure 4.10), both 
the caption and the painting represent Kim Il Sung as the father figure, rescuer of and 
provider for the young children, who symbolise the North Korean people as well as the future 
of the revolutionary cause in the DPRK. It is said that the paternal role of Kim Il Sung was 
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The clothing worn by Kim Il Sung and the Children’s Corps members is clearly 
gendered even though they all wear modified ethnic Korean-style clothing, except for Kim Il 
Sung who is dressed in a military uniform. The younger male and female children wear 
hanbok. The boys wear a jacket or a vest, which has been worn by Korean men since the late 
Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1897). The jacket has changed little since this time, but the vest was 
a new addition based on the Western-style vest.
133
 The young boys also wear trousers similar 
to the traditional ones worn since the Chosŏn Dynasty. In the painting, all male figures 
including Kim Il Sung and the young boys wear short hairstyles. In 1895, King Gojong 
(1852–1919) (Chosŏn Dynasty) ordered all Korean men to cut their hair short and wear 
Western-style clothing.
134
 By cutting their hair and wearing Western-style clothing, it was 
believed that men were taking the first step towards a modern nation.
135
 In comparison, the 
young girls in the painting wear the modified female hanbok. The length of the dress has 
been shortened to allow for easier mobility but the sleeves remain long and cover their arms. 
Each of the young girls also wears a modern short hairstyle. 
 Kim Il Sung is seen to be comforting two of the children in the painting. He holds the 
hands of the young girl who stands in front of him and embraces another who stands beside 
him. Both girls appear happy and safe in the arms of the leader. The other children from the 
Children’s Corps stand around him, looking up to the fatherly leader with admiration in their 
eyes. These children were groomed to carry on the political goals of Kim Il Sung in 
makeshift schools established on guerrilla bases. Concerned about the life of these children, it 
is said that Kim Il Sung provided them with gifts of new warm clothes and quilts. In return 
for protection and gifts, the children were said to be so deeply moved and grateful for the 
great love of Kim Il Sung that they made a winter suit and padded boots, which they 
presented to him.
136
 In the article, “Fatherly Love”, it states that because of the parental care 
of the “Fatherly General” (Kim Il Sung) towards the North Korean people, the children 
(symbolic of the nation) showed enduring love and devotion towards their leader.
137
   
 According to Sonia Ryang, in this “state-engineered process of the production of love 
and loyalty discourse” towards Kim Il Sung, the “North Korean people on the whole play a 
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129 
 
stereotypical ‘female’ part [just like] in old-fashioned romantic tales”.
138
 Ryang adds that 
North Korean men and women are represented as being “in love” with Kim Il Sung, adoring 
his image, cherishing his figure, admiring his manly beauty and wisdom, and totally 
submitting to his command”.
139
 Kim Il Sung held absolute power over the North Korean 
population, not necessarily by way of violence and oppression, but through the representation 
of benevolence and fatherly love and the responsibility for each household.
140
 Ryang suggests 
that because of the feminisation of the population gender inequality in North Korean society 
has effectively been cancelled because “men and women, young and old” play a feminised 
role.
141
     
 Alternatively, Immanuel J. Kim states that the North Korean government inevitably 
excludes the presence of women, whose sole responsibility is to support the nation through 
their motherhood.
142
 Kim continues that while new gender equality laws, and women’s 
participation in the workforce, military, and other social institutions suggest a paradigmatic 
shift towards a progressive North Korean state, women’s essential function in society is to 
reproduce the next generation of socialist revolutionaries.
143
 Kim asserts that for women to be 
integrated into a state like the DPRK, they have to become masculinised, where women, too, 
need to acquire the patriarchal language.
144
 In other words, gender equality in the DPRK does 
not eliminate gender difference but homogenises gender into a single masculine gender. 
Therefore, masculine discourse in the DPRK has conveniently eliminated gender difference 
and equality, instating the hegemony of males.
145
 I would argue however, that the North 
Korean population has neither been feminised nor masculinised but infantilised. North 
Korean men and women have equally been infantilised as they all are represented equally 
loving and cherishing the leader Kim Il Sung as their father. There is still, however, a 
gendering of societal roles. Women have continued to be represented in stereotypical 
feminine roles within the home, while the representation of men in the home is largely absent 
due to the masculine role being replaced by Kim Il Sung himself. Therefore, the role of men 
has fundamentally been left undefined by the North Korean government and in the pages of 
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Women of Korea. Instead, Kim Il Sung has replaced the role of ordinary men as the head of 
the household, as the provider and protector of all North Korean families.  
The visual representations and the stories of the Kim family in the magazine Women 
of Korea fostered and encouraged the idea that this heroic family epitomised national purity 
through their resistance to Japanese aggressors.
146
 This can be seen in the representations of 
Kang Ban Sok and Kim Jong Suk, promoted as feminine revolutionary subjects who were 
capable of caring for their families and the nation. These women, though, held no significant 
decision making power in the government to truly influence the patriarchal structure of the 
state or society and instead reinforced the gendered view of the government that women’s 
primary roles were in the home. The visual images and stories of Kim Il Sung as the 
“Fatherly General” of all North Korean people replaced the nurturing role of ordinary North 
Korean men within their family. These gendered representations of the Kim family members 
reinforced the gendered assumptions made by the government. These expectations however, 
undermined the government’s stated goal of liberating women from their homes and the 
provisions included in North Korean laws to ensure women shared equal rights with men. 
Further, these representations in Women of Korea of men and women undermined the 
government’s goal of promoting a positive and equal society for all North Koreans to the 
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Figure 4.10 “The Fatherly Leader General Kim Il Sung Embracing the Members of the 
Children’s Corps in Mt. Maan-shan”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. “Fatherly Love”, Women 




From the 1960s, the magazine Women of Korea featured a series of visual images and stories 
about the Kim family – Kim Il Sung, his mother Kang Ban Sok and his first wife, Kim Jong 
Suk. The depictions of the revolutionary Kim family present an idealised story of the 
liberation of the nation from Japanese colonial rule. While the Kim women are presented as 
heroic figures, who nevertheless support the revolution in gendered ways, through cooking, 
sewing and looking after children, Kim Il Sung is presented not only as a father figure in the 
Kim family, but as the patriarch of the nation. Within the DPRK, these representations of the 
Kim women provided heroic models for ordinary North Korean women to emulate, while 
also reinforcing the primacy and legitimacy of the Kim dynasty. In an international context, 
these representations promote the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. Although the North 
Korean government aimed to promote the idea that North Korean women shared equal rights 
with men the visual images and accompanying articles reveal the gendered assumptions made 
132 
 
by the government towards the roles of men and women. North Korean women were to leave 
the home and work alongside their male counterparts to rebuild the socialist state. However, 
men and women’s roles were gendered and men were to be soldiers and women mothers and 
wives, cooks and tailors. 
 In the next chapter, I discuss the representations of North Korean women in the labour 
force as seen in the magazine Women of Korea. From the 1980s, the North Korean economy 
began a downward turn as the Soviet Union and its satellites began to collapse. In this 
context, the emphasis on revolutionary heroines was slowly replaced with visual 
representations and articles on “ordinary” North Korean women. These women performed the 
roles of mothers and wives as well as contributing to the North Korean labour force as active 
and diligent workers. These exemplary women displayed skills the North Korean government 
wanted all women to display – loyalty to the state and hard work in society and the home. 
The emancipation of women in North Korea’s policy and laws revealed a backward aspect 
from this time, as the state’s patriarchal system was strengthened and women’s status was 
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5. Work and Family in Women of Korea  
 
We must step up the struggle to wipe out the feudal 
conventions of binding women to the home and other 
remnants of the old habits so that all of them will not only 
help their husbands who are participating in nation-
building endeavours, bring up their children well and run 
their homes thriftily, but also directly contribute to the 
nation-building work by their own labour efforts.  






From the 1970s, changes to the patriarchal system and the status of women in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) were influenced by both international and 
domestic political economic shifts. By this time Kim Il Sung had established a stable 
government and was preparing for the transfer of political power to his successor, Kim Jong 
Il.
2
 From this time, the emphasis on revolutionary heroines was slowly replaced in Women of 
Korea with an emphasis on the roles of ordinary North Korean women as wives and mothers 
who supported their husbands, sons, and families by working both inside and outside the 
home.
3
 In this chapter I examine the representation of ordinary women who performed their 
duties inside and outside the home as presented to the international community in the 
magazine. From this time the North Korean government promoted a positive image of 
women who were said to have shared equal rights with men. While women were encouraged 
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to work outside the home, this was in a clearly gendered North Korean labour force.
4
 As 
Sonia Ryang notes, the status of North Korean women was overwhelmed by traditional 
patriarchal values along with the logic of economic exploitation and gender differentiation in 




Although the North Korean government promised women the same work privileges, 
wages, and social security as men, in practice they were not paid comparable wages for 
essentially comparable work, and they were not equally promoted (see chapter 3 for further 
details on the North Korean legal system).
6
 Although the emancipation of women from the 
patriarchal family structure was strongly emphasised, their domestic labour was an important 
aspect of the national economy.
7
 Women’s roles in the home were subservient to male labour 
in the public sphere.
8
 In Women of Korea, the representation of protective male providers in 
the family unit was largely absent; rather the focus was on women who were expected to 
combine duties inside and outside the home. Therefore, any cultural and patriarchal 
restrictions that were placed on women were not eliminated simply by their joining the labour 
force. Instead, women’s responsibilities increased as they were expected to continue to 
perform their work in the home alongside their work in society. Under the surface of claims 
made by the North Korean government that women reached equality within society, the 
visual images and text rather reveal that discrimination against women continued to persist 
socially and culturally.  
In this chapter, I analyse the visual and textual representations in Women of Korea of 
ordinary North Korean women as mothers and workers in the labour force as promoted by the 
state.
9
 I begin with an outline of depictions of the contribution of ordinary North Koreans to 
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nation building in the 1970s national “Hidden Hero” campaign.
10
 I then go on to analyse the 
official rhetoric in the magazine of exemplary North Korean women who were mothers and 
wives, as well as workers in the so-called “light industries”. The roles of women in industries 
such as the childcare and education sectors,
11
 and the food industries
12
 were promoted in the 
articles and visual representations in the magazine.
13
 Women of Korea describes North 
Korean women as a major resource in the labour force, who were targeted to fill gaps in the 
light industries.
14
 The magazine reveals, therefore, the assignment of North Korean women to 
specific jobs deemed suitable and approved by the state. 
  
The “Hidden Hero” Campaign 
From the 1970s, articles and visual images in Women of Korea addressed women’s 
participation in the labour force and the socialisation of childcare facilities and the food 
industry. The “Hidden Hero” campaign is the background to the visual images and text 
published in Women of Korea from the 1970s to 1992.
15
 The selfless achievements of the 
heroes and heroines in the “Hidden Hero” campaign are said to resemble the devotion of Kim 
Il Sung to the building of the nation from the time of Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945).
16
 
The campaign was designed to increase the sentiments of nationalism amongst all North 
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Koreans. According to Immanuel J. Kim, “[i]n as much as collective memory of the Great 
Leader is state orchestrated, the Hidden Hero [or Heroine] is another campaign that sustained 
the continuity of the past and present”.
17
 The campaign singled out model citizens of both 
genders. The campaign not only encouraged North Korean men and women to participate 
actively in society, it also allowed the state to closely monitor their every move. It was 
imperative for the North Korean government to find those lacking in nationalism and loyalty 
to the Kim family and educate them with correct thought. Surveillance of North Koreans took 
place with the justification of finding heroic people amongst the population.
18
  
With the need to advance North Korean society under the Three Revolutions, the 
“Hidden Hero” campaign provided a motive for individuals to become involved in society.
19
 
These campaigns, though, never fully addressed or resolved the “woman question” in the 
DPRK, as the government understood that to achieve gender equality was to lessen women’s 
household duties and allow them to participate alongside their male counterparts in the labour 
force. Under North Korea’s economic campaigns, such as the Three Revolutions, women 
were targeted to join the labour force. Due to the state’s strong policies and institutional 
reform of socialisation of housework, women’s proportion of economic activities continued 
to increase until the late 1970s. Kim Il Sung is quoted as saying that it is “of tremendous 
significance to mobilise actively the women for the work of nation-building as they make up 
half the population”.
20
 To extol the value of the female workforce, visual media promoted 
images of ordinary North Korean women working in various places of employment but most 
notably in the food and textile industries and the education sector.  
 Before moving to representations of North Korean women in the labour force, I 
analyse the representations of ordinary men and women in the family unit. The images of 
women exemplified skills such as actively contributing to the revolutionary cause by helping 
to build a stronger economy, as well as the devotion of women as mothers and wives within 
their families. Consequently, women faced inevitable challenges from this time as they had to 
juggle both the domestic and public spheres. While the representation of ordinary North 
Korean men is largely absent in the magazine Women of Korea there are a few images that I 
will refer to.  
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Gender Roles in North Korean Families  
For at least two decades after the end of the Korean War (1950–1953), women were under 
intense pressure to produce more children.
21
 By the 1980s, however, the fertility rate in the 
DPRK was in decline with the average number of children born to women decreasing from 
6.5 in 1966 to 2.5 in 1988.
22
 The tendency to marry relatively late may be one factor affecting 
the fertility rates.
23
 The legal age to marry in the DPRK is 18 for males and 17 for females. 
However, since the 1980s, it has become increasingly common to marry in one’s late twenties 
or early thirties because of work and military service obligations.
24
 Maternity and childbirth 
have been given “protection” in North Korea’s legal system, as seen in Article 77 of the 1972 
DPRK Constitution. 
 
Women are accorded equal social status and rights with men. The 
State shall afford special protection to mothers and children by 
providing maternity leave, reduced working hours for mothers with 
many children, a wide network of maternity hospitals, crèches and 
kindergartens, and other measures. The State shall provide all 
conditions for a woman to play a full role in society.  
 
The granting of equal rights in law was not enough, though, to liberate women from 
patriarchy within the family structure.
25
 The concept of equality was strongly resisted by 
some in North Korean society such as in family relationships,
26
 which only superficially 
changed. For example, domestic work and the nurturing of children continued to be seen as 
“women’s work” by both the state and the majority of North Korean people.  
 Although women’s work outside the home was promoted, the DPRK had a larger 
number of women who stayed in the home compared to other socialist countries. There are 
many possible reasons, including: tradition still dictates that once married, a woman should 
stay at home to serve her husband and care for her children; marriage to high-income earners; 
reluctance of employers to retain married women; decline in North Korea’s economy and 
economic opportunity outside the official economy; and the government’s lack of concern for 
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the number of married women staying in the home.
27
 Once married some women voluntarily 
left their jobs but sought ways to generate income while also having the opportunity to stay at 
home. This practice was supposed to reduce the “double burden” of housework and economic 
employment, while increasing their economic independence.
28
 Whatever the reason, the 
number of homemakers increased to around 60 to 70 per cent by the mid-1980s.
29
 It should 
be noted that work in sideline production teams or neighbourhood work units was not 
officially counted as employment.
30
 The fact that a large number of women remain in the 
home suggests that views of gendered roles are strongly rooted despite legal provisions 
mandating equality. Confucianism defines women’s roles in the family in relation to male 




 Women as mothers appear in Women of Korea from the initial publication in 1966.
32
 
Kim Il Sung is quoted as emphasising that it is women’s natural duty to give birth and to raise 




The mother has to bear the major responsibility for home education. 
Her responsibility is greater than the father’s because it is she who 




This statement reinforces gender stereotypes within families and does not alter the model 
whereby men work outside the home and women look after children.
35
 This attitude is 
reflected in the painting “Dandelion” (see figure 5.1).
36
 The representation of Korean women 
as mothers was not new and can be seen from the mid-1920s, as the “wise mother, good 
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wife” ideal was promoted.
37
 As colonial oppression grew stronger in the 1930s in Korea, the 
doctrine of dedicated mothering gained even greater traction and many Koreans believed that 
their people’s future, including freedom from colonialism, depended on women’s willingness 
to sacrifice themselves to stay home and raise good sons and daughters.
38
 Becoming a mother 
was promoted as the most sacred duty and females who turned away from this role were 
accused of being over-sexed and vain.
39
  
 In the painting “Dandelion” the mother supports the young child by wrapping her 
arms around the child’s waist. The figures stand outside amongst plant life and both gaze at a 
flower held by the mother. Both child and mother blow lightly on the flower petals which 
float gently through the air. The child appears to be safe and happy with no care in the world. 
In this painting, it is difficult to tell the gender of the child as the child is dressed in yellow 
clothing, a gender-neutral colour. Further, the child is wearing a hat, so the viewer cannot see 
the length of the youngster’s hair, which could have indicated the gender. The mother is 
dressed in distinctly Korean clothing designed for women (joseonot/hanbok), which 
emphasises modesty, virtue, and feminine beauty. The sleeves of her hanbok though, are 
transparent allowing the viewer to see her skin. Suk-Young Kim states that in other North 
Korean cultural forms almost all female protagonists are projected in familial relationships, 
as mothers, sisters and daughters, to ensure that female characters do not incite erotic 
thoughts.
40
 This is confirmed by the visual images published in Women of Korea, which 
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Figure 5.1 “Dandelion”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. Women of Korea, 4 (132) (1991), p. 34.  
 
 
 In the painting “Toddler” (see figure 5.2) the roles of North Korean men and women 
within the family are clearly defined and are exemplified in the gendered roles performed and 
by the clothing worn.
41
 Four family members enjoy a day at a park and sit under a tree. The 
father and mother figures sit on a park bench watching their small child attempt to walk 
towards them, assisted by his older sister. The representation of the family dynamics appears 
to show gender-specific roles based on masculine and feminine expectations. Unlike other 
socialist states, such as the Soviet Union and China, the North Korean government kept the 
nuclear family together to ensure stability in society and the economy.
42
 This meant, 
however, that gender inequality and the gendered division of domestic labour in the home 
were maintained. It was thought that if the North Korean government had challenged the 
stereotypical gendered roles within families, it may have led to instability in society, the 
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labour force, and the basic unit of reproduction of future generations. Instead, the nuclear 




 While the government recognised women’s work in the home as a burden, there is no 
discussion of men’s responsibility to participate in domestic chores. On the rare occasion that 
the role of men in the home is mentioned in Women of Korea, they are represented in 
masculine stereotypical roles. The role of men is said to be centred on the responsibilities of 
providing financial support and moral guidance to their family. Men are typically depicted as 
responsible for the management of the household.
44
 Before the 1990s, North Korean 
households relied upon the state’s Public Distribution System (PDS) to ensure they had 
adequate food supplies and so they had little disposable income.
45
 Since the famine in the 
1990s, however, when people were forced to look for alternative ways to survive, trade along 
the North Korean and Chinese borders and marketplaces grew, thus incomes of some North 
Korean families also increased.
46
 In this situation the roles of North Korean men and women 
were challenged as women were more likely to work in trade and markets, becoming 
financially independent (see chapter 6 for further details on North Korean food crisis and 
gender roles).   
In Women of Korea, the painting “Toddler” is one of the few artworks to represent a 
man in the role of father and protector of his family, as this role is usually reserved for the 
national patriarch Kim Il Sung, as discussed above. In this painting, though, the father has 
taken on the role of protector of his family as he sits beside his wife on the park bench with 
his arm around offering support and comfort. He looks down, observing the young child as he 
attempts to take his first steps. Although he looks towards the child, the man does not appear 
too concerned with the events taking place before him as compared to his wife. The mother 
figure sits on the edge of the park bench and leans towards the child with concern in her eyes. 
She holds a child’s rattle, encouraging the youngest child to walk towards her. Even the elder 
sister has taken on the stereotypical feminine role as nurturer as she shows concern for the 
small child and assists him to walk. This suggests that the caring role of the man is not as 
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important in the family structure as the mother who is the primary nurturer of children. This 
is confirmed by the fact that the viewer can only see part of the father’s face, which is 
obstructed by the female figure.  
 In this visual image and others in Women of Korea, men are not represented wearing 
ethnic Korean clothing. As a way of practising the Juche ideology, which promotes extreme 
ethnocentrism, women did not abandon the Korean dress for Western clothing.
47
 While this 
explains the persistence of ethnic dress, it does not explain why only women had to express 
“Koreanness” through their bodies.
48
 In this painting, the clothing style and colours worn by 
the male and female figures are clearly gender-differentiated. While the father figure is 
dressed in Western style clothing, the mother is dressed in a light coloured pink and white 
hanbok, which modestly covers her body except for her face and hands. In the 1960s, the 
colour scheme of the female hanbok symbolised female modesty and chastity.
49
 The colour of 
women’s clothing continued to be an important indicator of the government’s assumptions 
about both genders well into the 1980s, as women are shown dressed in soft pastels rather 
than vibrant or dark colours. As can be seen in the paintings discussed so far, the female 
figures are represented in pale pastel colours symbolising femininity, modesty, and chastity.
50
 
In contrast, the male figure in this painting wears a modern Western-style suit in a dark blue 
colour, representing strength and masculinity.  
 The mother’s modesty in the painting is confirmed by her unmodified hanbok. Unlike 
the visual images discussed in the previous chapter, which depicted women clothed in 
modified dresses, this version of the hanbok does not reveal the body shape or legs of the 
wearer. In later editions of the magazine, the style of hanbok has returned to the traditionally 
longer version seen in the earlier representations of the revolutionary heroine Kang Ban Sok. 
This could suggest that the government wanted women to return a more modest and 
traditional life as personified by Kim Il Sung’s mother. While this clothing style ties women 
to Korea’s past, it also places them in a patriotic position compared to men, who are usually 
represented wearing Western-style clothing. It was thought that when North Korea men 
dressed and groomed in Western ways it was a symbol of progressiveness and modernity,
51 
suggesting that the status and roles of North Korean women are confined in the past and have 
not progressed towards modern life.  
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 A young girl is kneeling and looking towards the child with her arms stretched out 
encouraging him to walk towards her. The girl is dressed in a blue school uniform, her hair 
pulled back with a flower clip on top of her head. She wears a red handkerchief typically 
worn by the Young Pioneers Corps.
52
 The youngest child in the painting looks towards the 
older sister. By the hairstyle of the youngest child, it could be assumed that the figure is male. 
The young boy is dressed in a red sleeveless shirt, white pants, and red shoes. The viewer’s 
gaze is drawn to the child because of the colour of his clothing and because the other figures 
look in the direction of the youngster. This painting not only reinforces gendered assumptions 
about the role of men and women in the family, it also highlights the importance of children 
in North Korean society by drawing the viewer’s gaze to the most important figure in this 






Figure 5.2 “Toddler”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. Women of Korea, 4 (136) (1992), p. 22. 
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The Socialisation of Household Chores  
Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the North Korean government has promoted 
women’s participation in the labour force.
53
 Women also, however, remained the subject of 
gendered expectations whereby they were predominantly responsible for domestic chores and 
the care of children. Kim Il Sung is said to have acknowledged the hard work of women in 
building an economically independent nation combined with their roles in the home. In the 
article “At Sight of Women Carrying Water Jar on Head” published in Women of Korea, Kim 
Il Sung is quoted. 
 
Men eat meals cooked by women, and so, they do not know well 
about how painstaking women are. But women, even after they 





To ensure women were able to leave the home the government developed policies designed 
to lighten their domestic workloads.
55
 In 1972, at the Fifth Congress of the Worker’s Party of 
Korea (WPK), the congress made freeing women from the heavy burden of household work a 
major goal of the party. The government committed to providing childcare facilities, the pre-
packaged food industry, and laundromats to address the burdens of women in the home. Such 
a suggestion, however, rests on the belief that the home is not a workplace run by both 
genders.
56
 Although Kim Il Sung had promised timesaving equipment, it did not materialise 
for a majority of ordinary women, as items such as washing machines remained the property 
of a privileged few.
57
  
 The North Korean government strongly encouraged mothers to put their children into 
state-run childcare facilities and viewed it as a state responsibility to provide childcare, 
teaching and nursing necessities under the principle of the “best thing for the children”.
58
 
Although attendance at nurseries was optional it was available for three months to four year 
olds, while attendance at kindergarten was for children aged five to seven years and was 
compulsory. Between 1956 and 1960, the number of childcare facilities is said to have 
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increased 31 times, accommodating about 700,000 children.
59
 As of 1966, around 60 to 70 
per cent of all the children in the country were said to be at pre-school, cared for by a total of 
130,000 nursery and kindergarten teachers.
60
 It was reported that by 1985, more than 60,000 
nurseries and kindergartens had been built accommodating more than 3.5 million children.
61
 
All nurseries and kindergartens are said to be staffed by competent teachers, with food and 
adequate furniture.
62
 State-owned supply offices were established near each nursery and 
kindergarten and they were responsible for providing foodstuffs such as milk, meat, eggs, 
fruit, vegetables, and sweets as well as nursing and educational equipment, musical 
instruments, printed matters, teaching aids.
63
 No payment was required for the use of the 
childcare facilities and they were divided into three types, daily, weekly, and monthly so that 
mothers could meet their work commitments.  
  From the 1970s, the focus of the North Korean government was on developing the 
food industry to lessen the time women spent preparing meals in the kitchen. Kim Il Sung is 
said to have stated that the “most important thing we can do to lighten the women’s kitchen 
chores is to introduce innovations into the food industry”.
64
 This included the production of 
boiled rice, noodles, bread, and other foodstuff. At the same time, factories were established 
in towns and workers’ districts to process vegetables, meat, fish, and other food products by 
industrial methods so that women could prepare meals quickly and easily in the home.
65
 
There was a network of food take-out services for busy working women to collect premade 
food after work and before returning home. However, the variety of food that could be 
purchased from stores was extremely limited.
66
 It is said, though, that people’s dietary needs 
improved with the changes in the food industry.
67
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 The North Korean government emphasised the mass production of consumer goods 
centring on light industries as part of the Revolution of Technology.
68
 In 1972, at the Fifth 
Congress of the WPK, Kim Il Sung is quoted as saying that one of the  “vital tasks in the 
technical revolution is that of freeing women from the burden of kitchen and household 
work”.
69
 Kim Il Sung promised that refrigerators, cookers and other household appliances 
would be manufactured and the pre-packaged food industries would be established to make 
women’s lives easier within the home.
70
 Such a suggestion that women need to be freed from 
the burden of kitchen and household work rests on the assumption that they are responsible 
for the home, and men are not. Nowhere did Kim Il Sung mention men’s duties to undertake 
housework or caring for children.
71
  
   
North Korea’s Gendered Labour Force   
From the mid-1970s, the visual images in Women of Korea depicted ordinary women 
working outside the home, which coincided with the North Korean government’s emphasis 
on women leaving the home to build sustainable light industry. In order to provide suitable 
work for women the government transferred men from the light industries to heavy 
industries.
72
 This has resulted in significant occupational segregation between genders with 
women being assigned to low-skilled labour and unpopular work
73
 with lower pay. Men 
dominated the higher-paid jobs in mining and heavy industries, and took those with the 
highest status, as managers, university professors, and doctors.
74
 While wages in the DPRK 
do not have the same impact on the quality of people’s lives as in capitalist societies, such job 
segregation results in not just unequal pay, but also unequal status.
 75
 
 By 1970, women accounted for 70 per cent of the labour force in light industries and 
60 per cent of those employed in the agricultural sector.
76
 The 1980 data shows that women 
composed 70 per cent of the labour force in the light industry and just 15 per cent in heavy 
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 Specifically, women occupied 56 per cent of the labour force in the agricultural 
sector, 45 per cent in the industrial sector, while just 20 per cent in mining, and 30 per cent in 
forestry. In education, women accounted for 80 per cent of the elementary school teachers, 
while the figures for middle and high school, technical school and college were 35 per cent, 
30 per cent, and 15 per cent, respectively.
78
 Among professionals and technicians, women 
accounted for more than 37 per cent in 1989.
79
 In this respect, women’s proportion of 
economic activities was almost equal to men’s, seemingly showing gender equality. 
However, North Korean women worked prominently in feminised sectors such as agriculture, 
the education and light industries, which are typically paid lower wages, while men 




 The government promised women the same work privileges, wages, and social 
security as men but in practice women were not paid comparable wages for essentially 
comparable work, and they were not equally promoted.
81
 By 1980, women earned just 70 per 
cent of the average income of males, but continued to contribute significantly to household 
earnings.
82
 Although there was state legislation on equal employment and equal pay for men 
and women there remained significant occupational segregation between the genders.
83
 More 
importantly, even though some women worked as managers or supervisors in female 
preferred jobs, the proportion of women in high‐level positions was very low.84 The job 
segregation by gender reveals that the external equality of women’s economic participation 
did not necessarily guarantee actual equality in social activities.
85
  
As the North Korean government deemed factory work suitable for women they are 
described as playing a major role in the Revolution of Technology to increase consumer 
goods. This assumption is represented in visual images in Women of Korea, for example, the 
poster captioned, “Let Us Produce Mass Consumer Goods More and Better!” (see figure 
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 A woman stands among consumer products such as food, medical and stationery 
products. In her hands, she holds two rolls of fabric and behind her are items of clothing. This 
image is to encourage North Korean women to work harder to produce more consumer goods 
for society. The woman is dressed in a collared shirt and white apron and her hair falls to her 
shoulders. Her hair is covered with a scarf. The factory worker is clothed simply but retains 
distinctive feminine traits, such as long hair, and an apron to protect her clothing. The fact 
that she is dressed this way suggests that although women are said to participate in the labour 






Figure 5.3 “Let Us Produce Mass Consumer Goods More and Better!” Poster. Women of 
Korea, 2 (98) (1983), p. 41.  
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 In Women of Korea, women are often represented working in the textile industry and 
in clothing production but are also referred to by their domestic roles.
87
 In the article “From 
Zero”, the workers in the textile factory are referred to as homemakers and mothers.
88
 This 
textile factory is said to have been the first established factory in Sakje County (DPRK) with 
humble tools such as handlooms and spinning wheels.
89
 In the factory, ten “homemakers” 
were employed. This labelling of women as “homemakers” suggests that women were not 
seen as equal workers but instead as mothers first and then as contributors to North Korean 
society.  
 In the poster captioned, “Let’s Hit the Target of Textiles of New Long-Term 
Objectives Ahead of Schedule!” (see figure 5.4), a woman stands behind a table in a textile 
factory.
90
 Her hands are placed on machinery and she looks out towards the viewer. The 
woman wears a short-sleeved, collared blouse with a white apron covering and protecting her 
clothing. A soft flower motif decorates the blouse, symbolising femininity within the work 
environment. The clothing worn by the woman is simple and modern but retains distinctive 
feminine traits, such as the pattern printed on the clothing and the apron covering her clothes. 
The apron, an item of clothing usually associated with the domestic sphere, has been taken 
from the home and introduced into the workplace. The woman’s face is framed by a short 
bob ending below the ears and she does not wear any jewellery. Images such as this poster 
promote to the international community that North Korean women have left their homes to 
participate in the national economy. However, on closer examination of Women of Korea 
socially accepted gender inequalities are revealed.  
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Figure 5.4 “Let’s Hit the Target of Textiles of New Long-Term Objectives Ahead of 
Schedule!” Date unknown. Poster. Women of Korea, 4 (100) (1983), p. 41. 
 
 
 The visual images and personal stories in Women of Korea reflect the importance 
placed on women to educate the younger generation according to Kim Il Sung’s Juche idea. 
In the DPRK, education is considered crucial to the destiny of the country.
91
 All children, 
even those who live on remote islands or in mountainous areas are said to be educated at state 
expense and are regarded as the “Kings of the Country” [sic].
92
 There is said to be a free 
universal education system in the DPRK, which consists of a eleven-year program, 
compulsory for children to attend (1972 DPRK Constitution, Article 45). By 1980, women 
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composed 80 per cent of the labour force of primary school teachers and nursery school 
teachers.
93
 This dominance in the sector can be seen in the visual images and articles 
published in Women of Korea. For example, the article “Woman Principal in Mountain 
Village”, tells the story of a female teacher, Kim Yong Suk, who worked for more than 
twenty years at Sodu Senior Middle School, located in the remote area of Paegam County 
(Ryanggang Province, DPRK).
94
 The article states that she went to teach the students because 
no other teachers would live in a remote location. From the first day, Kim Yong Suk is said to 
have pledged to the students that she would stay in the area and not return to the city to marry 
as other female teachers had done previously.
95
 This claim places great importance on 
women’s contribution to educating the future generation rather than fulfilling one’s own 
plans, thus sacrificing one’s own happiness for the betterment of the country.  
 Kim Yong Suk was said to have been so dedicated to her work that even after 
teaching the students during the daytime, she would visit the students’ homes at night to 
guide them with their homework. However, the students’ work did not improve greatly so she 
started walking with them to and from school and taught them along the way. She is said to 
have made small plaques with mathematical formulas and foreign languages painted on them 
and placed the plaques on the trees along the path where the students walked. Kim Yong Suk 
was dedicated to improving the marks of students as they were the future of the revolution.
96
 
All students at the Sodu Senior Middle School were said to have become honour students 
because of Kim Yong Suk’s hard work.  
 The importance of women in the education sector is represented in the visual image 
“Children Enter School” (see figure 5.5), which depicts three teachers welcoming their 
students into the classroom.
97
 The large figure of the female teacher in the foreground is 
dominant as she towers over the students and wears bright coloured clothing. She looks down 
at her students happily. In comparison, the other teachers fade into the background and 
appear only in a supportive role to the main figure, the teacher in the foreground. The main 
teacher holds in one hand a book and with the other she is greeting a male student as he 
enters the classroom. All three teachers wear ethnic Korean clothing. The main teacher is 
dressed in a green hanbok with some alterations. While the sleeves of the dress cover her 
arms, her legs are exposed below the knees, a more modern form of tradition dress. The 
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teacher is groomed simply and is not adorned with elaborate make-up or jewellery; she wears 
a badge of one of the Kim men on her dress. Her hair is pulled back into a ponytail.
98
  
 The children enter the classroom and walk towards the desks. Some students carry 
colourful bunches of flowers and one student a hat. There are colourful ribbons on their 
schoolbags. The female students wear short dresses and short-sleeved collared blouses. Their 
hairstyles are varied in length but all wear light pink flower ornaments. Hair decoration in the 
form of ribbons, bows and flowers can be found in most North Korean visual images of 
young female children. This helps to feminise the figures and accentuates gender differences. 
The male students are dressed in trousers, short-sleeved collared shirts, and hats, with short 
hair. There are clear clothing differences between the students suggesting that the gendering 
of males and females starts from a young age. In no visual images are young girls depicted 
wearing long pants – they are always seen in dresses or skirts. In Women of Korea, working 
North Korean women are rarely represented wearing trousers or long sleeved shirts. On the 
rare occasion they are represented wearing trousers and jackets, their clothing is oversized 
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Figure 5.5 “Children Enter School”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. Women of Korea, 3 (131) 
(1991), p. 22.  
 








Figure 5.6 “Going to Farm Field”. Date unknown. Oil Painting. Women of Korea, 2 (86) 
(1980), p. 39.   
 
 
 The North Korean government places great importance on self-sufficiency and food 
production. In the agriculture sector, efforts to increase production included a variety of 
experiments with land tenure, farm organisation, and managerial techniques.
100
 Women were 
active members of the agricultural workforce during planting and harvesting, and laboured in 
road construction, land reclamation projects, and similar endeavours requiring mass 
mobilisation.
101
 In the images and articles in Women of Korea, women are often represented 
working on cooperative farms and producing food to sustain the country.
102
 The North 
Korean government saw women’s roles in the agricultural sector as an important contribution 
to self-sufficiency. Visual images of women working on cooperative farms as food producers 
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appear regularly in the magazine, for example, “A Nesting Place” (see figure 5.7).
103
  It is 
unusual though, to find depictions of men working alongside women in the agriculture sector 
in Women of Korea. In the painting, three people are working on a farm in an unspecified 
mountainous region of the DPRK.
104
 The small work team or perhaps a family work unit is 
composed of a man or father figure, a woman or mother figure, and a young woman or child. 
The man or father figure kneels beside the birdcage, looking down towards the pheasants that 
he is releasing into the wild. The male figure is dressed in Western-style clothing, consisting 
of a long sleeved collared shirt, blue trousers and straw hat.  
The older woman or mother figure stands beside the man with her hands in the air 
releasing one of the birds. The position of the woman within the artwork and the colour of her 
clothing draws the viewer’s eye to her. She stands tall and strong and wears the female 
hanbok with some alterations. Unlike the visual images discussed in the previous chapter that 
depict Kang Ban Sok in a traditionally long ethnic Korean dress, the length of this woman’s 
skirt (chima) is shortened. The vibrant pink and white skirt and jacket (jeogori) worn by the 
woman is drawn in at the waist, revealing her feminine shape and subtly sexualising the 
female figure.  
In the painting, the younger girl wears a light pink dress, resembling the Lenin dress 
of the Soviet Union.
105
 The Lenin dress symbolised the national revolution in the Soviet 
Union and was typically worn by female government staff.
106
 The clothing style became 
popular amongst Korean women in the early 1940s at the Yan’an revolutionary base 
(Shannxi, China). The dress later became associated with the Communist revolutionary 
movement in the Soviet Union and East Asia and was worn in support of the movement.
107
 
The young female figure stands in the background watching the man release the birds, while 
carrying a cage of pheasants towards him. In Women of Korea, this painting is significant as 
it represents the roles that men and women perform together in the North Korean agriculture 
sector. The composition of figures in the painting is unusual as it is usually just women who 




                                                     
103
 Women of Korea, 3 (103) (1984), p. 24. 
104
 “A nesting place”, Women of Korea, 3 (103) (1984), p. 24. 
105
 Powerhouse Museum, Chinese Dress 1700s–1990s, Evolution and Revolution (Sydney: Powerhouse 
Publishing, 2002), p. 23.  
106
 Mei Hua, Chinese Clothing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 141, 143. 
107










From 1989 articles and visual images in Women of Korea, include women’s fashion in 
the DPRK,
108
 traditional Korean food,
109
 and North Korean arts and literature.
110
 Below I 
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discuss three key issues covered in the magazine: laws that were promulgated to protect the 
rights of North Korean women, the rights of South Korean women and the so-called “comfort 
women” issue. 
 
The Law on Equality of the Sexes in Women of Korea  
In Women of Korea, several articles in the mid-1980s describe the legal measures taken by 
the North Korean government to ensure gender equality in the DPRK. Laws such as the Law 
on Equality of the Sexes were included in the magazine to argue to those outside the country 
that gender equality had been achieved in the DPRK.
111
 Before the liberation of Korea from 
Japanese colonial rule, it is said that Korean women had been subjected to double and treble 
exploitations and oppression for a long time.
112
 There were restraints imposed on Korean 
women such as no right to free marriage, confinement to their houses, or being sold like 
goods.
113
 However, one year after the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in 
1945, Kim Il Sung made preparations for the promulgation of the law and is said to have 
personally drafted the law himself.
114
 On 30 July 1946, Kim Il Sung is described as 
proclaiming to the world:  
 
With the liberation of Korea from the colonial rule of Japanese 
imperialism, the social position of women changed. The democratic 
reforms being carried out in north Korea have provided conditions for 
liberating women form the former inequalities in the political, 
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On the same day the Law on Equality of the Sexes was promulgated Comrade Kim Jong Suk 
is described as meeting the officials of the Women’s Union to share the joy with them about 
the new law.
116
 Informed that they were going to hold celebrations in the capital and 
provinces, Kim Jong Suk is quoted as follows.  
 
The celebrating meetings will be an effective occasion for education 
to get the women to know well about the significance and importance 
of the Law on Equality of the Sexes and make firm resolution to 
repay the favour to General Kim Il Sung who enacted the law.
117
   
 
Kim Jong Suk is then said to have taught the women how to hold the celebrations which took 
place across the country. Kim Jong Suk attended the celebration held in the DPRK’s capital 
Pyongyang, where she appealed to the women to take an active part in nation-building to 
demonstrate the validity and vitality of the Law on Equality of the Sexes.
118
  
 On 1 August 1946, Kim Jong Suk is said to have told the Women’s Union to issue a 
declaration supporting the Law on Equality of the Sexes. The declaration was to say:  
 
All the women in our country support the Law on Sex Equality. The 
Korean women had not been protected by law in state and public 
lives and even in family life for 5,000 years.  They had been forced 
into slavery and suffered subhuman insult and treatment as a good of 
the white slave market for 36 years under Japanese imperialist 





Under the guidance of Kim Il Sung and the promulgation of the Law on Equality of the 
Sexes, it is said that the position of Korean women changed radically as the Law granted 
equal rights with men in politics, the economy and society. During the early days after the 
promulgation of the Law, Kim Jong Suk guided the North Korean women to ensure they got 
“rid of the outworn idea of predominance of man over women and equip them with the idea 
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 It is also said that Kim Il Sung personally gave continuous guidance to the 




In Women of Korea it is claimed that North Korean women now enjoy a happy life 
and have no idea of gender inequality.
122
 These articles, looking back on the Law on Equality 
of the Sexes of 1946, appear around the fortieth anniversary of the Law in 1986. These 
articles were also published just after the United Nations International Decade for Women 
(1975–1985), and after the enactment of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women in 1979 (see Appendix 1). This suggests that the North 
Korean government might have been working with a consciousness of international events. 
 
South Korean Women in Women of Korea  
From the mid-1980s, several articles are published in Women of Korea that criticise the 
“failure” of women’s rights in South Korea and the lack of protection in the labour force.
123
 
In the article “Hard Work Place to Death”, Kim Il Sung is said to have taught North Korean 
women, that: 
 
[t]he South Korean [female] workers are exploited and oppressed 
more cruelly than in the days of Japanese imperialist rule. Far from 





When discussing the rights of South Korean women in contemporary society, articles 
published in the magazine refer to the “occupation” of Korea by the United States of America 
(USA). All South Korean women’s misfortunes and hardships in the labour force are said to 
be entirely due to the USA and its “imperial evil policy of colonial enslavement” in South 
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 From the 1980s, tensions grew between the North Korean government and the USA 
and South Korea due to the former US President Ronald Reagan’s (1911–2004) strong anti-
communist stance and more assertive foreign policy.
126
 It was from this time that articles 
published in Women of Korea, began to focus on the situation of South Korean women.  
 In the article “South Korean Women Groaning under ‘Hell of Labour’”, it is said that 
female workers in South Korea are suffering from severe exploitation and oppression and are 
“treated virtually as slaves” and paid low wages.
127
 South Korean women are said to be paid 
one-half or one third of the wages male workers receive for the same work performed.
128
 
According to data presented by the DPRK, the average monthly wage of female workers is 
about 100, 000 won (146 AUD/ 111 USD) in 1983. Further, 59 per cent of all South Korean 
women work over 10 hours a day and those women in public welfare services are forced to 
do 10 to 12 hours or more and have no holidays all year, as well as work overtime without 
pay.
129
  South Korean women are said to work in drudgery without taking meals and are in 
constant danger of dismissal at defective work places with no labour protection facilities 
available to them to access.
130
  
 Due to the poor working conditions, it is said that female workers are tortured with all 
kinds of occupational and other diseases. According to the article, every year there are several 
hundred cases of nervous paralysis in the lower body amongst the female workers. Further, 
workers in South Korean factories can lose their eyesight and develop tuberculosis symptoms 
because of the poisonous gas, high heat and a foul labour environment.
131
 The intensity of 
labour that the South Korean women are said to be compelled to is said to be far beyond the 
limit of their “physical strength”.
132
  The suffering of South Korean women working in the 
factories is said to not be an isolated case as women who work in the fibre, clothes and 
leather industries also suffer from injustices.
133
 In the DPRK, such depictions of the situation 
of South Korea would be intended to demonstrate the superiority of the North Korean regime. 
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When addressing an international audience, these English-language articles would be an 
attempt to claim legitimacy for the North Korean regime and the success of the provisions in 
state laws that protect the rights of North Korean women.  
   
The “Comfort Women” Issue in Women of Korea  
From the 1990s, there were articles in Women of Korea that explored the issue of the so-
called Korean “comfort women”, an issue that was then receiving international attention.
134
 
An article in the magazine, “Volunteer corps” states that the greatest crime committed by 
Japan against the Korean people was the drafting of Korean women as “comfort girls” in the 
name of the “volunteer corps”.
135
 The North Korean government asserts that the “volunteer 
corps” originated from Japan’s intention to assimilate the Korean nation to Japan and 
obliterate the Korean lineage.
136
 The article continues by stating that the “comfort girl” 
system was established on a secret order from the former Japanese Ministry of the Army, 
which initiated the system to prevent “the spreading of war weariness” among the troops.
137
 
The draft is described as applying to unmarried women aged from 17 to 20 years but girls in 
their teenage years were said to have been “dragged to comfort houses”.
138
 When they did not 
submit they were killed, shot, dismembered and hung.
139
 According to the article 
“Grievances”, in urban areas the comfort houses were managed by civilians under the 
guidance of the Japanese military and on the battle front by the Japanese themselves.
140
  
North Korea states that such women were first employed during the Japanese-Chinese 
War (or the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945) but numbers are said to have grown 
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after the massacre in Nanjing (1937–1938).
141
 After the event in Nanjing, the rape of women 
was prohibited by Japan so the so-called “comfort system” was said to have been established. 
In the article “Volunteer corps” the number of Korean women draftees in the Pacific War is 
estimated at about 200,000.
142
 In order to prevent the crimes against the Korean people being 
divulged during and after the occupation of the country, the North Korean government stated 
that Japan kept the matter of the “Volunteer corps” secret and that many documents that 
outlined what had happened were burnt.
143
 However, the crimes committed by the Japanese 
military were revealed by public activists, by the people involved in the crimes and by the 
victims themselves. The DPRK states that the criminal actions committed by Japan can never 
be pardoned nor should history be falsified.
144
 The North Korean government demands that 
the government of Japan apologise for the inhuman crimes committed against countless 
Korean women who were sent to sexual slavery by the Japanese military.
145
 The North 
Korean reporting of this issue suggests a consciousness of international debates. In the 
DPRK, the government’s statements on this issue would have been a means of promoting 
nationalist and anti-Japanese sentiment. In the international context, this would have been a 
means of deflecting certain criticisms of the North Korean regime. In particular, there was 
increasing attention in the 1990s to incidents where the North Korean government had 
abducted Japanese citizens, something which Kim Jong Il finally admitted in the year 2002 in 





Articles and visual images in Women of Korea represent the North Korean government’s 
constructed view of masculinity and femininity in society, the workplace and the family unit. 
The goal of the North Korean government to liberate women from the home was based on the 
assumption that women were primary caregivers and the belief that women had not 
previously contributed meaningfully to society as active workers in the labour force. It is 
evident in the articles and visual images in the magazine that North Korean women are 
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assigned to gender specific jobs in the labour force, which are based on their perceived 
attributes rather than actual ability. Women are assigned to occupations in the light industries 
and service industries such as textile manufacturing, nursing and teaching based on the belief 
that they are better suited to this work. Work in these industries is paid less than other 
occupations and women have fewer opportunities to progress to managerial roles. This means 
that any gender equality laws in the North Korean legal system are undermined by the 
segregation of women to gender-specific roles in the labour force. 
The North Korean government also promoted the idea in Women of Korea that 
women could successfully combine their roles in the home with their responsibilities to work 
in building a strong socialist society. In the family unit North Korean women continued to be 
represented wearing the ethnic Korean hanbok, while women working in the light industries 
were represented in simple and modern, but feminine, clothing. In contrast, North Korean 
men in the family and work context are not represented in ethnic Korean clothing but in 
Western dress, suggesting that men are able to progress into a modern North Korean society. 
The magazine regularly published articles on the Law on Equality of the Sexes, but at the 
same time the depictions of women as mothers and as workers reveal the gendered 
assumptions behind the allocation of domestic tasks and different occupations. As mentioned 
above, from the 1990s, the issue of the “comfort women” or military sexual slavery system 
perpetrated by the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy received increased international 
attention, and this is reflected in Women of Korea.
147
 The North Korean government 
attempted to mobilise attention to this issue in its international communications, as we shall 
see below. 
In the next chapter, I focus on the changing economic situation in the DPRK in the 
1990s. This provides necessary context for understanding the communications between the 
North Korean government and the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women in the early twenty-first century, to be explored in chapter 
seven. 
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6. The North Korean Food Crisis and   
Gender Relations (1990s) 
 
The current standard of living of our people cannot be 
said to be very high, but it is still higher than it was in the 
past. The young generation, not knowing what hardship 
is, are enjoying a life in which there is nothing in the 
world for them to envy. 





In previous chapters, I have considered the representations of North Korean men and women 
as presented to the world by the North Korean government in its official propaganda 
publication, Women of Korea. This official publication presented the roles of revolutionary 
heroines and members of the Kim family who were defenders of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), as well as more “ordinary women” who were loyal 
mothers and wives and who worked in feminised occupations. While North Korean men were 
represented as soldiers and defenders of the nation, Kim Il Sung was represented as the 
national patriarch. In 1992, Women of Korea ceased to be published due to major economic 
and political upheavals. From 2000, however, the North Korean government communicated 
with the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(hereafter “CEDAW Committee”), as will be discussed in the next chapter. In this chapter, I 
provide the reader with background knowledge of the famine in the DPRK during the 1990s. 
This provides a bridge between the discussion of the official representations of gender roles 
in English-language publications from the 1960s to the early 1990s and the discussion of the 
official representation of gender roles in the communications with the CEDAW Committee in 
the early 2000s.  
In this chapter I focus on non-governmental organisations (NGO) sources to discuss 
the situation in the DPRK in the 1990s, in the absence of official sources. The NGO sources 
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also provide an alternative view of gender relations in the DPRK, providing a corrective to 
official North Korean rhetoric promoted to the international community. I begin by outlining 
the collapse of the North Korean economy in the 1990s and the effects on the official Public 
Distribution System (PDS). It was during this time that the country also experienced natural 
disasters and a shortage of food as agricultural land was destroyed from flooding. I then 
discuss the opening up of the DPRK from the 1990s as the North Korean government was 
forced to allow NGOs to work within the country to provide aid. I then explain the 
consolidation of Kim Jong Il’s power after the death of his father, Kim Il Sung, in 1994. 
Finally, I discuss the challenge to men and women’s roles in society and the home because of 
the food shortage and economic crisis.   
 In 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) collapsed and 
terminated its aid to the DPRK and China halted trade with its neighbour. Without the heavily 
subsidised fuel from the Soviet Union and China, the DPRK was unable to use agricultural 
equipment, and as a result the country’s agricultural sector weakened and food production fell 
sharply.
2
 From 1991 to 1996 the North Korean economy contracted by 30 per cent, 
coinciding with extreme weather conditions such as droughts and floods across the country.
3
 
In this situation hundreds of thousands of North Korean people suffered from chronic 
malnutrition and ultimately death.
4
 According to the World Food Programme (WFP), the two 
main contributors to the substantial food crisis in the DPRK were the stagnant agricultural 
sector and the country’s declining economic situation coupled with the natural disasters. This 
made an already deteriorating food supply situation much worse.
5
 Without adjusting the 
economic policy to the rapidly changing circumstances, the North Korean government 
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instead reduced the daily food rations distributed through the PDS and launched the “Let’s 
Eat Two Meals a Day” Campaign in 1991.
6
 The PDS distributes subsidised rations on a 
gram-per-day per person basis, according to a person’s occupation, gender and social class. 
This system was established by the North Korean government in the 1950s. By 1997, the 
PDS was only able to supply 6 per cent of the population with food.
7
 Those receiving food 
rations were located in the capital Pyongyang or had close connections to the government. 
The rest of the population who did not have access to the food distribution system adopted 
coping strategies such as foraging for alternative foods like roots, grasses, tree bark, and 
stalks. It has been argued that the North Korean government could have avoided the food 
shortage by simply making reasonable policy adjustments, such as maintaining food imports 
on a commercial basis or aggressively seeking multilateral assistance. Instead, the 
government blocked food aid to the hardest-hit areas in the DPRK and restricted commercial 
imports as humanitarian assistance began to arrive.
8
  
Amidst the economic collapse and natural disasters, on 8 July 1994, North Korea’s 
Great Leader Kim Il Sung collapsed from a sudden heart attack leaving the country in a 
fragile political state. It would take his son three years to consolidate his power. Kim Jong Il 
(1941–2011) officially took over his father’s post as General Secretary of the Workers’ Party 
of Korea (WPK) on 8 October 1997. From this time, the government directed state funds 
towards strengthening the military instead of sourcing food and other state resources. It is 
understandable, therefore, that the last edition of the magazine Women of Korea was 
published in 1992 as the priority of the WPK shifted to stabilising Kim Jong Il’s political 
position in North Korean society. Other North Korean magazines such as Korea Today 
continued to be published in various languages such as English, Russian, Chinese, French, 
Spanish and Arabic and distributed to the world. The English-language version of Korea 
Today was published monthly by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Pyongyang 
from 1959 to date.  Although the content of the magazine does not focus primarily on gender 
equality in the DPRK the economic and political achievements of the North Korean 
government are promoted for the world to see.  
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 Faced with a deteriorating economic situation and food shortages, the North Korean 
government initially did not want to share openly with the world the full extent of the food 
crisis and imposed tighter controls on the population to hide the extent of the disaster.
9
 This 
only exacerbated the effects of the famine and the subsequent food crisis.
10
 During this time 
the North Korean government did, however, allow a number of NGOs to work in the country 
to administer food and medical aid to the North Korean people. While these NGOs were 
allowed to work in the DPRK they were heavily monitored by the government and were only 
allowed into selected areas of the country to distribute aid. Although the work of the NGOs is 
relatively limited because of government control, their activities forced the DPRK to open up 




Consolidation of Power by Kim Jong Il  
At the time of Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, the most important position held by Kim Jong Il 
in North Korea’s political system was in the military, specifically second in command of the 
Korean People’s Army (KPA).
12 
In order to keep control of the government, Kim Jong Il 
needed to secure his support base in the military so he deliberately chose to sideline other 
aspects of the government in order to assert the importance of the military.
13
 This included 
the abolition of the Central People’s Committee, the state presidency, and sidelining the 




On 24 December 1991 at the 19th Plenary Meeting of the Sixth Party Central 
Committee, Kim Jong Il was appointed as the Supreme Commander of the KPA and moved 
his organisational base from the WPK to the National Defence Commission (NDC). A year 
later on 20 April, he received the title Marshal, the DPRK Constitution was revised, and the 
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NDC became the leading state body (1992 Constitution, Article 106).
15
 In 1993, Kim Jong Il 
became chairman of the NDC at the Fifth Session of the Ninth Supreme People’s Assembly 
(SPA) and was formally elected leader of the Assembly in 1998. He held this position until 
his death in 2011. In 1998, the DPRK Constitution was revised as Kim Jong Il took total 
political control of the DPRK. The amended Constitution designated Kim Il Sung as “Eternal 
President” (Preamble), the NDC was elevation to the highest organ of the state (Article 108), 
and Kim Jong Il as its chairperson (Article 107). This meant that Kim Jong Il was elevated to 
the highest position in the DPRK. Lacking the war hero credentials of his father, though, Kim 
Jong Il shifted the fundamental orientation of the state in his effort to win the support of the 
military by bestowing on the NDC policy influence and prestige, as well as a large share of 
the national budget, through the Songun (“Military-First”) Policy.  
Once Kim Jong Il came to power, the “Military-First” Policy became the major 
ideology of the DPRK. Under this policy, the KPA was elevated to primary position in the 
North Korean government and society. The policy also prioritised the defence force in the 
affairs of the state; defence was allocated the majority of state resources, such as food and 
money, as well as acting as a guide for international relations.
16
 Although, Kim Il Sung’s 
Juche ideology continued to function in the DPRK, Songun soon replaced the older ideology 
as Kim Jong Il consolidated his power over the government, military and the North Korean 
people.
17
 One reason why the “Military-First” Policy was promoted by Kim Jong Il after 
1994 was the desire to increase the DPRK’s military strength within the region.
18
 In this 
context, Songun has been perceived as an aggressive, threatening move to increase the 
strength of the North Korean military at the expense of other parts of society.
19
  
 On 7 April 1997, the “Military-First” Policy was mentioned for the first time in 
Rodong Shinmun (Workers’ Daily) under the headline “There Is a Victory for Socialism in 
the Guns and Bombs of the People’s Army”.
20
 The article defined the ideology as “the 
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revolutionary philosophy to safeguard our own style of socialism under any circumstances”.
21
 
In 1998, Songun began appearing in conjunction with other terms, including “military-first 
revolutionary idea”, “military-first revolutionary leadership”, and “military-first politics”, 
expanding the concept of the policy into even more aspects of North Korean governance.
22
 
On 5 September 1998, the DPRK Constitution was amended to state that the NDC, the 
highest military force in the DPRK, was the supreme body of the state (Article 100 to Article 
113). This date is considered the official beginning of the Songun era and means that by this 




The North Korean Food Crisis  
Since 1946, the DPRK has been dependent on financial and agricultural assistance from the 
Soviet Union and China. One of the causes of the North Korean famine and food crisis in the 
1990s was changes to this assistance. After the DPRK’s bilateral trade with the Soviet Union 
dropped more than ten-fold from $2.56 million in 1990 to $1.4 million in 1994, the DPRK 
became dependent on China for assistance.
24
 However, the DPRK’s bilateral trade with China 
also fell from US$900 million in 1993 to $550 million in 1995, while food imports fell by 
half between 1993 and 1994.
25
 The seasonal arrival of extreme rains in July and August in the 
DPRK in 1995 compounded by soil erosion led to flooding that destroyed the yearly harvest. 
These events contributed to a period of food insecurity and ultimately the starvation of the 
North Korean people. This period has been referred to as the Arduous March by the DPRK.
26
 




 Since the North Korean government was forced to make an unprecedented appeal to 
the international community for food aid and assistance,
28
 the state opened up to the world to 
some extent.
29
 The international community responded to the food shortage in the DPRK 
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with generosity and committed more than two billion dollars over a decade.
30
 However, this 
has resulted in the DPRK becoming increasingly dependent on international assistance 
instead of the government addressing economic and agricultural issues. The United Nations 
(UN) responded to the food shortage in 1995 when the United Nations Disaster Assessment 
and Coordination (UNDAC) team was sent to the DPRK to try and obtain reliable 
information.
31
 The UNDAC team consisted of representatives of the World Food Programme 
(WFP), World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations International Children’s 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). The 
functionality of UNDAC in the DPRK was limited, though, as its mission was primarily in 
the development sector as opposed to humanitarian operations. The one exception was the 
agricultural sector, where relief and rehabilitation work were conjoined.
32
 An important 
consequence of UNDAC’s visit to the DPRK was that several organisations became 
permanently established in the country.
33
 The WFP established an office in Pyongyang in 
November 1995, UNICEF in January 1996 and WHO in late 1997. These organisations have 
continued their limited roles in the DPRK to date. 
 NGOs working in the DPRK have faced many challenges when delivering aid as 
North Korean officials often monitor their operations. There are a limited number of NGOs 
who are able to monitor the distribution of aid in the DPRK, as they are strictly controlled by 
the government and often excluded from places that are deemed to represent the country 
negatively to the world. Initially, NGOs were blocked from visiting the northeast provinces 
of Chagang, South Hamgyong, North Hamgyong, and Ryanggang, as well as parts of 
Kangwon, South Hwanghae, and North and South Pyongyang.
34
 It could be assumed that 
these areas were the worst hit by natural disasters and famine and the North Korean 
government did not want to reveal the full extent of the food crisis to the world. Between 
1995 and 2000, the international community concentrated mostly on easing the food shortage 
and on providing medical treatment for the North Korean people.
35
 The North Korean 
government, though, insisted that NGOs use the PDS to distribute aid to recipients but NGOs 
demanded to be able to monitor the distribution of aid themselves. The government, however, 
did not listen to this request and did not allow NGOs to perform random visits to sites. As 
                                                     
30
 Liang-Fenton, “Failing to Protect”, p. 49.  
31
 Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace. International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in 




 Ibid., pp. 109, 110.  
34
 Good Friends, Human Rights in North Korea, p. 4.  
35
 Jung and Dalton, “The Humanitarian’s Dilemma”, p. 205. 
171 
 
these conditions restricted the operation of NGOs, it was difficult to assess how much of each 
donation actually reached its intended recipients and how much was diverted for resale in 
private markets or to the military.
36
 It is precisely for this reason that humanitarian aid to the 
DPRK poses moral dilemmas. 
There were also concerns from NGOs about the reliability of data provided by the 
government on the number of North Korean people suffering from the food crisis. To address 
this issue UNICEF provided capacity-building programs to the DPRK Central Bureau of 
Statistics.
37
 Reliable statistical information is still difficult to obtain from the North Korean 
government. For example, figures on the number of North Koreans who died during the food 
crisis are difficult to obtain and estimates between 1991 and 1998 vary widely ranging from 
220,000 to 3.5 million, out of a pre-famine population of approximately 22 million (between 
2.7 and 4.5 per cent of the total population).
38
 Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human Rights 
& Refugees (Good Friends) states that during the most acute phase of the famine between 
August 1995 and late July 1998, an estimated one to two million people died of starvation,
39
 
and hundreds of thousands of people crossed the North Korean border to China to obtain 
food. Over time though, some smaller NGOs did obtain better access and monitoring than 
much larger international organisations, giving them some assurance that aid was reaching 
the right recipients.
40
    
 NGOs such as Médicins Sans Frontières, Oxfam, Action Contre La Faim, CARE, the 
United States Private Voluntary Organisation Consortium and Médicins Du Monde, though, 
have withdrawn from the DPRK, citing inadequate access to people and the consequent 
inability to account for the use of their aid supplies.
41
 As discussed above, the monitoring of 
aid distribution has often been problematic and visits to certain areas require prior permission 
from the North Korean government.
42
 Médicins Sans Frontières has stated that restrictions on 
access made it impossible to deliver aid in a “principled and effective” manner.
43
 
Organisations that withdrew from the DPRK requested donor governments to review their aid 
policies towards the DPRK, to exact greater accountability, to ensure that aid agencies were 
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able to assess needs impartially and have direct access to the population. Several sources 
have even asserted that the North Korean government distributes international aid to those 
who are loyal to the state, while some of the most vulnerable groups have been neglected.
44
 
 Other NGOs, such as German Agro Action (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe) have 
continued to provide humanitarian aid in the DPRK, as these organisations believe that slow 
improvements in access and monitoring justify their continued involvement.
45
 Despite 
concerns about access, other larger humanitarian organisations such as the WFP, the FAO 
and UNICEF have all continued working in the DPRK. However, most of the food supplied 
by the WFP, the biggest humanitarian organisation present in the country, is distributed 
through the PDS. North Korean officials’ insistence that food aid be distributed through this 
distribution system is to “provide a vehicle for control over distribution of the resources 
provided by the international community, reinforcing the existing institutional, regional, 




Challenging Gender Roles in North Korean Society 
Before the North Korean food crisis, gender roles and the division of work in the home were 
strictly fixed. Since the economic instability of the country combined with natural disasters, 
however, gender roles have been challenged.
47
 Since the 1990s, the North Korean PDS 
system has failed to operate effectively and the government is unable to provide food and 
other necessities to its citizens. Faced with a failing economy and food shortages the North 
Korean government emphasised the importance of the “socialist extended family” in the 
Family Law (1990, Articles 1 and 3). This provision intended the integration of state and 
society by focusing on family groups,
48
 meaning that, when faced with difficulties, the state 
passed the economic burden of supporting individuals (through the PDS) to the family 
(Family Law, Articles 35 and 36). In this situation, the financial responsibility of the family 
became the primary responsibility of women, as most North Korean men lost the ability to 
support their families because food coupons were not distributed through their workplaces on 
a regular basis. 
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 As state factories and enterprises closed, households decided that it was more 
important for North Korean men to remain in state employment, meaning far fewer men left 
their official workplaces compared to women.
49
 With men staying in the official economy, it 
allowed households to meet security requirements and access residual social services 
provided through the work unit, however inadequate. In contrast, North Korean women who 
had worked in state-owned workplaces left their official employment and gravitated towards 
employment in the marketplace.
50
 Some women in the official economy were dismissed and 
sent home to help relieve the economic burden.
51
 By reducing the number of women 
employed in the official economy, the government was able to decrease the amount 
distributed through the PDS. Thus, in economically uncertain times many women were 
forced to become active players in the unofficial North Korean economy.
52
 
 One of the unintended consequences of this avoidable food crisis was the widespread 
emergence of informal markets. As the PDS was no longer able to provide rations or minimal 
food amounts the North Korean government was unable to exercise the level of control over 
the establishment of markets that it had once had.
53
 Prior to the mid-1990s, the North Korean 
government maintained a centrally planned economy and markets were suppressed,
54
 but 
from the mid-1990s, the importance of the market grew. The government’s inability to fulfil 
its economic obligations unleashed an unplanned, bottom-up marketisation of the economy 
resulting in the alteration of social and political relations among the population. Although the 
North Korean government initially tolerated markets during the food crisis, the state 
controlled the items traded, the actual size of the marketplace, and the operation period of the 
markets.
55
 The present market system in the DPRK was established as agricultural markets in 
1950, under the management of the People’s Council in each province, city, and county. 
Agricultural products or commercial and industrial products were traded. In August 1958, the 
agricultural markets were given the new name “Farmers’ Market”. Items were restricted to 
vegetables and subsidiary food and industrial products were prohibited. By 1992, the 
government intensified its control by closing unauthorised markets and adjusting the 
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frequency of activities in the markets from every day to every ten days.
56
 As the food crisis 
worsened by the mid-1990s though, markets reopened daily and official control over trade 
items was relaxed to some extent. From this time, markets became an essential element in 
North Korean society, functioning as an alternative source of income and food for many 
families.  
 It was North Korean women who engaged in peddling and trade in the marketplace 
order to buy food for their families, as men shied away from these kinds of activities as they 
were often looked down upon.
57
 Women living mostly in the northeastern regions of the 
DPRK saw China as their best strategy for survival.
58
 Control on freedom of movement was 
loosened, to some extent, as large numbers of people attempted to escape from the DPRK and 
others sought to obtain supplies from China to trade. As more North Koreans travelled back 
and forth to China, they saw for themselves the relative prosperity of their neighbour and 
received information about the Republic of Korea (ROK), which was vastly different from 
the official propaganda.
59
 In this context, the North Korean leadership made numerous efforts 
to rein in the markets and constrain freedom of movement within the country and across the 
border. These measures met with various levels of resistance. It is estimated that informal 
economic activities reached 78 per cent of total income for North Korean households a 
decade after the famine of the mid-1990s.
60
 
 There were also unforeseen consequences for North Korean women who left their 
homes to participate in the unofficial economy as cases of violence against them increased 
both in the home and by government officials in marketplaces. Women were often forced to 
submit to North Korean officials who asked for sexual intercourse in exchange for permission 
to continue their economic activities.
61
 This also occurred for women who travelled in the 
DPRK and across the border to China to obtain items to sell. Women not only faced abuse by 
North Korean officials but by ordinary men on public transport and in the marketplaces.  The 
North Korean government does not acknowledge that women are exposed to these kinds of 
violent acts and has not made any public comment concerning the need to monitor and 
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reprimand those who commit such crimes against women.
62
 Violence against North Korean 
women, in many forms, will be discussed in detail in chapter 7 in the context of reports to the 
CEDAW Committee. 
   
Challenging Gender Roles in North Korean Families  
Although many North Korean women became financially independent because of their 
activities in the marketplace or by trade, they did not deny the authority of the patriarchal 
head of the family and continued to respect the superiority and authority of their husbands or 
fathers.
63
 Also, while the financial provider in the family unit was challenged because of the 
food crisis, women continued to be primarily responsible for raising children.
64
 Customary 
practices continued to exist in North Korean homes, although some men tried to support their 
wives in childrearing responsibilities and the collection of food.
65
  
 During the food crisis, North Korean official rhetoric continued to emphasise 
women’s place within the home as wives and mothers. As part of their perceived 
responsibilities, women were to take care of their own or their husband’s parents and as a 
revolutionary comrade to actively assist and support their husbands in revolutionary 
projects.
66
 This role as a dutiful wife and caring mother is taught to young girls in the school 
and family environments. However, these teachings perpetuate the cultural assumption that 
women are not independent beings but rather subordinate to the patriarchal head of the 
family. From the fourth grade girls are taught a separate subject, “Training for Women” on 
the role of women within the home. This subject covers topics such as cooking, sewing and 
menstruation.
67
 Information about birth control methods, sexual hygiene, and sexually 
transmissible diseases, however, is not provided. The absence of appropriate sex education 
led many North Koreans to have misperceptions about contraception methods.
68
 As North 
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Korean women and men are not exposed to different contraception measures, women tended 
to rely on abortions if they had an unwanted pregnancy.
69
    
 North Korean women reported to the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human 
Rights (NKHR) that before the food crisis care for infants and children was well organised by 
state organisations and available to all people but this changed during the instability of the 
1990s.
70
 As a result, women began relying on their in-laws or their older children to take care 
of younger children while they went out to look for work. Mothers who worked in the 
markets or traded on the borders often kept their daughters out of school to take over their 
domestic work.
71
 Helping in the house, and attending to a family business or farm affected 
both boys and girls but girls mostly did household chores such as baby-sitting or attending to 
the house garden. It is evident that women and girls have continued to be exposed to various 
types of stereotyping and customary cultural practices in the family and North Korean 
society.  
 During the 1990s, incidences of family breakdown and divorce increased as family 
members separated in search for food or ways to earn money.
72
 Women who travelled for 
their livelihood returned to their home just once or twice a month, consequently weakening 
family ties, sometimes leading to divorce.
73
 Before the food crisis, obtaining a divorce was 
difficult as the North Korean government tried to keep families together. In the early years of 
the DPRK with the growing influence of the Korean Democratic Women’s Union (KDWU, 
Women’s Union) in the 1960s, women were only encouraged to divorce their husbands in the 
case of an ideological difference or if the husband was accused of a political crime.
74
 During 
the food crisis though, it became easier for ordinary people to bribe judges with cigarettes or 
alcohol to obtain divorce papers.
75
 Many women resorted to illegal means such as bribery to 
escape their situation, as there were no other appropriate legal channels for women to turn to 
for help.
76
 Judges usually grant divorce when a woman alleges continuous domestic violence 
or a husband’s alcoholism.
77
 The North Korean government has also practised breaking up 
families by forcing couples to divorce because of one family member’s undesirable 
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 If either husband or wife commits a political crime and is sentenced to prison, 
then their partner has no choice but to divorce him or her, otherwise they are forced to join 
their family in prison.
79
 When an individual is sentenced to a political prison camp, families 
generally accompany them because they are believed to be guilty by association.
80
 This 
practice is utilised extensively against the so-called “hostile class”.  
Since the food crisis, women have indicated to NGOs that domestic violence, 
including verbal and physical abuse has increased significantly.
81
 There is a general 
perception, though, that domestic violence is not a crime and that the government should not 
intervene in private family matters.
82
 For those who witness domestic violence or are victims 
and want to report the incident to the police, they reported to NKHR that the police 
completely disregard them and send them back home.
83
 With women working in markets and 
trade activities, their economic situation improved, allowing some to flee from violent 
situations. 
 
Conclusion   
In this chapter, I have provided background to the food crisis in the DPRK during the 1990s 
by examining the information collected and provided by NGOs working in the country. 
During this time, the food crisis affected the roles of North Korean men and women in the 
home and society. The most notable change was the challenge to customary practices in the 
family unit, as women became the primary providers. Many women were forced to carry out 
survival strategies such as trade activities along the border with China to save themselves and 
their families.
84
 In a situation where the PDS collapsed and men were not able to provide 
financially for their families, women also became active players in local markets in the 
DPRK. This created new opportunities for them as well as new challenges for those who 
sought to protect gendered roles.
85
 The new role that women played gave them at the very 
least some economic power but even though these women improved their economic situation, 
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it is likely that many remained subordinate to that of the household head as patriarchal values 
remained embedded in North Korean society. Although gender stereotypes have been 
challenged, it has also added to women’s burdens, as they are now in many cases primary 
financial providers.  
 In the following chapter, I return to the theme of how the North Korean government 
presents itself to the international community in an analysis of a brief period when the DPRK 
engaged with the CEDAW Committee between 2001 and 2005. These reports reveal for the 
first time issues not previously discussed by the North Korean government with the world. In 
particular, the reports focused on discrimination against women in all forms, verbal and 
physical, and in all parts of society from family life to employment, as well as addressing 
women’s access to education, health and employment. The reports also provide examples of 
customary discrimination practices in the DPRK that the government acknowledges need to 
be addressed. Close examination of the DPRK’s reporting, however, reveals the extent to 
which gendered stereotypes still underpin the government’s views of the roles of men and 




7. North Korea and the CEDAW 
Committee (2001–2005) 
 
Women should not only be given equal political and 
economic rights with men but also be attentively cared for 
as they shoulder [the] heavy maternal burden [sic]. 





As discussed above, due to the food crisis of the 1990s, the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK, North Korea) opened up to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to ensure 
food aid reached North Koreans in need. This communication with the outside world exposed 
the DPRK to the international community and its negative views of the regime and the human 
rights of its citizens. Pressure from the world grew from the 1990s for the North Korean 
government to follow the United Nations (UN) human rights instruments it had acceded to 
and to sign on to the other human rights treaties and conventions. From 2000 to 2005, the 
relationship between the North Korean government and the UN developed positively and 
communication flowed. During this time, state reports were submitted by the DPRK on four 
of the key conventions to which the country is a party: the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2000, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 2002, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 2002 and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) in 2003.
2
 This shows a degree of conformity by the DPRK to treaty obligations 
never seen before or since.
3
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In this chapter, I focus on the DPRK’s communication regarding CEDAW. The 
DPRK acceded to CEDAW in 2001 and over a four-year period from 2001 to 2005 there was 
an exchange of reports between the North Korean government and the Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereafter “CEDAW 
Committee”). In the reports, the government maintains that discrimination against women in 
all forms, verbal and physical, was abolished after the revolutionary struggle against Japan 
(1910–1945) and with the promulgation of the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946. In this 
chapter, I argue that a close examination of the DPRK’s reporting reveals the extent to which 
gendered stereotypes still underpin the government’s views of the roles of men and women, 
even while it promotes its commitment to gender equality to the international community.  
The DPRK’s reporting to the CEDAW Committee is important as it demonstrates 
how the North Korean government presents itself to the world, and how it negotiates the gap 
between official views of gender equality and the actual conditions in the DPRK. Reports 
exchanged between the DPRK and the CEDAW Committee are one of the few official 
sources available for gaining some indication of the stance of the North Korean government 
on women’s rights and include the few-recorded cases where the government acknowledges 
gender discrimination in the country. In response to the DPRK the CEDAW Committee 
requested additional information, to which the North Korean government responded.
4
 The 
correspondence between the CEDAW Committee and the DPRK provides the primary 
sources for this chapter. I also refer to shadow reports by two NGOs: the Citizens’ Alliance 
for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) and Good Friends: Centre for Peace, Human 
Rights and Refugees (Good Friends).
5
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The DPRK and the CEDAW Committee 
In February 2001, the North Korean government agreed to the guidelines and procedures 
outlined in CEDAW (see Appendix 1). The North Korean government continued 
communication with the CEDAW Committee until 2005. There are several possible reasons 
for the limited relationship between the DPRK and CEDAW Committee, although they are 
not discussed in the reports. These reasons may include the censorship of information by the 
government, travel restrictions placed on officials, or the lack of state funds to send 
representatives to meetings. The interruption in the communication with the CEDAW 
Committee could also be because of the position of the DPRK in the world. In January 2002, 
the then United States (US) President George W. Bush (1946–) described the DPRK, Iran and 
Iraq as the “Axis of Evil”. The Bush administration initiated an overtly hostile and accusatory 
policy toward each of these countries after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 
(“9/11”), alleging that they were involved in illicit activities relating to nuclear weapons.
6
 
Undeterred by lack of evidence and the failure to find a nuclear weapons program (or any 
weapons of mass destruction) in Iraq, the Bush administration remained relentlessly focused 
on the nuclear weapons ambitions of the DPRK and Iran, all the while ignoring or minimising 
non-confrontational diplomatic efforts.
7
 As noted above, in 2002 the then leader Kim Jong Il 
admitted that the North Korean government had in the past abducted Japanese citizens, a 
continuing source of tension between Japan and the DPRK.
8
 In 2003, the diplomatic hostility 
of the Bush administration towards the DPRK resulted in the North Korean government 
withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
9
 This was the impetus for the 
Six-Party talks held between the DPRK, South Korea, China, the United States, Russia, and 
Japan, which aimed to find a peaceful resolution to the security concerns in the region, 
particularly in regards to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Little progress was made 
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until the fifth round of talks (9–11 November 2005), when the DPRK agreed to shut down its 
nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid.
10
  
 The North Korean government has offered no reason as to why communication stalled 
with the CEDAW Committee and the Committee has not explained the absence of 
correspondence with the DPRK since 2005. However, the CEDAW Committee continues to 
request further information from the DPRK regarding gender equality. The Committee has 
also requested that the North Korean government sign the Optional Protocol to CEDAW but 




The DPRK’s Coordination Committee of the Implementation of CEDAW  
On 10 September 2001, the DPRK formed the National Coordination Committee of the 
Implementation of CEDAW. The Committee is composed of representatives from the 
Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly (Presidium of SPA), the Cabinet, the Ministry 
of Labour, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Central Court and Central Public Prosecutor’s Office, as well as other state 
organs.
12
 In total, there are seventeen members on the National Coordination Committee.
13
 
Initially, the North Korean government believed that the implementation of the Convention 
should be carried out by women, and at first included only two men in the membership of the 
Committee. Later the government is said to have realised that the elimination of 
discrimination against women also depends on the attitudes of men and decided that both 
women and men must carry out the implementation of CEDAW.
14
 By 2003, eight men had 
been elected members of the Committee.
 
 
 The duties of the National Coordination Committee include the administration and 
implementation of CEDAW, the drafting of reports and the examination of how the 
requirements of the Convention are embodied in state legislation.
15
 Among the Committee’s 
most important tasks was the preparation of the initial report to the CEDAW Committee. The 
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National Coordination Committee is said to have collected data from government bodies and 
NGOs concerned with the various sectors of the country. The drafters of the report included 
officials from the judicial, legislative, and administrative bodies of the North Korean 
government.
16
 The leader of the country and trusted members of the Workers Party of Korea 
(WPK) typically revise any information released to the international community.
17
 Therefore, 
the draft report was submitted first to the government bodies for their review, and then to the 
Presidium of Supreme People’s Assembly, at which time women deputies are said to have 
offered their views. The Presidium represents the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) when 
the SPA was not in session.
18
 The National Coordination Committee also works to examine 
how the requirements of CEDAW are embodied in state legislation. The Committee 
established a system for the supervision of the implementation of the Convention by 
coordinating with the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Labour and other 
government organs concerned with the rights of women. The North Korean government 
suggests in the report to the CEDAW Committee that officials in the sectors of law, 




 The National Coordination Committee participated in a study tour on CEDAW to the 
Philippines in February 2002. The Committee stated that it was necessary for officials to have 
more opportunities for international training.
20
 To address critical gaps in data collection and 
knowledge, the UN organises study tours for countries with new human rights protection 
systems to learn from those with more advanced systems.  
 
The DPRK Reports to the CEDAW Committee 
An initial report for consideration to the CEDAW Committee was submitted by the DPRK on 
11 September 2002.
21
 The report was in accordance with the CEDAW Guidelines Regarding 
the Form and Content of the Initial Reports of States Parties (Article 18).
22
 Under this Article, 
state parties submit to the UN Secretary-General a report on the legislative, judicial, 
administrative or other measures which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of 
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 Progress made by state parties is reported within one year after the Convention’s 
entry into force and thereafter every four years or when the Committee requests. To date the 
DPRK has submitted an initial report in 2002 but not the required follow-up reports in 2006, 
2010, and 2014. The DPRK’s initial report was divided into two parts. Part One, titled 
General Survey, provided an overview of the political structure of the DPRK, the legal 
framework whereby human rights are protected and the inclusion of human rights 
conventions in domestic legislation. Part Two, titled Substantive Provisions, provided an 
overview of efforts made to eliminate discrimination against women, the development and 
advancement of women, and the rights of women to access education, employment, and 
health care in North Korea. When preparing the report, the North Korean government claims 
to have discovered that the basic requirements of the Convention had already been fulfilled in 
a number of sectors of the country.
24
 
 On 9 February 2005, the CEDAW Committee issued the North Korean government 
with a list of questions with regards to its initial report.
25
 The 33 questions were organised 
according to the Articles of the Convention. The Committee was concerned with several 
issues in the DPRK’s report, including direct and indirect discrimination against North 
Korean women, and recommended that awareness campaigns be carried out on the meaning 
and scope of indirect discrimination – aimed at legislators, the judiciary and the legal 
profession.
26
 Questions on the lives of women from rural and urban areas and violence 
against women were also raised. Two months after the CEDAW Committee issued a list of 
questions, the DPRK replied on 15 April 2005.
27
 The responses focused on conditions that 
might affect women differently from men, as well as challenges specific to gender equality. 
Information was provided on poverty and the famine, as they were said to have been causes 
for conditions of existing inequality and further discrimination against women. A number of 
questions were not answered, but the DPRK made some crucial admissions that had not 
previously been acknowledged, as discussed below. 
 Three years after the DPRK submitted its initial report to the CEDAW Committee, 
two meetings were held between North Korean representatives and the Committee on 18 July 
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 These meetings were held in two sessions at 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. at the United 
Nations Headquarters in New York. The North Korean delegation included: Ho O Bom, Pak 
Kum Bok, Pak Tok Hun,
29
 Hong Ji Sun, and Han Chae Sun.
30
 While three men and two 
women represented the DPRK, a male delegate, Ho O Bom, answered the majority of 
questions. There were twenty-one members representing the CEDAW Committee, with a 
total of twenty females and one male participating. At the first meeting, the 699th, issues 
discussed included discrimination against women in the home, domestic violence, and food 
allocation through the Public Distribution System (PDS).
31
 At the 700th meeting, issues 
raised by the CEDAW Committee included women’s representation in the North Korean 




 On 22 July 2005, the CEDAW Committee released a report of concluding comments 
for the North Korean government to consider.
33
 The recommendations and conclusions of the 
Committee were based on the DPRK’s initial report and the meetings held with North Korean 
officials at the UN Headquarters in 2005. Concerns and recommendations of the CEDAW 
Committee include the withdrawal of reservations to the Convention, the revision of the Law 
of Sex Equality to include provisions of CEDAW, and the lack of effective remedies for 
female complainants whose rights have been violated.  
 
Non-Governmental Organisation Shadow Reports  
In response to the DPRK’s initial report to the CEDAW Committee, two South Korean 
NGOs submitted shadow reports. The UN invites NGOs to follow the work of the CEDAW 
Committee, which includes participation at the pre-session working groups to provide 
country-specific information on state parties whose reports are being considered.
34
 This 
ensures that the CEDAW Committee is well informed about the country submitting the 
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periodic reports. NGOs submit their reports to the Committee prior to or at the session. NGOs 
submitting shadow reports or other country-specific information prepare a list of issues and 
questions for the reporting country. The Committee then sets aside time at each of the 
working sessions, usually at the beginning of the first and second week of the session, to 
enable representatives of NGOs to provide information.  
 The two NGO reports submitted to the UN outline concerns about the status of 
women in and outside the DPRK. In June 2005, Good Friends submitted a shadow report 
with concerns regarding food shortages in the mid-1990s and the impact on women.
35
 Their 
report mentions the trafficking and prostitution of women, their right to access healthcare, 
and the situation of North Korean women in China. In July of the same year, NKHR 
submitted a shadow report to the CEDAW Committee.
36
 Concerns raised by NKHR include 
discrimination against women in society and the home based on gender, violence against 
women in North Korean society and the sexual exploitation and trafficking of women.  
Below I discuss the communication between the DPRK and the CEDAW Committee, 
as well as the shadow reports and what they reveal about official North Korean attitudes to 
gender equality. The discussion is organised according to the themes which arise in this series 
of communications. 
 
The DPRK’s Reservations to CEDAW  
The CEDAW Committee permits ratification of the Convention subject to reservations made 
by governments.
37
 Reservations are made if governments see the Convention as not being 
compatible with national law, tradition, religion, or culture. The DPRK has entered two 
reservations regarding Article 2 (f) and Article 9 (2) of CEDAW. 
The North Korean government states that since the promulgation of the Law on 
Equality of the Sex in 1946, equal rights for women have been provided for in all spheres of 
economic, social, cultural, and political life, including the right to free marriage and 
divorce.
38
 However, the law includes a difference in the minimum age for marriage, which is 
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17 years for females and 18 years for males so the government made a reservation to Article 
2 (f) of CEDAW, which states: 
 
State Parties are to take all appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs, 




 The North Korean government has also made a reservation on Article 9 (2) of 
CEDAW, which states, “State Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect 
to the nationality of their children”.
40
 The North Korean Citizenship Law (1995) stipulates: 
 
DPRK citizenship will be granted to a child born between North 
Korean citizens, a child born between a North Korean citizen residing 
in the DPRK and a foreign citizen or a stateless person, a child born 
between stateless persons residing in the DPRK and a child born in 




Further, the law provides that the citizenship of a child under the age of 14 born between a 
North Korean citizen residing in a foreign country and a foreign citizen is determined in 
accordance with the express intention of the parents (Article 7).
42
 The Citizenship Law does 
not give preference or differentiate between father and mother over their opinion of the 
nationality of the child. 
 Chin Kim suggests that the promulgation of the Citizenship Law in 1995 was political 
rather than being designed to protect the rights of either parent living abroad or a child born 
abroad to parents of differing citizenship.
43
 The reservation was made to CEDAW in 
accordance with the North Korea’s Nationality Law (1963), which ensures the child the 
freedom to visit the DPRK freely (Article 3) and have the political and legal protection of the 
DPRK irrespective of their residence (Article 2).
44
 The Articles of the Nationality Law 
contain political implications and are designed to provide a rational basis for the North 
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 The CEDAW Committee requested further explanation as to why the North Korean 
government entered the two reservations and whether there has been any consideration of 
amending state legislation in order to withdraw these reservations.
46
 The North Korean 
government responded that a reservation was made on Article 2 (f) of CEDAW because 
Article 9 of the Family Law provides that the minimum marriage age is 17 for girls and 18 
for boys as discussed above. The DPRK claims that nobody considers this age difference 
discriminatory against women so a reservation was entered provisionally until due legislative 
amendments are enacted to avoid any misunderstanding of the age difference in current 
legislation.
47
 The government states that a reservation was made to Article 9 (2) because of a 
concern that a child born to a foreign citizen and a North Korean citizen may have double 
nationality if parents differ in their opinion. The National Coordination Committee is said to 
have discussed the reservations while preparing the initial report and decided to recommend 
amendments to related laws and legislation bodies.
48
 To date these reservations have not been 
withdrawn by the DPRK and the laws have not been amended.  
 In its concluding comments the CEDAW Committee states that, while appreciating 
the North Korean government’s willingness to amend national legislation and consider lifting 
the reservations, the Committee considers that the reservations made are contrary to the 
objective and purpose of CEDAW.
49
 The Committee urges the DPRK to accelerate its efforts 




Customary Discrimination in North Korean Society  
The North Korean government understands that discrimination against women can be based 
on whether one is married or not; can occur in political, economic, social, civil, public and 
private life; when someone consents to or is tolerant of inequality either on purpose or by 
negligence; and the different treatment of men and women, which includes distinction, 
exclusion, restriction, ignorance, impairing and violence.
51
 In comparison, Article 1 of 
CEDAW states that the term “discrimination against women” means: 
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any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex 
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their 
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 




 In the initial report to the CEDAW Committee, the DPRK stated that following the 
liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the North Korean interim 
government “thoroughly carried out the democratic reforms to free people from all forms of 
imperialist and feudalistic yoke and fetters”.
53
 As part of the reform process: 
 
[p]olitical, economic, traditional and customary bases of 
discrimination against women have fundamentally been eliminated 
and the overall institutional, administrative, organisational and 





The DPRK continues that the Constitution, laws, regulations, and rules: 
 
comprehensively and concretely provide for the rights and freedom 
that citizens ought to be endowed with and enjoy in the political, 




The DPRK states that “the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or 
the stereotyped roles of men and women have nearly been eliminated” so “discrimination 
based on the outmoded customs is no longer a big issue of social concern”.
56
 Then again, the 
North Korean government admits that customary discrimination exists in society and 
households. 
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Calling a man the outer householder and a woman the inner 
householder in a family, a man becoming the head of a family, the 
community employing mostly females in the jobs like restaurant 
reception, switchboard operation, typing and the like, regarding a 





The term “inner householder” references Korean women’s roles in the past when they lived 
within the inner walls of the home and were not allowed outside to participate in society. In 
comparison, Korean men were allowed to move freely from the home to outside the building, 
therefore they were referred to as the “outer householder”. The North Korean government 
claims to have tried to change this view by enhancing “the consciousness of respecting 
women among the new generations and to thoroughly prevent the discriminatory conception 
and happening occasionally witnessed among the old generation”.
58
 The DPRK says that it 
encourages the active education of the population in the idea of respecting and caring for girls 
and women through mass media, such as the magazine Chosŏn Yŏsŏng (Korean Women).  
 The North Korean government explains that discriminatory action against women is a 
“matter not only of prejudice and custom but also [because] of the national situation of 
economic development”.
59
 Therefore, to overcome these discriminatory practices in society 
the country aimed to overcome the economic and technical backwardness of old Korean 
society. It was in this setting that the government established the Three Revolutions at the 
Fifth Congress of the WPK in November 1970 (as discussed in chapter 5). The government 
stated in the initial report to the CEDAW Committee that when the Three Revolutions are 
fulfilled and technical advancement realised then discrimination caused by customary 
stereotyping of gender roles will be eliminated.
60
 In the initial report, the DPRK stated that a 
great deal of harsh and heavy labour has been abolished and the Three Revolutions 
successfully achieved,
61
 suggesting that the burden that women carry within the home has 
also largely been eliminated. In reality, North Korean women continue to be burdened with 
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caring for children and the home, which is demonstrated in the gendered language employed 
by the government.  
 Based on Articles 1 and 2 of CEDAW, the Committee requested the DPRK to provide 
further information on measures undertaken to combat gender discrimination based on the 
perceived notion of women as inferior and men superior.
62
 In response, the DPRK states that 
through the reform process after the liberation of Korea in 1945, the social, economic and 
legal basis of the “outmoded concept” of women as inferior has “nearly been eliminated”.
63
 
The government is said to have actively unfolded educational activities against the idea of 
women’s inferiority and taken “the steps of preferential treatment of women by law and 
policy”.
64
 The North Korean response listed various legal measures taken through the 
Constitution and laws which provide provisions for gender equality.
65
 The North Korean 
government also, however, refers to occasions where men and women are treated differently 
because of the role of women in reproduction and childrearing. It is because of this role that 
the DPRK provides women with “special protection” in the 1998 DPRK Constitution:  
 
guaranteeing maternity leave before and after childbirth, reducing 
working hours for mothers with many children, and expanding the 





Answering gender equality with the preferential treatment of women in state laws does not 
address the customary attitudes of some North Korean people. It could be said that gender 
equality in the DPRK therefore, has largely been unsolved, as the government has not 
addressed the cultural construction of gender entrenched in North Korean society.  
 In 2005, during the meetings in New York the North Korean delegate Hong Ji Sun 
explained historical attitudes to gender in Korea. 
  
The inferiority of women was a concept deeply rooted in the culture 
of the DPRK, which had been a feudalist society for 2000 years and 
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had been subjected to Japanese colonial rule. Under the old regime, 





The North Korean official reiterates that soon after the independence of Korea from Japan in 
1945 the North Korean interim government promulgated the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 
1946 with the aim of eliminating all forms of discrimination against women.
68
 In other words, 
the government assigns discrimination against women to the colonial period and the 
liberation of women to a newly-established socialist North Korea. However, Hong Ji Sun 
states that the Law on Equality of the Sexes is not fully implemented or recognised as some 
men have continued to be regarded as responsible for affairs outside the house, with women 
assigned to chores within the household.
69
 
 The CEDAW Committee notes with concern the persistence of gendered assumptions 
and attitudes in respect to the roles and responsibilities of women and men, which are 
primarily discriminatory against women and influences all areas of their lives.
70
 It notes the 
perception of women as caregivers and homemakers and their assignment to areas such as 
education and employment on the basis of spheres suitable to their “characteristics”. The 
Committee is concerned that such expectations of North Korean women have serious 
consequences, preventing them from accessing rights and entitlements on an equal basis with 





Gender Roles in North Korean Families  
In the DPRK’s initial report, it did not mention the stereotyping of gender roles within family 
homes. We know from academic research and reporting by NGOs, however, that the promise 
to ease the domestic burdens of women through the Three Revolutions failed to materialise 
for many.
72
 Modern conveniences such as clean running water in homes, refrigerators and 
washing machines failed to materialise or remained the property of a privileged few. As 
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discussed in chapter 6 above, gendered roles remained until the mid-1990s when the 
differentiated roles of men and women in the home were challenged because of the food 
crisis. With the end of the state food rationing system men’s capacity to provide economic 
support deteriorated, and many North Korean women had to become primary financial 
providers to their families in place of their husbands.
73
 However, this did not mean that the 
strict gendered roles in the home were significantly undermined. According to Jung and 
Dalton, the sharing of housework between husband and wife continued to be uncommon.
74
 
Further, most women continued to respect the superiority and authority of their husbands and 
their lives were still shaped by their husbands’ social position and status.
75
 Since the food 
crisis, reductions in state welfare, provisions, and facilities resulted in even higher demands 
on women to provide additional support such as healthcare and education to their families.
76
   
 Due to the lack of information offered by the DPRK in its initial report and based on 
Article 5 of CEDAW, the Committee requested further information on measures undertaken 
by the government to combat the stereotyping of women’s roles in the home.
77
 In response, 
the North Korean government acknowledged that women assumed more of the family burden 
due to the customary roles of household chores assigned to them.
78
 From the 1970s, though, 
the government claims to have addressed this issue by defining the emancipation of women 
from household chores as part of the task of the Three Revolutions, as explained above. The 
DPRK claims that women in both urban and rural areas now use modern facilities and 
electrical kitchen appliances to alleviate their duties in the home.
79
 However, the North 
Korean government acknowledges that due to the economic difficulties within the country 
“both women and men are hampered from enjoying their legal rights to the full”.
80
 Evidence 
suggests that since the mid-1990s basic shortages in food and fuel, and the breakdown of the 
water supply systems have disproportionately influenced the workload of women and girls.
81
 
The capacity for women to take advantage of measures designed and legislated to protect 
them is frequently superseded by the need to survive. For example, the extensive piped water 
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supply systems put in place during the early 1980s are in ailing condition due to low levels of 
state investment, the shortage of electricity, and the destruction caused by natural disasters. 
The United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports that according to the 
2008 DPRK Census, 22 per cent of the population spends time fetching water from sources 
other than piped water in their homes.
82
 UNICEF found that of the population that collect 
water there is a clear gendered inequality involved, as only 32 per cent of those responsible 
for this activity are men compared to 68 per cent women.
83
 While the North Korean 
government claims that the burdens that women carry have lessened because of the Three 
Revolutions, UNICEF claims that the number of women in comparison to men forced to walk 
to alternative water supplies is higher.
84
  
 At the meetings between the DPRK and CEDAW Committee in 2005, Ho O Bom 
states that “[the government has] established a plan of action to root out outmoded customs, 
attitudes and stereotypes that discriminated against women, but such attitudes were deep-
seated and the process would take a long time”.
85
 It is said that public organisations and 
institutions work to educate people and overcome gender stereotypes. Hong Ji Sun states that 
men and women of the new generation have attitudes very different from the older 
generation, who still hold stereotypical views. The North Korean delegation states that the 
division of labour in the home has changed in recent years, due to the increased awareness of 
CEDAW.
86
 The delegation continues that husbands are now equipped with the knowledge of 
the Convention and are doing some cooking and other household chores such as taking care 
of children so women have been freed from the home to participate in society.
87
 The DPRK, 
however, offers no evidence in its initial report or during the meetings in New York on the 
attitudinal changes of the younger generation or how men access information about CEDAW. 
Even though there have been changes in the North Korean legal system the actual effects of 
these amendments in society are less obvious. Many have argued that changes that have 
occurred in society and family life are rather a result of the government’s mismanagement of 
its economic policies combined with natural disasters. This created a situation where people, 
and typically women, have been forced to find alternative ways of supporting their family’s 
survival.  
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 The CEDAW Committee notes with concern the persistence of stereotyped 
assumptions and attitudes in respect to the roles and responsibilities of North Korean women 
and men.
88
 The Committee is concerned that such expectations of women have serious 
consequences, preventing them from accessing rights and entitlements on an equal basis with 
men as well as creating dependency on male family members.
89
 The Committee urges the 
DPRK to increase its efforts to address stereotypical attitudes about the roles and 
responsibilities of women and men, including the hidden patterns that perpetuate direct and 




Marriage and Family Breakdown  
The DPRK’s initial report states that marriage is “entered into on the basis of true love, free 
choice, and full consent”.
91
 Marriage that is entered into against the will of either male or 
female, by money, coercion, allurement, and outdated customs is strictly forbidden. Article 
11 of the Family Law states that marriage is legal after registration at a registry office and is 




A marriage that is not based on the free consent of the parties, a 
marriage under the minimum age for marriage (18 years for males 
and 17 years for females), a marriage with a person who already has a 
registered husband or wife, and a marriage between blood relatives ... 




Although the legal age of marriage is 17 years for women and 18 years for men, the average 
age for women to marry is 24 to 26 years and for men 26 to 28 years.
94
 The government has 
conducted a campaign to persuade people that early marriage is not good for women’s 
health.
95
 Jung and Dalton suggest that later marriage may be a result of work and military 
service obligations.
96
 Articles 15 and 19 of the Family Law state that a husband and wife are 
                                                     
88
 CEDAW, Concluding Comments, para. 35, p. 5.  
89
 Ibid.  
90
 Ibid., para. 36, p. 6 
91




 Ibid., para. 237, pp. 34, 35. 
94
 UNICEF, Children and Women, (2006), p. 47. 
95
 CEDAW, “700th meeting”, para. 12, pp. 3, 4. 
96
 Jung and Dalton, “Mothers of the Revolution”, p. 754 
196 
 
duty-bound to ensure their family is harmonious, cheerful, and supported by their partner 
should he or she lose the ability to work.
97
  
 The DPRK’s initial report in 2002 states that the average annual number of divorces is 
about 2,000 cases.
98
 The government states that the comparatively small number of divorces 
in the DPRK is not due to any legislation that makes divorce difficult but because, since the 
“olden times, it has been a traditional national custom peculiar to the Korean people for a 
married couple to live together until they die”.
99
 Article 21 of the Family Law (1990) states 
that divorce may be granted if a marriage cannot be continued because one party has been 
found guilty of gross infidelity and mistrust or for some other reason.
100
 Further, Article 5 of 
the Law on the Equality of the Sexes states that women have the equal right to submit to the 
courts an application for a divorce.
101
 The government does not permit a married couple to 
live apart or with another partner without a legal divorce. 
 At the dissolution of the marriage, there is no special consideration except for the 
interest of children involved. Article 22 of the Family Law states that the custody of children 
is “decided according to mutual agreement between the two parties, in consideration of the 
interests of the children”.
102
 When no mutual agreement can be reached, the custody of the 
children is decided by the court. If the child is less than three years of age then the child is 
“brought up by the mother, unless there is a compelling reason for this not to happen”.
103
 This 
assumes though, that women are the primary carers of children rather than the responsibility 
of both parents. If a person is not the primary carer of the child, then this person pays the 
other parent the expenses for raising the child until the child reaches working age. The 
amount payable to the carer is fixed by the court and is usually within the range of 10 to 30 
per cent of the monthly income of the contributor, and according to the number of children.
104
 
The Family Law also states that during divorce proceedings property owned before the 
marriage or property that was given to a person by inheritance is owned by that individual 
(Article 39).
105
 Family property bought during the marriage is divided among the parties 
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through mutual agreement. If the couple cannot reach an agreement on the division of 
property, the matter is settled by the court.
106
 
 The CEDAW Committee acknowledges that while divorce is not a favoured option, it 
is sometimes necessary. It requested further information on the rights of divorced North 
Korean women to the custody of children and to a share of marital property.
107
 The 
Committee expresses concern that if a woman could only take the amount of property that 
she brought to the marriage, then many women would have serious difficulties after the 
divorce if they did not have a job. Concerns are also raised on whether food rations are 
distributed according to the job held by a person as this might mean that an unemployed 
divorced woman would not receive food rations.
108
 Finally, information is requested on 
whether the number of divorces in the DPRK is rising or declining since the mid-1990s.
109
  
 In response, the DPRK states that the people’s power organ that supervises law 
enforcement conducted a comprehensive analysis of court judgments in divorce cases and 
found that nearly all of the judgments contained the sharing of property between couples.
110
 
The government maintains that women are not given less than a man simply because of 
gender.
111
 The principle is that the property individually owned by each spouse before 
marriage goes back to the owner, while the property acquired during a marriage should be 
disposed of by agreement. If a party asks for the division of property by law, the court 
intervenes.
112
 The DPRK maintains that no woman receives less property than a man simply 
because she is a female. In fact, a woman with children is given more property in the view of 
her support of children. However, this enforces the gender stereotyping of women to the role 
of carer of children. The North Korean government also maintains that the distribution of 
food supplies is to all households, including divorced women.
113
 
 Ho O Bom, a North Korean delegate sent to meetings in New York in 2005, states 
that both men and women can apply equally for a divorce and that the rate of divorce is going 
down after a rise in the mid-1990s.
114
 However, scholarly research suggests that as women 
were frequently absent due to trade or business and the number of dual earner couples 
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increased, it caused disharmony in marriages and family breakdowns,
115
 ultimately leading to 
the number of divorce cases increasing.
116
 It is within the DPRK’s unstable economic 
environment and the challenge to gendered roles that North Korean courts encouraged 
couples to have counselling sessions before divorce proceedings, ensuring couples are kept 
together when possible. The DPRK wishes to “protect the basic social unit, which is the 
family”.
117
 Keeping families together, however, could be detrimental to the welfare of 
women and particularly for those who are victims of domestic violence. It also indicates that 
a person’s wish to determine their own life in the DPRK is less important than the 
government’s desire for family unity. Divorce from spouses branded “reactionaries” or “bad 
elements” is granted comparatively easily to either gender and, in fact, is strongly encouraged 
by the state.
118
 The protection of the family unit by the state has prolonged the stereotyping of 
men and women to gendered roles within the home. Kang argues that the family group and its 
culture are “an important mechanism of social control and regime maintenance”.
119
 In the 
case of the DPRK, this is particularly true since the mid-1990s when the North Korean 
government passed the economic burden of supporting individuals to family groups (Family 
Law, Articles 35 and 36).  
 The CEDAW Committee expressed concern about the practice of encouraging 
conciliation among spouses who apply for divorce, with the aim of protecting the family unit, 
which could be detrimental to women who are victims of domestic violence and other forms 
of abuse.
120
 The Committee recommends that the DPRK conduct a comprehensive analysis of 
divorce cases and encourage judges to review the utilisation of conciliation to ensure that the 
rights of women are duly protected.
121
 The Committee recommends gender-sensitive training 
for legislators, the judiciary, and public officials. It also recommends the establishment of 
counselling services for victims of domestic violence and the implementation of awareness-
raising campaigns and public education programmes.  
 
Childrearing Responsibilities  
The DPRK’s initial report states that parents have equal rights and responsibilities relating to 
their children. Articles 27 and 28 of the Family Law state that both parents “have the same 
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obligation to educate and care for the health and growth of their children” and failure to do so 
is a punishable criminal act (Criminal Law, 1987, Article 136).
122
 The North Korean 
government maintains that it is a social and moral custom to respect the opinions of husband 
and wife, and rationally combine the requirements of the family and society in deciding the 
number and spacing of children.
123
 It is said that the healthcare system counsels women on 
the number and spacing of births and dispenses contraceptives free of charge.
124
 The title of 
“Maternal Heroine” though, has been assigned to women by the government to promote the 
idea of women’s roles as mothers and increase the birth rate. More than 60 per cent of women 
use contraceptives, mainly the intrauterine device, while contraceptive use among men is 
rare. It is expected to change as the government, in close cooperation with the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) and other international organisations, distributes condoms to men.
125
 
The size of North Korean families tends to be small, with most households consisting of 
between four and five people.
126
 Since the immense hardship associated with the food crisis 
of the 1990s, family size has been affected and many women prefer to have only one child.
127
 
NKHR, however, states that, according to the testimonies of North Korean refugees, the 
government limits the number of children a family has or encourages mothers to give birth to 
more children according to the government’s political, social, and economic situation.
128
  
 Preference for sons is a cultural trait common to both North and South Korea.
129
 Sons 
are desired more than daughters because of cultural attributes including patrilineal kinship 
relations, relying on sons to carry on the family name, responsibility to live with and care for 
elderly parents and perform key religious ceremonies.
130
 Until the early 1980s, a wife’s 
inability to bear a son gave a husband grounds for divorce in the DPRK. The North Korean 
government acknowledges in the initial report that “on rare occasions, grandparents demand 
childbirth until they have a grandson”.
131
 This means that women are sometimes compelled to 
give birth until a male child is born indicating that the preference for boys continues.
132
 This 
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means that there is fundamental discrimination against females in North Korean society, 
which begins from birth. 
 In accordance with Articles 15 and 16 of CEDAW, the Committee requested further 
information on measures taken by the North Korean government to change the attitude of 
preference for a son.
133
 In response, the DPRK states that the attitude of son preference is 
based on the “outdated and unreasonable notion of family inheritance or clan prosperity” and 
that some older people still have this attitude.
134
 The government maintains, though, that the 
new generation does not follow this attitude and that many people prefer daughters. The 
government does not feel it necessary to adopt special measures to alter the attitude of son 
preference which, it claims, has somehow been resolved.
135
 The CEDAW Committee does 
not offer any recommendations to the DPRK on how to address discrimination against female 
children. However, as discussed above, Articles 15 and 16 of CEDAW outline state 
responsibilities to eliminate discrimination against women within families and marriages. As 
the DPRK is party to this Convention it has a responsibility to fulfil these provisions.  
 
Domestic Violence 
There is no mention of domestic violence against women in the DPRK’s initial report to the 
CEDAW Committee. The NKHR shadow report states though, that violence against North 
Korean women in the home is rooted in the patriarchal family structure and the principle of 
women’s subservience to men.
136
 The deeply-rooted cultural concept of men being superior 
to women has been strengthened by the North Korean government and has allowed for 
further degradation of women’s status. Therefore, the common abuse of power by men is not 
viewed as a social problem. Due to the economic hardships and instability of the mid-1990s, 
domestic violence against women has been aggravated. NKHR states that husbands often 
punish their wives for failing to provide food.
137
 In addition, as growing frustration and 
alcoholism rates increase among men it has resulted in widespread domestic violence. NKHR 
believes that future economic hardships and instability of the DPRK will only aggravate the 
problem of domestic violence against women further if not addressed by the government.  
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 The CEDAW Committee presumes that such violence occurs in the DPRK, as 
domestic violence against women is a worldwide phenomenon.
138
 The Committee states that 
as the North Korean delegation had described the characteristics of women as being gentle 
and caring, it implied that men’s characteristics were opposite and if this is the case when 
couples disagreed it could lead to acts of violence.
139
 Therefore, the Committee asked 
whether the family courts that administered the Family Law were specialised in the area of 
domestic violence and whether the law had any provisions on domestic violence. If the law 
did not include provisions to protect women against domestic violence, the Committee urged 
the North Korean government to consider amending state laws.
140
 The CEDAW Committee 
requested further information regarding the measures taken by the DPRK in accordance with 
Article 5 of the Convention to prevent and combat violence against women.  
 In response, Ho O Bom states that the government is aware of the existence of 
domestic violence, and research on the issue is ongoing.
141
 He continues by stating that 
“[h]usbands sometimes treated their wives roughly when they were drunk” but he did not 
know of any case where “domestic disputes had ended in the murder of a spouse”.
142
 The 
government does acknowledge, though, that when domestic violence occurs between couples 
it generally leads to divorce.
143
 In fact, some women who sought a divorce raised the issue of 
abuse by their husbands.
144
 In the DPRK, domestic violence cases are brought before the 
court and dealt with as a crime under Articles 151 and 154 of the Criminal Law. When 
dealing with these cases, it is said that these judges are trained to consider and rely on 
international human rights instruments, including CEDAW. However, the North Korean 
delegate Ho O Bom states that in his experience: 
 
[m]ost of the complaints brought [to the courts] by women did not 
relate to gender based discrimination, but rather to the quality of 
services offered by certain providers and to the excessive 
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Husbands who are found guiltily of domestic violence before the courts are supposedly 
educated by the power organs concerned and in grave cases punished by the socialist law-
abiding life guidance committee established in each power organ.
146
 To discourage men 
further from mistreating their wives, the North Korean government established educational 
programmes conducted by the Korean Democratic Women’s Union.
147
 It is unclear, though, 
who attends these educational programmes, and if they are compulsory for men who are 
known by authorities to be perpetrators of domestic violence.  
 The DPRK reports that in most domestic violence cases, women do not wish to 
discuss their private matters in public so many cases are not reported to authorities.
148
 The 
North Korean delegate Han Chae Sun states that the DPRK’s National Coordination 
Committee was very willing to pay greater attention to the question of domestic violence in 
order to ensure that women were not just “keeping quiet about it”.
149
 The delegate Ho O Bom 
states that the number of incidents of domestic violence has decreased in recent years and he 
does “not believe that the phenomenon pose[s] a threat to the society”.
150
  Alternatively, 
NKHR reports that female refugees admit that violence in the home is common, but women 
do not ask for help because of social constraints and simple lack of institutional assistance.
151
 
Male defectors have admitted to NGOs that in South Korea if they had been reported for 
domestic violence they would have been approached by the police, while in the DPRK men 




 The CEDAW Committee expressed concern that the North Korean government is not 
aware of the extent of domestic violence against women and that, as a result, there was a lack 
of specific legislation to deal with all forms of violence.
153
 The government at this stage had 
not instituted prevention and protection measures for victims of violence. The Committee 
urges the DPRK to find ways to make visible the existence of domestic violence, for example 
by training health workers to identify signs of abuse. It also recommends that the North 
Korean government adopts specific legislation on domestic violence to ensure that violence 
against females constitutes a criminal offence, that victims of violence have access to 
immediate means of redress and protection and that perpetrators are prosecuted and 
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 The Committee requests the government to conduct research on the incidence, 
causes, and consequences of all forms of violence against women and to include the results in 
its next report.
155
 To date the DPRK has not submitted a second report and therefore has not 
provided updated statistical information on violence against women.  
 
Sexual Violence against North Korean Women  
The DPRK’s initial report made no mention of marital rape, rape or the murder of North 
Korean women. In accordance with Article 6 of CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee requested 
further information on whether the North Korean government had any information on sexual 
violence against women. In particular, the CEDAW Committee wanted to know further 
information on the number of rape cases brought before the court, and the number of men 
convicted of committing sexual crimes against women, including spousal rape and homicide 
and whether any man has had sex with an underage female.
156
 In response, the North Korean 
government states that the sexual abuse of women in the form of rape has occurred on rare 
occasions and if it occurs, the case is dealt with under Article 153 of the Criminal Law.
157
 
The DPRK denies that any man has had sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 15 or 
obliged a woman who is his subordinate to have sexual intercourse.
158
 The government states 
that it became aware of marital rape by studying CEDAW.
159
 Previously the government had 
never discussed marital rape but now the DPRK’s National Coordination Committee for the 
Implementation of CEDAW and different governmental departments were considering the 
issue of rape within marriage.  
 When questioned about statistical information regarding rape cases, the DPRK 
provided the following information on the number of rape cases, rape and murder cases, and 
rape and burglary cases in the years 2003 and 2004 (see Table 7.1).
160
 It is unclear whether 
the information represents women who were married and were violated or all women who 
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Table 7.1 Statistics of Rape Cases (2003–2004) 
 
                                    Year 
Crime 
2003 2004 
Rape 2 1 
Rape and Murder 2 2 
Rape and Burglary 4 3 
 
 
Source: United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), “Responses to the list of issues and questions for consideration of the 
initial report”, resp. 12, pp. 8, 9. 
 
 
 It is evident from the Table 7.1 that the reported number of cases of rape, rape and 
murder, and rape and burglary in the DPRK in the years 2003 and 2004 is extremely low. 
NKHR states however, that rape and sexual assault of women is common in North Korean 
society, detention centres and political prison camps.
161
 This table suggests that the North 
Korean government is in denial of sexual violence against women. The data provided by the 
state could be seen as an attempt to deliberately hide cases of sexual abuse against women or 
could reflect the fact that women do not have an avenue to report incidents. Due to the 
cultural value placed on women’s purity or chastity, most North Korean women who have 
been victims of sexual assault and harassment are reluctant to report the incident to the 
authorities.
162
 Up until this point, the DPRK had not promulgated legislative avenues for 
victims of sexual or violent abuse to receive assistance by counselling services or legal 
advice. However, where women have achieved some financial independence, it may be easier 
to leave abusive husbands.
163
  
 The CEDAW Committee did not submit recommendations to the DPRK on how to 
addresses the rape or murder of women. However, as discussed above, Article 6 of CEDAW 
outlines state parties’ responsibilities to eliminate the sexual exploitation of women. As the 
DPRK is party to this convention, it has a responsibility to fulfil these provisions.  
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Women in the Labour Force  
In the DPRK’s initial report, the government states that the key to promoting women’s rights 
is to bring women into the labour force. The government’s target to increase female labour 
participation began as early as 1958, although actual codification of major standards came 
about with the enactment of the Labour Law in 1978.
164
 Article 31 of the Labour Law 
stipulates, “[t]he State shall provide all conditions for women to take part in social labour”. In 
the North Korean legal system women are also guaranteed the right to employment 
opportunity, the right to free choice of profession, the right to equal pay and the right to safe 
working conditions as discussed above in chapter 3. While the government states that 
“[w]omen are free in the choice of employment in conformity with their technology, 
knowledge, aptitude and wish”, it also states that it allocates female graduates to jobs.
165
 This 
statement indicates a contradiction in the wording and actions of the state because if a person 
has the freedom to choose his or her occupation then there would be no need for the 
government to allocate anyone to an occupation.  
 The working age of men and women in the DPRK is 16 to 55 years and if a person 
older than 55 years wishes to work, they can do so.
166
 Workers devote eight hours a day to 
their jobs, eight hours to study (of the Juche idea) and eight hours to rest and sleep.
167
 By 
1998, women accounted for 48.4 per cent of the labour force.
168
 By the early 1990s, though, 
women, especially those married to high-income earners, tended to quit their jobs after 
marriage or were the first to be laid off due to the stagnant economy.
169
 As more married 
women became full-time housewives, a clearly gendered view of the role of women was 
emphasised by the government.
170
 The state emphasised the role of women as mothers and 
passed the responsibility of caring financially for the family to the family members 
themselves. The state was no longer capable of supporting all North Koreans with the 
collapse of the PDS and the redistribution of sources to certain areas in society such as the 
military and loyal followers.  
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 The North Korean government is said to have provided social infrastructure to 
facilitate the entry of women into the labour force.
171
 Article 31 of the Labour Law and the 
Law on Nursing and Upbringing of Children (1976) provides for local government bodies, 
enterprises and social cooperative organisations to develop nurseries, kindergartens, 
children’s wards, and public service facilities for the convenience of working women.
172
 
Article 77 of the 1998 Constitution also provides for the government to establish rice-cooking 
houses, food processing factories, morning and evening shops and other public welfare 
facilities in the residential districts.
173
 In addition to these legal measures, the government has 
also stressed the technological development of time-saving domestic appliances to ease the 
domestic burden of women. All of these facilities, along with kindergartens and nurseries, 
were built under the assumption that women are the primary caregivers and therefore need to 
be freed from household chores so they could join the public labour force. The North Korean 
government claims that women and men receive equal remuneration in respect of work of 
equal value.
174
 Article 7 of the DPRK Constitution states that citizens “work according to 
their abilities and are paid in accordance with the quantity and quality of their work”. Salaries 
in the DPRK are supposedly determined under the principle of compensation for the physical 
and mental consumption of labour and in consideration of various facts including the 
worker’s technical skill, labour intensity, and work conditions.
175
 
  With reference to Article 11 of CEDAW, the Committee requested an explanation on 
the process by which the North Korean government “allocates” female graduates to the 
employment sector.
176
 As women are traditionally employed in health care, education and the 
commercial and light industrial sectors, the Committee requested the DPRK to provide 
detailed information, disaggregated by gender, regarding the salaries of employees working 
in various sectors and the wage gap between genders.
177
 
In response, the DPRK states that the allocation of work is decided by the labour 
administration organ, institution, enterprise or organisation concerned in view of an 
individual’s wishes.
178
 It is up to one’s own mind whether to accept the decision and a person 
may lodge a complaint with the people’s power organ, the institution or enterprise concerned, 
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if a decision on employment is unacceptable.
179
 When the institution, enterprise, or 
occupation of their choice has no vacancy, people temporarily work in other places until a 
place is available. The DPRK provided the following statistical information about the gender 
segregation of several sectors in the years 2003 and 2004 (see Table 7.2). 
 
Table 7.2 Employment Sectors and Gender Segregation (2003–2004) 
 
Employment Sector Gender 2003 2004 
Industry Male 1,965 1,979 
Female 2,146 2,206 
Agriculture Male 1,644 1,701 
Female 1,672 1,687 
Construction and 
Geological Survey 
Male 340 352 
Female 105 107 
Transport and 
Telecommunication 
Male 274 296 
Female 111 117 
Commerce and 
Procurement 
Male 152 159 
Female 363 371 
Education, Culture, 
and Health 
Male 347 355 




Male 153 161 




Source: United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), “Responses to the list of issues and questions for consideration of the 
initial report”, resp. 20, p. 4.  
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 The data provided in Table 7.2 suggests that the ratio of men to women in most 
employment sectors changed only slightly from 2003 and 2004. The table, however, 
demonstrates the feminisation of some sectors, such as healthcare, culture, and education, 
which tend to be paid lower than other sectors considered heavy industries, which are mostly 
occupied by men.
180
 In the DPRK, salaries depend on occupational classification, rating, 
technical skill, functions, and work conditions. The DPRK reports: 
 
The principle in paying salary is to recover the physical and mental 
energy consumed in the work and ensure the life of a person, and this 




Therefore, if a person works in an occupation considered “hard labour” where more energy is 
required they would receive a higher salary than those in the so-called “light industries”. 
Further, a person who performs technical or intellectual work receives a higher salary than 
those performing simple labour. In 2001, the minimum monthly salary was 2,200 NKwon 
(3.20 AUD/ 2.45 USD), the average salary 5,000 NKwon (7.25 AUD/ 5.55 USD), and the 
highest salary level 8,000 NKwon (11.60 AUD/ 8.90 USD).
182
 The government claims that 
the minimum salary is enough to procure staples, subsidised food and daily necessities, as 
well as saving 800 to 900 won.
183
 Table 7.2 suggests however, that a gender hierarchy within 
occupations exists in the DPRK as men occupy positions which are perceived as higher 
skilled (and thus more lucrative) positions than women do.
184
 Eun-young Shin states, 
however, that it is debatable whether the gendered division of labour is necessarily a 
disadvantage to women as the government transferred men from the light industries to heavy 
industries in order to provide jobs for women.
185
 Shin suggests that this can be viewed as a 
special consideration to protect women rather than to discriminate against them.
186
 The 
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 In the meetings held in New York between the DPRK and CEDAW in 2005, Ho O 
Bom states that the National Coordination Committee for the Implementation of CEDAW has 
developed a 10-year plan for the advancement of women, with the primary objective “to 
promote women’s participation in the country’s economic and social life”.
188
 He 
acknowledges that women account for 80 per cent of the total number of employees in the 
education and public health sectors, while representing less than 20 per cent of the workers in 
certain other sectors. Ho O Bom’s colleague, Hong Ji Sun states that it “is true that women 
tended to go into fields of medicine, commerce and light industry and were similarly heavily 
represented in administration posts relating to those areas”.
189
 She explains that women’s 
“presence in the caring professions seemed to be related to the nature of women”. This 
statement suggests that attitudes towards roles performed by men and women in North 
Korean society have not changed significantly, as certain occupations are seen to be better 
suited to women because of their “nurturing” characteristics. Han Chae Sun describes the 
process of allocating graduates to jobs. First teachers explain what job opportunities are 
available to graduates and then communicate each graduate’s choice to the labour 
administration department of municipal and district people’s committees, which discuss the 
graduate’s choice with the respective enterprises.
190
 After that, the committees meet the 
graduates and jobs are allocated. There is no system for advertising jobs in the DPRK so 
notification of job opportunities is made through schools and people’s committees. 
 The CEDAW Committee was concerned that there are many instances of indirect and 
hidden discrimination against women in the employment sector and that the prevailing 
perception is that the public and social spheres are “men’s spheres”.
191
 The Committee urges 
the DPRK to recognise and analyse the persistence of indirect and hidden discrimination as 
an obstacle to the implementation of CEDAW, including measures to identify where 




The Trafficking of North Korean Women  
The North Korean government claims in its initial report to the CEDAW Committee that the 
“traffic in women and prostitution [of women] are regarded as the most shameful crime” and 
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that there has been no reported case for many years.
193
 The government instead points to the 
colonial period when women were forced into prostitution and states, “[t]here used to be the 
systems of licensed or unlicensed prostitution, Kisaeng, and traffic in women in the days of 
the Japanese colonial rule”.
194
 According to the DPRK, the Japanese imperial army forced 
200,000 Korean women into prostitution as so-called “comfort women”.
195
 Historians 
estimate however, that between 100,000 and 200,000 women were enslaved in this system.
196
 
While many of the women who were forced into sexual slavery were young Korean women, 
there were also women of several other nationalities.
197
 Women were recruited in many ways. 
Some women were promised work in factories or military hospitals and some women were 
kidnapped. Immediately after the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the 
North Korean interim government promulgated strict legal prohibition against the prostitution 
and trafficking of women.
198
  
  The DPRK states that as a precautionary measure to prevent the sexual violation of 
North Korean women, the government promulgated the Criminal Law and Criminal 
Procedures Act in 1974, revised in 1987 and 1992 respectively.
199 
Article 152 of the Criminal 
Law states: 
 
A man who rapes a woman by using violence or threat or by taking 
advantage of her when she is helpless, or a man who has sexual 
intercourse with a girl under the age of 15 shall be punished gravely. 
 
The Article does not explain in detail, though, what the punishment of the perpetrator would 
be if a woman or girl is sexually violated. The Law continues, “[a] man who obliges a woman 
who is his subordinate officially or by duty to have sexual intercourse with him shall be 
punished” (Criminal Law, Article 154). Again, the Article does not specify the punishment of 
the perpetrator. Articles 151 and 152 of the Criminal Law address the punishment of a 
perpetrator by stating: 
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[a] person who illegally as well as discriminatively restricts the 
liberty of a woman, or insults or impairs the honour of a woman is 




However, the law does not explain in detail the punishment of perpetrators in each different 
form of abuse against women and domestic violence is unaddressed.  
 Due to the difficult living conditions in the DPRK in the 1990s, many people were 
pushed to cross the border to China. Good Friends states that “a majority of [North Korean] 
women who crossed the national border to China said that their decision was based on the 
severe economic difficulty in the DPRK”.
201
 Though some North Korean women chose to 
cross the border to marry Chinese men, other women were forced into marriages through 
trafficking.
202
 An important factor stimulating the trafficking of North Korean women is the 
gender imbalance in China caused by the state’s one-child policy and parents’ general 
preference for male offspring. The gender gap in rural areas of China has grown because of 
the continued economic boom and modernisation of cities, which sees more and more 
Chinese women leave the countryside in search of employment in the better-paid urban 
industrial sectors.
203
 As a result, the North Korean bride market and the placement of women 
into the Chinese sex industry have grown over the years. NKHR states that the trafficking of 




 Since the food crisis in the mid-1990s, women have turned to prostitution in desperate 
circumstances to secure money for food for their families.
205
 Good Friends states that 
according to the countless testimonies it has collected from North Koreans, prostitution has 
grown drastically after the food shortage.
206
 Prostitution in the DPRK though, is different 
from other societies, as it is not conducted in the public sphere. It is instead prevalent, for 
instance, as a bribe to officials or police officers for favours or it is employed solely as a 
survival strategy.
207
 Since the food crisis, prostitution in the DPRK has become “not only 
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 The CEDAW Committee noted the concerns of the Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women who reported on the trafficking of North Korean women and girls to China as 
brides or prostitutes.
209
 In accordance with Article 6 of CEDAW, the Committee requested 
the DPRK to indicate what legal and programmatic measures are in place to identify, prevent 
and combat the trafficking of women.
210
 The Committee also urged the government to 
indicate whether any cases of trafficking had been brought before the courts under Article 
153 or 154 of the Criminal Law.
211
 
In response, the North Korean government maintains, “there has not been any report 
of trafficking in women or prostitution”.
212
 Therefore, the DPRK asserts that there has been 
no need for amendments to the Criminal Law to include provision for the punishment of 
trafficking in women and prostitution. The North Korean legal system has considered some 
proposals to include these provisions in the Criminal Law for preventive effect. The 
government states, “it is unlikely that [North Korean] women and girls are sold to China as 
prostitutes or brides, some went over to China in the northern areas for the needs of life or 
trade”.
213
 It is said that these women then came back to the DPRK with the things they had 
procured in China. The government is said not to have punished them as their “deeds were 
related to the current economic difficulties”.
214
 The DPRK reports that recently there have 
been reports of “disorderly crossing over the borderline under the pretext of economic 
difficulty”.
215
 It is in this circumstance that the immigration office strengthened its legal 
requirements and concluded bilateral agreements with the neighbouring countries to control 
illegal immigration. The DPRK did not indicate what countries it discussed control of illegal 
immigration with but one could assume that it was China because of the issues outlined 
above.  
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 During the meetings in New York in 2005, Ho O Bom stated that the government had 
looked into the situation of women crossing the border into China and found that women 
mostly crossed in search of food.
216
 However, as many of them bypassed the proper legal 
formalities for leaving or re-entering the country, both the DPRK and China had intensified 
monitoring by their border guards. The delegation did not address the increase in numbers of 
women entering prostitution as a survival tactic. It instead referred to the colonial period and 
stated that gender equality was never achieved before the North Korean government came to 
power because the Japanese Imperial Army had “forced 200,000 Korean women into 
prostitution as ‘comfort women’ for the military, on threat of death if they refused”.
217
 
 The CEDAW Committee is concerned that North Korean women may become 
vulnerable to trafficking and other forms of exploitation, such as prostitution.
218
 It calls on the 
DPRK to train law enforcement officials, migration officials and border police on the causes, 
consequences and incidence of trafficking and other forms of exploitation so as to enable 
them to render support to women who might be at risk of becoming victims of trafficking or 
commercial sexual exploitation.
219
 It also recommends that the government conduct a 
nationwide awareness campaign on the risks and consequences of trafficking of women and 
girls. The Committee urges the government to intensify its efforts to deal with this 
phenomenon through increased international, regional, and bilateral cooperation. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the gap between how the North Korean government promotes gender equality 
to the international community and the actual conditions within the DPRK have been 
considered through the communication between the state and the CEDAW Committee.  In the 
DPRK’s initial report to the CEDAW Committee the North Korean government emphasised 
the efforts of the state in eliminating all forms of discrimination against women by stressing 
the importance of preferential treatment of women in state laws and policy. Referring to 
“preferential” treatment of women, though, exposes the gendered lens of the government. 
Often the language employed in the laws assigned women to stereotypical feminine roles. For 
example, measures taken by the government to “protect” women within families and society 
actually reinforced stereotyping of men and women to certain roles in families, and forced 
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women to adapt themselves to the role of mother and carer. Therefore, the realities faced by 
many women fall short of the ideals outlined in the state laws and policies.  
Further, laws and policies designed to emancipate North Korean women have not 
been amended to incorporate modern problems, such as women who are victims of domestic 
violence and trafficking. The government explained that these issues are not of great social 
concern or have not occurred since the occupation of Korea by Japan. Instead, the gendered 
view of the North Korean government is to assume that women perform the majority of 
household chores and to address this through the promulgation of laws to help lessen their 
burdens. These laws, however, only confirm the government’s perception that women are the 
primary carers of children and responsible for cleaning and cooking for their families. 
Further, once women left the home to work in the national reconstruction project they were 
assigned by the government to work deemed suitable for them to perform. These jobs were 
typically paid less than those monopolised by men because women were deemed more 
physically and mentally suitable for light work. Therefore, in the DPRK’s communication 
with the CEDAW Committee official state rhetoric has presented to the international 
community a positive image of life for North Korean women. 
 In the next chapter, I examine communication between the DPRK and the UN from 
2006 to 2011 and focus on the government’s deployment of historical issues such as the 
sexual enslavement of Korean women by Japan when answering questions regarding gender 
equality. The North Korean government asserts that in order to overcome customary 
discrimination within the country issues of past crimes against Korean women, including the 
issue of so-called “comfort women”, need to be addressed and completely resolved. The 
government has taken the position that the sexual exploitation of Korean women was 
fundamentally tied to the colonial occupation of the country and was thus a historical rather 
than contemporary issue. The North Korean government denies that sexual violations against 
women continued to occur after the liberation of the country. Along with the DPRK’s 
continued communication with the UN, there was international pressure for the North Korean 
government to amend existing state laws and establish new laws to include provisions for the 
greater protection of women’s rights. In 2010, the state adopted the Women’s Rights Act, 
which was the first law to directly address the rights of women since the promulgation of the 
Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946. For the first time, provisions addressed issues such as 
domestic violence, female infanticide and the protection of pregnant women who face 
execution. In the following chapter, I consider the years from 2006 to 2011, including the 
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Women’s Rights Act and the DPRK’s communication with the UN. The year 2011 also 
marked the end of the rule of Kim Jong Il. 
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8. North Korea and the United Nations 
(2006–2011) 
 
The Japanese confined each girl in a cell of about two 
square metres. My room was No. 8. I had to ‘serve’ 20 
Japanese soldiers on a daily average, and more on 
Sundays. The Japanese beat, even stabbed, ‘comfort girls’ 
if the latter cried with pain.  





As discussed in the previous chapter, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, 
North Korea) and the Committee to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(hereafter “CEDAW Committee”) held their last meeting in New York in July 2005.
2
 This 
was the last time that the North Korean government and the CEDAW Committee directly 
communicated about the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW). After 2005, the North Korean government continued to communicate 
with the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, General Assembly) and other United 
Nations (UN) bodies. In its communications, the DPRK often addressed concerns raised by 
the UN and the CEDAW Committee relating to the status of North Korean women.
3
 These 
concerns involved the continued stereotyping of women in the home and in the labour force, 
and women’s access to food, health care, and education. At every possible opportunity, the 
                                                     
1
 Testimony of former North Korean “comfort woman”, Ri Kyong Saeng, recorded in 1992, aged 76 years at the 
time. Testimony published in Jong Hyong Ri, Japan’s War Crimes, Past and Present (Pyongyang: Foreign 
Language Publishing House, 1999), p. 153.  
2
 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
“Summary Record of the 699th meeting”, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/SR.699 (Thirty-
third session, 5 to 22 July 2005), (New York: 18 July 2005 at 10 am) (distributed 9 September 2005); United 
Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), “Summary 
Record of the 700th meeting”, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/SR.700 (Thirty-third 
session, 5 to 22 July 2005), (New York: 18 July 2005 at 3pm) (distributed 9 September 2005). 
3
 “Statement by the Delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Item 56 ‘Advancement of 
Women’”, Permanent Mission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations (New York: 
Third Committee of the 63rd session of the United Nations General Assembly, 14 October 2008); “Statement by 
Mr. Pak Tok Hun on Agenda item 28 ‘Advancement of Women’”, Permanent Mission of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations (New York: Third Committee of the 65th session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, 14 September 2010).  
217 
 
UN, as well as the international community, emphasised the importance of improving the 
situation for women in the DPRK.  
 In this chapter, I examine communications between the DPRK and UN from 2006 to 
2011, including the DPRK’s deployment of the historical issue of the sexual enslavement of 
Korean women by the Japanese Imperial Army when discussing gender equality. 
Specifically, I refer to two North Korean press releases issued in response to items discussed 
during UN General Assemblies in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, the DPRK participated in the 63rd 
session of the UNGA and issued a press release in response to Item 56 “Advancement of 
Women”.
4
 The press release addressed the issue of achieving gender equality and the 
elimination of customary discrimination within the DPRK. The government asserted that in 
order to overcome customary discrimination issues of past crimes against Korean women, 
including the issue of so-called “comfort women”, needed to be addressed and completely 
resolved. Then, in 2010, a North Korean delegation, including the Ambassador Deputy 
Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the DPRK to the UN, Pak Tok Hun, 
participated in the 65th session of the UNGA and issued a press release in response to 
Agenda item 28 “Advancement of Women”. The press release outlined the DPRK’s concerns 
about achieving gender equality within the country and the issue of “comfort women”.
5
  
 During these years, there was pressure from the international community for the 
North Korean government to amend existing state laws and establish new laws to include 
provisions for the greater protection of women’s rights. Between 2006 and 2010, two pieces 
of legislation that stand out were the amended state Constitution in 2009 and the Women’s 
Rights Act in 2010. In this chapter, I specifically examine provisions that address the issues 
of gender stereotyping, violence against women and the trafficking of North Korean women. 
This information will be compared to the findings of the non-governmental organisations 
(NGO), Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), and the Korea Institute 
for National Unification (KINU).
6
 The information collected by these organisations includes 
testimonies of North Korean refugees which offer an alternative look at North Korean society 
in recent years. In this chapter, I argue that despite international pressure for the North 
Korean government to address the rights of women in its dealings with the UN and through 
amended laws and policies, the DPRK has still not addressed the stereotyping of women to 
                                                     
4
 “Statement by the Delegation”. 
5
 “Statement by Mr. Pak Tok Hun”. 
6
 Joanna Hosaniak, Status of Women’s Rights in the Context of Socio-Economic Changes in the DPRK, NKHR 
Briefing Report No.7 (Seoul: Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, 2013); Korea Institute of 
National Unification (KINU), White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, 2012 (Seoul: Korea Institute for 
National Unification, 2012).  
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gendered positions in society. This is evident in the DPRK’s deflection of the contemporary 
issue of the trafficking of Korean women to the historical issue of the sexual enslavement of 
Korean women by Japan as will be discussed further below.  
I begin by outlining the relationship of the DPRK and the UN between 2006 and 2011 
to ensure the reader has an understanding of North Korea’s relations with the world during 
this period.  
 
The DPRK and the United Nations (2006–2011) 
Since the DPRK’s and CEDAW Committee’s last meetings in New York in 2005, the North 
Korean government has continued to correspond with the UNGA, the United Nations Human 
Rights Council (UNHCR)
7
 and other UN bodies, such as the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC)
8
 and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
9
 At times relations between the 
DPRK and UN have been strained, usually because of actions taken by the North Korean 
government. This can be seen on 9 October 2006, when the North Korean government 
authorised a nuclear weapons test in Sangpyong-ri, about 15 km from the coastal city of 
Kimchaek and about 50 km west of Musadan-ri, DPRK. In spite of this, the UN kept 
communication channels open to ensure that the DPRK continued to interact with the 
                                                     
7
 United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), “Human Rights Council – Universal Periodic Review”, 
United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, (7 December 2009), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/Highlights7December2009pmaspx.aspx (accessed 4 July 
2014). 
8
 The DPRK acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in September 1990 without any reservations. 
On 10 December 2007, the DPRK submitted a combined third and fourth periodic report to the Committee on 
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2007, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,  CRC/C/PRK/4 (submitted 10 December 2007), (distributed 15 
January 2008); United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Written replies by the government 
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the List of Issues (CRC/C/PRK/Q/4) prepared by the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child in connection with the consideration of the third and fourth periodic 
reports of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CRC/C/PRK/Q/4/Add.1 (Fiftieth session, 12-13 January 
2009), (distributed 22 December 2008). 
9
 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), “Human Rights Situations that Require the Council’s Attention”, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea: Vitit Muntarbhorn, 15 February 2008, A/HRC/7/20 (Human Rights Council, seventh session, 3 to 28 
March 2008, Agenda item 4); United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), “Implementation of General 
Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled ‘Human Rights Council’”, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Vitit Muntarbhorn, 
7 February 2007, A/HRC/4/15(Human Rights Council, fourth session, 12 to 30 March 2007, Item 2 of the 
provisional agenda); United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), “Situation of human rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea”, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 28 February 2008, A/RES/62/167 
(Sixty-second session, 18 December 2007, Agenda item 70 (c)); United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 
“Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 
August 2008, A/63/332 (Sixty-third session, 16 September 2008, Item 67 (c) of the provisional agenda). 
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international community, build upon already established relationships, and not isolate itself 
further from the world.  
 The DPRK was not always forthcoming with information, however, and did not 
submit several periodic reports to the various UN bodies. Specifically, North Korea did not 
submit the following reports: the third periodic report of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) due January 2004, the second and third periodic reports of 
CEDAW due March 2006 and March 2010, and the third periodic report of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) due June 2008. The DPRK has 
always been a key topic of discussion in the UNGA and other UN bodies though, and at 
every opportunity, the UN has questioned the DPRK on the human rights of the North 
Korean people. Below I examine several issues that occurred between the DPRK and the UN 
between 2006 and 2011.  
 
The United Nation Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) 
Five days after the DPRK’s nuclear weapons test on 14 October 2006, the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC, Security Council) issued Resolution 1718 in response.
10
 This 
resolution provided context for the decision by the Security Council to impose sanctions. The 
resolution cited the DPRK’s violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the 
country’s subsequent withdrawal from the Treaty on 10 January 2003,
11
 the DPRK’s refusal 
to participate in another round of the Six-Party Talks and its failure to address other security 
and humanitarian concerns raised by the international community.
12
 UN bodies also took 
further action on human rights issues through resolutions of the UN General Assembly, and 
reports from the UN Secretary-General and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in the DPRK.
13
 North Korean funds that were controlled or owned directly or indirectly 
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 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Resolution 1718 (2006)”, Resolution adopted by the Security 
Council, S/RES/1718(2006), (5551st meeting, 14 October 2006).  
11
 The DPRK ratified the NPT on 12 December 1985, but gave notice of withdrawal 10 January 2003 following 
US allegations that it had started an illegal enriched uranium weapons program. Withdrawal from the Treaty 
came into full effect on 10 April 2003 making North Korea the first state ever to withdraw from the NPT.  
12
 UNSC, “Resolution 1718 (2006)”, para. 14, p. 5. Responding to the UN Security Council’s allegations, the 
DPRK declared on the 14 April 2009, that it would not attend the Six Party Talks, and resumed its nuclear 
enrichment program.  
13
 Sanctions imposed by the Security Council prohibited countries from exporting military goods and supplies, 
as well as banning the export of luxury goods to the DPRK. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 
“Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, Resolution Adopted by the General 
Assembly, 1 March 2007, A/RES/61/174 (Sixty-first session, 19 December 2006, Agenda item 67(c)); UNGA, 
“Situation of human rights”, A/RES/62/167; UNGA, “Situation of human rights”, A/63/332; UNGA, 
“Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251”; United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 
“Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, Note by the Secretary-General, 15 
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by a person or entity engaged in the nuclear weapons program were frozen and travel bans 
applied to persons tied to the program.
14
 The Security Council determined that other UN 
member states were empowered to inspect cargo to and from the DPRK to enforce the ban on 
trafficking in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
15
 The Security Council made clear 




 In response to the UN Security Council Resolution 1718, the DPRK was 
uncooperative. A UN press release regarding the resolution quoted a North Korean 
representative, Pak Gil Yon, as stating that the DPRK government “totally rejected” the 
resolution, saying that it was “gangster-like” of the Security Council to adopt such a coercive 
resolution against the country, while neglecting the nuclear threat posed by the USA against 
the DPRK.
17
 The statement continued that the Security Council had completely lost its 
impartiality and was applying double standards.
18
 Although the DPRK had conducted a 
nuclear test, “due to American provocation”, the North Korean delegate stated that “it still 
remained unchanged in its will to denuclearise the Korean peninsula through dialogue and 
negotiation, as that had been President Kim Il Sung’s last instruction”.
19
 The delegate stated 
that the DPRK had clarified more than once that: 
 
[i]t would have no need for even a single nuclear weapon as long as 
the [USA] dropped its hostile policies towards the country and as 




Instead, the USA is said to have “manipulated the Security Council” into adopting a 
resolution putting pressure on Pyongyang.
21
 Two months after the DPRK tested nuclear 
                                                                                                                                                                     
August 2007, A/62/264, (Sixty-second session, 18 September 2007, Item 72 (c) of the provisional agenda); 
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 Ibid., para. 8(f), p. 3. 
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 Ibid., para. 9(a), pp. 3, 4.  
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 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718 (2006), SC/8853 (New York: Department of Public 
Information, News and Media Division, Oct. 14, 2006). 
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conducted underground nuclear tests as a way of bolstering the country’s self-defence. UN: SC, Security 
Council Condemns Nuclear Test. 
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20
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221 
 
weapons and the UNGA instituted Resolution 1718, the General Assembly approved two 
subsequent resolutions. As part of these resolutions, reports were commissioned by the UN 
Secretary-General and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK. 
The two resolutions and four reports of the Secretary-General and the Special Rapporteur are 
discussed below.  
 
The United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 61/174 and 62/167 (2006–2007) 
Concerning the human rights situation in the DPRK, the UNGA approved Resolution 61/174 
and 62/167 in December 2006 and December 2007 respectively.
22
 The resolutions covered 
concerns similar to those outlined previously by the General Assembly, but added concerns 
regarding “the violations of economic, social, and cultural rights, which have led to severe 
malnutrition and hardship for the population in the [DPRK]”.
23
 The UNGA urged the North 
Korean government to end the “systematic, widespread, and grave violations of civil, 
political, economic, social, and cultural rights in the [DPRK]”.
24
 Specifically the resolutions 
requested the DPRK to consider the: 
 
[c]ontinuing violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of women, in particular the trafficking of women for the purpose of 
prostitution or forced marriage and the subjection of women to 





The General Assembly suggested that, when addressing these human rights violations, the 
DPRK should “tackle the root causes leading to refugee outflows and criminalise those who 
exploit refugees by human smuggling, trafficking and extortion, while not criminalising the 
victim”.
26
 This was particularly significant for North Korean women, as the North Korean 
government had not addressed the trafficking of young girls and women to China in the 
CEDAW report in 2002 or any state legislation up until this point. The UNGA also requested 
that the DPRK extend access and cooperation to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
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 UNGA, “Situation of human rights”, A/RES/61/174; UN: GA, “Situation of human rights”, A/RES/62/167.   
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 UNGA, “Situation of human rights”, A/RES/61/174, para. 1(b)(vi), p. 2. 
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26
 Ibid., para. 4(b), p. 4. 
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human rights in North Korea, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and other UN 
agencies and humanitarian actors.
27
  
 In Resolution 61/174, the General Assembly continued to examine the situation of 
human rights in the DPRK at its 63rd session, which was to take place in September 2008. It 
also requested the UN Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on the situation in 
the DPRK and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea to 
continue to report the findings and recommendations.
28
 This was the first time the Secretary-
General was requested to report to the UNGA about the human rights situation in the DPRK.  
 By September 2007, the UN Secretary-General had finished the report, outlining the 
UN’s history in dealing with the DPRK’s human rights issues.
29
 The report identified the 
conditions that led to the General Assembly Resolution 62/167, including the DPRK’s failure 
to cooperate with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and with the 
Special Rapporteur.
30
 The report also summarised the work and findings of various UN 
bodies on the status of human rights in the DPRK.
31
 Based on the information in the report, 
the Secretary-General noted that little progress had been made in implementing any of the 
international treaties or resolutions of the UNGA, the UN Commission on Human Rights or 
other UN bodies.
32
 The UN Secretary-General urged the North Korean government to 
“safeguard fundamental rights and freedoms and show visible signs of domestic legal reform 
so as to fulfil its treaty obligations and comply with international standards”.
33
 At the time, 
the DPRK had not submitted its second periodic report concerning the implementation of 
CEDAW, which was due by March 2006.
34
 While information provided by the DPRK was 
sometimes limited, the Secretary-General requested that the Commission on Human Rights 
continue its efforts to engage in constructive dialogue with the country, as well as the 
international community continuing to support the DPRK through humanitarian efforts.
35
 The 
North Korean government was urged by the Secretary-General “to sustain cooperation with 
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 Agencies include: the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the FAO, the WFP, the UNICEF, 
the UN Development Programme, and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. 
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The United Nations Special Rapporteur Reports (2007–2008) 
From February 2007 to February 2008, the then Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in North Korea, Vitit Muntarbhorn (Thai representative), issued three reports on human 
rights concerns in the DPRK.
37
 The first report, issued in February 2007, outlined the 
DPRK’s refusal to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur and highlighted the ongoing human 
rights violations in the country, including food shortages and malnutrition, a lack of basic 
freedoms, the mistreatment of prisoners and the exploitation of refugees.
38
 The report also 
discussed the responsibility of the North Korean government to protect its population and the 
obligation of the international community to take collective action should the country fail to 
fulfil its obligations to protect its people. The Special Rapporteur concluded by calling for the 
DPRK to abide by its international human rights obligations, facilitate humanitarian aid, 
improve food security, reform its prison system and improve the treatment of refugees.
39
  
 Six months later, in August 2007, the UN Secretary-General presented the Special 
Rapporteur’s second report to the UNGA.
40
 While the DPRK continued to refuse to provide 
the Special Rapporteur access to the country, the report noted that there were some 
improvements in North Korea’s relationship with the international community, in particular 
the progress made through recent six-round Six-Party Talks (19 March–22 March, 18 July–
20 July 2007).
41
 Despite the appearance of some improvement, the Special Rapporteur 
reported that many of the same problems and human rights abuses highlighted in the first 
report of February 2007 continued in the DPRK. The North Korean government was urged to 
“protect the rights of women, children and other groups, particularly by addressing their 
vulnerable positions and ending discrimination”.
42
 This was particularly important, as the 
DPRK had not addressed the elimination of discrimination against women and girls since its 
reporting to CEDAW in 2005. The Special Rapporteur also reiterated the previous 
recommendations for the DPRK to cooperate with the UN and for the international 
community to continue to provide food aid and put pressure on the North Korean government 
because of human rights violations.  
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 In February 2008, the Special Rapporteur issued the third report to the UNGA.
43
 The 
report noted that there had been some progress made since the fifth-round (third phase) of the 
Six-Party Talks in February 2007, when the North Korean government agreed to disable its 
controversial nuclear plant.
44
 This was advanced by the participation of the DPRK in the 
second session of the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing from 27 to 30 
September 2007. The participants at the meeting reached agreement on the “Second-Phase 
Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” of 19 September 2005.
45
 The goal of 
the joint statement was the verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful 
manner. North and South Korea participated in the second inter-Korean Summit held in 
Pyongyang from 2 to 4 October 2007.
46
 At the meeting, representatives of both parties agreed 
to adopt and sign the Declaration on the Advancement of North–South Korean Relations, 
Peace and Prosperity, aimed to strengthen cooperation between North and South Korea and 
replace the Armistice, which ended the Korean War (1950–1953), with a permanent peace 
treaty.
47
   
 The Special Rapporteur’s report stated that, given that the human rights situation in 
the DPRK “remains grave on several fronts, it is essential to press for concrete actions to 
address the various challenges set out in this report”.
48
 Therefore, both the North Korean 
government and the international community were urged to “address the impunity factor, 
which has enabled such [human rights] violations to exist and persist over many years”.
49
 In 
this situation, the Special Rapporteur requested the DPRK to take the “softer entry point to 
deal with the misdeeds of local officials” and make them accountable at the national level.
50
 
The Special Rapporteur cautioned that care should be exercised to assess such actions against 
international standards and the rule of law in the DPRK.
51
 However, given the non-
independent nature of the judiciary within the country, it was difficult to ensure that “justice 
is done and seen to be done”.
52
 The international community was urged to continue to 
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advocate for accountability for human rights violations in the DPRK, whether in terms of 
state responsibility or individual accountability. The Special Rapporteur noted that the 
international community had advocated to apply the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine 
to the situation in the DPRK (see Appendix 9).
53
 To conclude, the Special Rapporteur stated, 
“The question remains whether the issue of violations in the [DPRK] will be taken up at some 
stage at the pinnacle of the system, within the totality of the United Nations framework”.
54
 A 
few months after the UN expressed concern for the human rights of the North Korean people, 
the North Korean government reported to the CRC Committee on the status of children in 




The DPRK and the 63rd United Nations General Assembly (2008) 
On 16 September 2008, two days before the 63rd session of the UNGA, the North Korean 
delegation to the UN issued a press release in response to Item 56 “Advancement of 
Women”.
56
 Item 56 entails discussions about the advancement of women in society, the 
implementation and outcomes of the Fourth World Conference on Women (September 1995, 
Beijing, China) and of the 23rd special session of the General Assembly (June 2000). The 
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing marked a significant turning point for the 
global agenda for gender equality. Participants discussed how women’s lives had changed 
over the decade after the United Nations Decade for Women (1975–1985) and the steps taken 
to keep issues of concern to women high on the international agenda.
57
 The Beijing 
Declaration and the Platform for Action were adopted unanimously by 189 countries at the 
conference. The Platform advocated for women’s empowerment and is considered the key 
global policy document on gender equality. The governments which attended the 23rd special 
session of the UNGA (June 2000) reaffirmed their commitment to the goals and objectives 
                                                     
53
 Ibid., para. 46, p. 14. The R2P is a principle born from a desire to protect the world’s most vulnerable 
communities and populations from international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. See DLA Piper LLP and Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), 
Failure to Protect: a call for the UN Security Council to act in North Korea (Washington: DLA Piper LLP, 
2008); Christian Solidarity Worldwide, North Korea: A Case to Answer, A Call to Act (Surry: Christian 
Solidarity Worldwide, 2007). 
54
 UNGA, “Human Rights Situations”, A/HRC/7/20, para. 45, p. 14. 
55
 CRC, “Consideration of Reports”, CRC/C/PRK/4. 
56
 “Statement by the Delegation”. 
57
 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Agenda of the sixty-third session of the General Assembly, 
A/63/251, Second plenary meeting, 19 September 2008), distributed 19 September 2008, p. 5; United Nations 
Women, World Conferences on Women, (2011–2014), http://www.unwomen.org/co/how-we-work/ 
intergovernmental-support/world-conferences-onwomen#sthash.k8QJuBdl.dpuf  (accessed 23 July 2014). 
226 
 
contained in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World 
Conference on Women in 1995.
58
 
 In 2008, the North Korean press release stated that the DPRK had constantly 
reinforced legal and practical measures for women to realise gender equality, by upholding 
“man-centred [sic] Juche ideas, as its guiding principles”.
59
 The DPRK also paid tribute to 
the Law on Equality of the Sexes (1946), stating that women were guaranteed the same rights 
as men to participate in all areas of social life – political, economic and cultural. So much so, 
that today woman are said to fully exercise rights on equal footing with men. The North 
Korean government maintains that it has continuously taken legal and practical measures for 
gender equality and the advancement of women in conformity with the evolving development 
of North Korean society.
60
 The DPRK states that it has “faithfully honour[ed]” its obligations 
to both the CEDAW and CRC Conventions.  
 
The Government of the DPRK stands unshakable in implementing its 
policies to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and 





To achieve gender equality it is claimed that the DPRK has taken measures to improve and 
enhance the function and role of the North Korean National Coordination Committee for 
CEDAW and CRC.
62
 Both Coordination Committees continue to contribute to the protection 
and promotion of women and girls’ rights in the DPRK and as a result, females exercise their 
rights to the full in all spheres of state and social life.
63
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  Below, I discuss the growing tensions between the DPRK and the northeast Asian 
region due to the attempted satellite launch by the North Korean government in 2006. This 
will set out clearly the context in which the state communicated with the world. Although the 
DPRK’s relationships in the region were strained, the UNSC and other UN bodies continued 
to communicate with the state during 2009 to ensure the country did not isolate itself any 
further from the international community.   
 
The DPRK and the United Nations Security Council (2009) 
On 5 April 2009, the North Korean government announced the launch of a satellite, despite 
international pressure not to do so. The UNSC condemned the DPRK’s actions even though 
the satellite launch was a failure, landing in the Pacific Ocean. Seven days after the launch on 
13 April 2009 at the 6106th meeting of the UNSC, the Council considered the item entitled 
“Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”.
64
 At the meeting, the President 
of the Security Council made the following statement. 
 
The Security Council bears in mind the importance of maintaining 
peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in northeast Asia as a 
whole. The Security Council condemns the 5 April 2009 (local time) 





The UNSC urged the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under Security Council 
Resolution 1718 (2006) and not conduct any further launches. The Council also advised the 
DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks and called for an early resumption. All participants in 
the Talks were urged to intensify their efforts on the full implementation of the Joint 
Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, South Korea, the 
Russian Federation (Russia) and the United States of America (USA).
66
 The Joint Statement 
aimed to achieve the verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful 
manner and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia. 
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The UNSC also called upon all UN member states to comply fully with their obligations 
under resolution 1718 (2006), which entailed sanctions against the DPRK, as discussed 
above. The Security Council expressed its desire for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the 
situation and welcomed efforts by Council members and member states to facilitate a 
peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue.
67
 
 In response, the DPRK rejected the “unjust actions” taken by the UNSC, saying the 
Council’s vote to condemn the launching of the satellite and the tightening of sanctions was 
an “unbearable insult” to the North Korean people.
68
 The DPRK expelled the UN nuclear 
inspectors from the country and ordered them to remove surveillance devices and other 
equipment from the Yongbyon nuclear plant. On 14 April 2009, the North Korean Foreign 
Ministry published a press release stating that the DPRK: 
 
flatly reject[ed] the brigandish ‘presidential statement’ which the US 
and its followers finally released by abusing the UNSC to condemn 
the DPRK’s launch of satellite for peaceful purposes.
69
   
 
From this time the North Korean government stated that there would be “no need to hold Six-
Party Talks” as the talks had now become a platform for infringing upon the sovereignty of 
the DPRK. Therefore, the North Korean government would “never participate in the talks any 
longer nor will it be bound to any agreement of the six-party talks”.
70
 Finally, the government 
stated that it would “bolster its nuclear deterrent for self-defence”.
71
 
 While the DPRK’s relationships within the northeast Asian region were strained the 
North Korean government continued communication with the UN. This can be seen with the 
DPRK’s submission of a report to the Universal Periodic Review Committee (“UPR 
Committee”) in 2009.  
 
The DPRK and the Universal Periodic Review (2009) 
Before the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process in August 2009, the DPRK submitted a 
report to the UPR Committee outlining from its own perspective the human rights situation in 
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 On 7 December 2009, the DPRK underwent the UPR, a process that involves a 
review of the human rights records of all 193 UN member states once every four years.
73
 The 
DPRK was a country of special interest to the UPR Committee because of several reports 
submitted to the UN by NGOs concerning human rights violations such as torture, forced 
labour camps, public execution, and violence against children and women.   
 During the three-hour review process, the working group noted a number of positive 
achievements of the DPRK, which included the decision to participate in the UPR, the policy 
of providing eleven-years of compulsory and free education, and universal medical care. 
They also acknowledged the North Korean government’s concerted efforts aimed at building 
a progressive and prosperous nation by the year 2012.
74
 Issues and questions raised by the 
working group concerned reports of “grave and systematic violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” in the DPRK.
75
 For example, concerns were raised about the control 
mechanisms which ensured inhumane conditions for detainees held in prisons and in 
particular camps holding political prisoners, the need for independent monitoring systems to 
ensure victims’ rights were protected, and questions about whether there were plans by the 
government to effectively implement obligations under the international human rights treaties 
to which the DPRK had acceded.
76
  
 At the review, thirteen North Korean representatives participated. The delegation 
consisted of representatives from the Department of Legislation of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly, the Legal Bureau of the Central Court, the Ministry of Public Health, and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
77
 The North Korean delegate Ri Tcheul, Ambassador and 
permanent representative of the DPRK to the UN in Geneva, spoke on behalf of the 
delegation. He stated that the “review of the human rights situation of the [DPRK] was taking 
place under circumstances different from others” as North Korea had been singled out for 
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discussion every year. The delegate believed that the purpose and motivations of the UNHCR 
and the UNGA were irrelevant to genuine human rights concerns. Therefore, the DPRK 
neither recognised nor accepted the resolutions of these two bodies, categorically rejecting 
what they called the “extreme manifestation of politicisation, selectivity, and double 
standards” in the area of human rights.
78
 The DPRK, however, had come to this session of the 
UPR as it valued the review mechanism, which was impartial to all UN member states.  
 The North Korean delegate Ri Tcheul stated that some of the comments and 
recommendations by the members present were made out of “misunderstanding of the reality 
of the country, or based on misinformation”.
79
 The delegate denied the existence of public 
executions and prison labour camps.  
 
The conditions of prisoners are provided by the living standards of 
common people…To the issue of public execution, I must tell you 




Further, the delegate commented on violence against children and women.  
 
In my country, children and women are accorded all sorts of special 
protection. Children are valued as the kings of the country, and 




Instead of addressing the customary discrimination practices in society, the North Korean 
delegate confirmed the government’s gendered view that women and children need “special 
protection”. Further, the language employed by the delegate only further promotes gendered 
difference between children as they are referred to as “kings”, a position held by males and 
usually associated with power and strength, while women are referred to as “flowers”, an 
object associated with delicacy and fragility, qualities stereotypically associated with females. 
Such gendered language naturalises the gendered roles accorded to men and women in 
society. Although positive progress was made between the DPRK and the UN with the 
submission of a report to the UPR Committee, actions taken by the North Korean government 
over the subsequent year stood to further threaten its international standing. 
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The DPRK and the United Nations Security Council (2010) 
From 2010, tensions grew between North and South Korea, until finally the DPRK authorised 
an attack on a ROK naval ship in March 2010. Three months later on 9 July 2010, at the 
6355th meeting of the UNSC the hostilities between North and South Korea were discussed 
amongst the delegation. The President of the Security Council stated that a letter was 
received on 4 June 2010 from the permanent representative of the ROK and from the 
permanent representative of the DPRK on 8 June 2010.
82
 The Security Council noted the 
responses from parties, including the DPRK, which had stated that it had nothing to do with 
the incident.
83
 The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group led by the ROK with the 
participation of five nations (Australia, Sweden, Canada, the United Kingdom and the USA), 
concluded that the DPRK was responsible for sinking the South Korean navy ship, the 
Cheonan. The UNSC deplored the North Korean sinking of the ROK naval ship, which had 
resulted in the loss of forty-six lives.
84
 The Security Council called for “appropriate and 
peaceful measures to be taken against those responsible for the incident” in accordance with 
the United Nations Charter and all other relevant provisions of international law.
85
  
 On 23 November 2010, the DPRK fired upon the South Korean islands of 
Yeongpyeong in the Yellow Sea. The attack resulted in the deaths of two South Korean 
marines and two civilians, and the wounding of fifteen marines and at least three civilians.
86
 
South Korean forces retaliated by firing at least eighty shells in the direction of the DPRK. At 
the same time hostilities increased with neighbouring countries but the North Korean 
government continued to communicate with the UN on the status of women within the 
country.    
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The DPRK and the 65th United Nations General Assembly (2010) 
In September 2010, the North Korean delegation, including the Ambassador Deputy 
Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the DPRK to the UN, Pak Tok Hun, 
participated in the 65th session of the UNGA. In response to Agenda Item 28 “Advancement 
of Women”, the North Korean Ambassador issued a press statement outlining the DPRK’s 
commitment to gender equality.
87
 Agenda Item 28 outlined the elimination of all forms of 
violence against women, the trafficking of women and girls, and the United Nations 
Development Fund for Women.
88
 In the press release, Pak confirms that the DPRK is 
committed to eliminating all forms of discrimination against women and faithfully fulfils its 
obligations to CEDAW. The North Korean delegate points to the promulgation of the Law on 
Equality of the Sexes in 1946 as steps taken by the DPRK to provide the legal basis for 
women to enjoy the same rights with men, free from all sorts of social inequality and 
discrimination.
89
 The DPRK acknowledges that elimination of discrimination and violence 
against women are major agenda items of the UN and other international forums. However, 
the global effort for elimination of discrimination against women and for advancement of 
women including assurance of gender equality still faces many difficulties and challenges.
90
 
Pak states that the North Korean government has continuously taken legal and practical 
measures to ensure gender equality and the advancement of women. As a result, North 




 In the following section, I discuss North Korea’s claim that gender equality in the 
DPRK will only be successful once the Japanese government acknowledges its past crimes 
against Korean women.  
 
The DPRK on Military Sexual Slavery  
The enforced military sexual slavery of Korean women by the Japanese military in wartime 
has always been of concern to the North Korean government and at every possible 
opportunity the DPRK has raised the issue with the UN. For instance, several years after the 
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DPRK reported to CEDAW, it attended the 63rd session in 2008 and the 65th session in 2010 
of the UN General Assemblies. At these Assemblies, respective North Korean delegations 
raised the issue of the forced sexual enslavement of Korean women by the Japanese Imperial 
Army and Navy during the occupation of Korea.  
 At the 63rd UNGA, the North Korean press release stated that in spite of the 
intensified efforts of the international community to protect and promote women’s rights 
through the elimination of discrimination, many difficulties and challenges have persisted in 
the DPRK.
92
 In order to overcome these “deep-rooted difficulties and challenges and achieve 
the advancement of [North Korean] women”, the delegation asserted that the “issues of the 
past crimes [against women] behind the black curtain should be completely resolved”.
93
 This 
statement refers to the Japanese colonial period in Korean history (1910–1945). The DPRK 
asserted that without recognition of enforced sexual slavery of Korean women in wartime by 
the Japanese military, the ongoing gross violations of women’s rights will never be 
eliminated on the Korean peninsula. 
  The 2008 North Korean press release states that the Japanese government drafted 
200,000 Korean women into the so-called “comfort women” system, which is a crime against 
humanity and yet to be settled once and for all.
94
 The North Korean press release at the 65th 
UNGA, however, states the figure of “comfort women” slightly differently as it 
acknowledges that the estimated number of 200,000 women included both Korean women 
and women of other nationalities. The press release strongly advocates for Japan to 
acknowledge its legal responsibility for all past crimes such as the forcible drafting of 8.4 
million Koreans as workers and the massacre of one million Koreans, and make a sincere 
apology and compensation to its victims.
95
 Other historians, such as Jeongwon Choi, estimate 
that there were around 200,000 women of different nationalities forced into the military 
prostitution/military sexual slavery system across Asia.
96
 The later press release continues 
that the Japanese army “inflicted unimaginable and immeasurable sufferings and damages on 
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hundreds of thousands of women from Korea and other several Asian countries” [emphasis 
added].
97
    
 The North Korean government claims in the 2008 press release that all victims of 
forced prostitution during the colonial period have been rehabilitated.
98
 The possibility that 
all North Korean women that were forced into sexual slavery have been rehabilitated is 
unlikely. Many women of other nationalities who were also subjected to the same forced 
prostitution practices by the Japanese military during World War II (1939–1945) continue to 
live with the memories of “violence containing not only the physical pain but also the 
emotional trauma of the social shame”.
99
 These women live with low self-esteem due to the 
loss of their virginity, being unable to have conventional families because of childlessness 
and chronic pain associated with past physical injuries and sexual abuses endured during their 
enslavement.  
 The North Korean delegation at the 63rd session of the UNGA stated that Japanese 
authorities not only deny state responsibility for their crime but also refuse to make a sincere 
apology and monetary compensation to victims. The DPRK urged Japan, “to face up to the 
attitudes of other countries that are making sincere apology and reparation of their past 
crimes even today when half a century has passed since the end of the 2nd World War 
[sic]”.
100
 The press release continues that the 1996 UN Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women, Radhika Commaraswamy, defined “comfort women” as “military sexual 
slavery” and as a crime.
101
 The Special Rapporteur had recommended that the Japanese 
government accept legal responsibility, make an official apology and compensation for the 
victims immediately, reflect the truth of the history in the educational curricula and punish 
the criminals.
102
 The North Korean press release asserted that this recommendation has not 
been implemented until now, “due to intentional and stubborn objection on the part of the 
Japanese government”.
103
 The 2010 North Korean delegation reminded Japan, “[e]ven the 
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Parliaments of some western countries adopted resolutions demanding repentance and 
apology for the crimes related to ‘comfort women’”.
104
  
 The 2010 North Korean press release of the 65th UNGA stated that the Japanese army 
recruited young Korean women because it was in line with a policy of “obliterating the 
Korean nation”.
105
 By “obliterating the Korean nation”, Pak Tok Hun is referring to the 
assimilation program carried out by the Japanese government in colonial Korea. In 1937, 
during the occupation of the Korean peninsula, Japan began an active assimilation program, 
which included the “Pledge of the Imperial Subjects”, hoisting the Japanese national flag, 
worshipping the Japanese emperor and attendance at Shinto ceremonies.
106
 Other polices 
required Koreans to change their names to Japanese names. The Japanese government also 
established the legal grounds for mobilising Koreans for war and in 1939 began to enforce 
the systematic mobilisation of both Korean men and women for the war effort.
107
 Koreans 
were sent to Japan and many parts, where their descendants live to this day.
108
  The 2010 
delegation stated, “Japan should settle its crimes committed against mankind above anything 
else before “clamouring about ‘peace’ and ‘human rights’” on the Korean peninsula.
109
 The 
North Korean government, in its commentary on human rights issues, brings up this 
unresolved historical issue in order to delegitimise any criticisms waged by the Japanese 
government. As noted above, there is ongoing tension between Japan and the DPRK on the 
issue of the abduction of Japanese citizens by the North Korean government.  
 Until 2010, the DPRK claimed that most issues to do with gender equality had been 
resolved by the Law on the Equality of the Sexes in 1946, as discussed in detail above. There 
were, however, some amendments to the North Korean legal system in the 2000s. Next, I 
outline North Korean laws updated and promulgated between 2006 and 2010, focusing on the 
amended 2009 DPRK Constitution and the provisions of the Women’s Rights Act of 2010.  
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North Korean Laws (2006–2010) 
From 2006 to 2010, under intense international pressure, the North Korean government 
reviewed the state legal system to include new legislation and amend existing laws. In the 
book, Creator of Happiness, the North Korean historian Seong-gil Oh states:  
 
[t]here is no other place like North Korea, a nation that continuously 
establishes laws and provides social services for women. North Korea 
is just like a utopia for women as the nation assumes a great role in 
the upbringing of children and household chores that allows women 




Laws amended and promulgated since 2006 include the state Constitution in 2009 and the 
Women’s Rights Act in 2010.  Below I consider the importance of some provisions included 
in these laws, which were not previously recognised by the DPRK when communicating with 
the UN or the CEDAW Committee. I also draw attention to the gendered language that the 
DPRK has continued to employ in its legal system.  
 
The DPRK Constitution (2009) 
The North Korean government adopted the revised state Constitution in April 2009. The 
amended Constitution continued to emphasise and affirm the mobilisation of female workers 
by protecting the rights of working mothers.
111
 To ensure women could leave the home 
Article 77 guarantees facilities such as “expanding the network of maternity hospitals, 
nurseries, and kindergartens, and by implementing other measures”. The rights of women in 
marriage are “protected” in Article 78 of the Constitution, stipulating that marriage and 
family “shall be protected by the state. The state shall take deep interest in consolidating the 
family, the basic unit of social life”. The Constitution, though, does not outline why marriage 
and family are awarded special protection. According to Jin Woong Kang, family units in 
North Korea are “an important mechanism of social control and regime maintenance”.
112
 The 
consolidation of the family unit was particularly important for the North Korean government 
from the mid-1990s, as the state passed the economic burden of supporting individuals to 
                                                     
110
 Seong-gil Oh, Creator of Happiness (Pyongyang: Pyongyang Press, 2006), p. 240. 
111
 Eun-young Shin, “Ideology and Gender Equality: Women’s Policies of North Korea and China”, East Asian 
Review, 13 (3) (2001), p. 99.  
112
 Jin Woong Kang, “The Patriarchal State and Women’s Status in Socialist North Korea”, Graduate Journal of 
Asia-Pacific Studies, 6 (2) (2008), p. 38. 
237 
 
family groups (Family Law, 1990, Article 35 and Article 36). By passing the responsibility of 
financial and food security to the family unit, the state tried to ensure the stability of the 




The Women’s Rights Act (2010) 
Several years after the DPRK submitted its initial report to the CEDAW Committee in 2001, 
the North Korean government promulgated the Women’s Rights Act on 22 December 2010 
(see Appendix 8).
114
 The Act reflected some of the concerns expressed in the concluding 
observations of the CEDAW Committee in 2005.
115
 The inclusion of the Act suggests that the 
DPRK has responded to the international attention by the UN, who have focused on its poor 
human rights record towards women.
116
 While the Act reiterates women’s equal right to 
marriage and divorce (Article 44 and Article 42 respectively), and the rights of working 
mothers (Article 26 and Article 37) it also attempts to address the need to stop discrimination 
against women in other forms such as the prevention of  violence (Article 46). 
Under the Women’s Rights Act the North Korean government, “shall establish a basic 
plan to guarantee women’s rights and execute it [the Act]” (Article 4). Article 4 continues 
that women’s rights are to be “achieved through the Municipal People’s Committees 
establishing detailed plans on a yearly basis according to the state’s basic plan to guarantee 
women’s rights”. The responsibility of the Municipal People’s Committees is to guarantee 
women’s rights as an important assignment and take measures to ensure the rights of women 
in the area of jurisdiction (Article 6). The NKHR report highlights unexplained issues with 
this Article. Firstly, Article 6 fails to mention in detail which governmental departments 
would establish the initial basic plan, what areas of women’s rights would be covered in the 
plan, whether there would be any framework for monitoring the implementation of the plan, 
and finally what timeframe should be given for the implementation of the plan.
117
 Therefore, 
the Act should be interpreted as a starting point.  
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 Article 8 of the Women’s Rights Act states that it is the responsibility of legal 
institutions to enforce “legal control in order to prevent women’s rights from being violated 
by any act of crime or violation of law”. Any item related to women’s rights which is not 
regulated by this law is to be governed by relevant laws and any international convention to 
which the DPRK is party (Article 10) and this would include CEDAW. Crimes against North 
Korean women that are not covered by provisions of the Act, however, include marital rape, 
workplace harassment, and stereotyping of women to gendered roles. Theoretically, because 
the Act does not cover these issues specifically, CEDAW should be taken into consideration.  
 To ensure the North Korean community is aware of their responsibilities under the 
Women’s Rights Act the Korean Democratic Women’s Union (KDWU, Women’s Union) is 
authorised to promote the protection of women’s rights. The KDWU duties include the 
support and strengthening of the government’s ideology through the education of people and 
the organisation of public works and events.
118
 Article 53 of the Women’s Rights Act states 
that the Women’s Union is to “organise and execute enterprises of various forms and 
methods to raise social awareness on women’s rights and to raise the status of women”. 
However, if the Women’s Union is a mouthpiece for the government then it leaves no avenue 
for women to complain or advocate for change in North Korean society.  
 
Gendered Roles in North Korean Families  
In the Women’s Rights Act the language employed by the North Korean government towards 
the role of men and women has not changed significantly, as the government continues to 
stress the importance of women’s roles in the home. This can be seen in Article 3 of the Act, 
which stipulates, “women play an important role in the welfare of the family and the 
development of the society”.
119
 NKHR states that the wording of this Article implies that the 
role of women is first within the family and then in society,
120
 suggesting that the language 
employed by the North Korean government towards gender equality has not changed since its 
accession to CEDAW in 2001. The fact that it is the “Women’s Rights Act” rather than, say, 
the “Gender Equality Act” reveals that the North Korean government still does not question 
men’s roles in society or the home.  
  The rights of women in marriage (Article 44) and divorce (Article 42) have continued 
to be protected under the Women’s Rights Act. The DPRK addresses violence in families for 
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the first time in Article 46 of the Women’s Rights Act, which stipulates that there “must not 
be any form of domestic violence against women in the family”. Although the Article 
attempts to act as a preventive measure against domestic violence, it does not criminalise 
domestic violence or provide any legal protection for victims against spousal violence.
121
 The 
inclusion of this provision in state law is a step forward in the North Korea’s legal system, as 
previous laws did not address violence within homes. Instead, violence in the home was seen 
as a private matter.
122
 The Korean Institute for National Unification reports that many 
defectors have testified in recent years that incidents of domestic violence are widespread in 
the DPRK.
123
 It is difficult to clarify the number of cases of domestic violence though, as the 
North Korean government has not provided statistical data to the UN in its reporting. When 
domestic violence cases are reported to the Municipal People’s Committees, institutions, 
corporate associations, and organisations, it is usually not investigated because it is 
considered a “family matter”.
124
 However, if the case is investigated authorities usually issue 
a personal warning to the perpetrator, who is required to write a letter of self-criticism.
125
 On 
rare occasions, husbands who have physically abused their wives have been arrested and sent 
to labour-training camps as punishment.
126
  
 Article 49 of the Women’s Rights Act stipulates that “a woman has equal rights and 
responsibility to protect underage children with her husband”. The Article continues by 
stating that if the husband is deceased, has lost legal capabilities to protect the children, or for 
any other unavoidable reasons cannot be guardian of the children, the woman has the sole 
right and responsibility to protect the children. This Article places the responsibility of 
protecting and raising children on women and does not mention what responsibility men have 
within the family if the roles are reversed and the woman is incapable of caring for a child. In 
previous state laws such as the Family Law (Article 27 and 28), both parents had the same 
obligation to educate and care for the health and growth of children.  
 The Women’s Rights Act maintains that women “have the right to give or not give 
birth to children” (Article 50). Article 50 continues, however, that “[n]ationally it is 
encouraged by the state that women give birth to and raise many children”. Although the state 
encouraged North Korean women to have multiple children this was an unrealistic 
expectation. Since the food crisis in the mid-1990s, most women struggle to find food for 
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their existing family members without adding further mouths to feed. For most women, their 
work in the home has increased tremendously since the food crisis, due to the state’s inability 
to deliver on its promise of socialising housework and childrearing.
127
 Just as food security 
was unstable, childrearing facilities promised by the state no longer operated to their full 
potential. In this context, the government saw North Korean women as being primarily 
responsible for carrying the burden of family chores and rearing of children. This meant that 
women who no longer worked in the official economy took on the responsibility of caring for 
their children all day, a responsibility once belonging to the state.  
 In the DPRK’s initial report to the CEDAW Committee, there was reference to the 
older generation still preferring male children over female.
128
 To address the CEDAW 
Committee’s concern about son preference the North Korean government explicitly mentions 
this issue in the Women’s Rights Act. Article 38 of the Act prohibits female infanticide by 
stipulating that it is “prohibited to kill a newborn infant because she is a female and to 
mistreat or show contempt for women who give birth to a female child or are pregnant, ill, 
disabled or old”. Provisions in the Article also address discrimination against other marginal 
groups such as those who are ill, disabled or old.
129
 This is the first time the North Korean 
government has addressed female infanticide in any state law and is a positive step. On the 
other hand, it highlights that gender discrimination continues to exist in the DPRK and that 
the state needs to legislate against gender discrimination and violence.  
 
Gendered Roles in the North Korean Labour Force  
In the DPRK, labour within the official economy is the responsibility of all people, because it 
is not seen as an individual benefit but is based on the collectivist principle to benefit 
everyone.
130
 Therefore, the right to work is not a right but a duty to respond to the 
mobilisation of labour, and the North Korean government has long promoted the participation 
of women.
131
 The Women’s Rights Act states that women have equal rights with men in the 
labour force and that Municipal People’s Committees and relevant organs are to guarantee 
the equal rights of women to take part in labour (Article 26). Article 37 states that to ensure 
women are able to leave the home relevant institutions, corporate associations, and 
organisations should establish day-care centres, kindergartens and other facilities. This idea, 
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however, rests on the belief that women are primarily responsible for the care of their 
children. For women who do not have access to these facilities because they work in the 
unofficial economy this is an added responsibility. Further, it is evident that the government’s 
thinking on women’s roles has changed little since the promulgation of the Law on Equality 
of the Sexes or the state’s accession to CEDAW in 2001.  
 It has been a long-held practice for the North Korean government to assign women 
between the ages of 16 and 55 years to specific positions in the labour force. Therefore, 
discrimination against women in the workplace has emerged in the forms of differentiated 
pay scales and the type of work women are assigned to. Article 28 of the Women’s Rights 
Act highlights this view by stating: 
  
Institutions, corporate associations and organisations, except for 
those professions or departments that are not appropriate for women, 
are not allowed to not take in women or restrict them for reasons such 
as gender, marriage, pregnancy, and childbirth.  
 
The exception made in the Article to “professions or departments that are not appropriate for 
women” shows that the North Korean government still deems some occupations unsuitable 
for women. This perceived unsuitability is based on assumptions about the physical and 
mental capabilities of women. This results in men being assigned to important and higher 
paying jobs, while women are assigned to relatively less important and lower paying jobs,
132
 
in the light industry such as agriculture, communications, health and education.
133
  
 The Women’s Rights Act states that workplaces must pay full attention to the 
protection of female workers by providing safety and hygiene facilities in accordance with 
women’s physical attributes; and that women cannot be assigned to work that is not 
appropriate (Article 29). The Act does not elaborate on what occupations are considered “not 
appropriate” but Article 30 states that the “supervising organ for labour administration 
determines which fields and professions are prohibited for women”. Institutions, corporate 
associations, and organisations must not make women work in prohibited fields or 
professions, and cannot make a woman work at night if she is pregnant or has an infant 
(Article 30). The concept of work as “not appropriate” for women reveals the government’s 
assumption that women are naturally suited to certain occupations in line with feminine 
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qualities. This does not give women the right to choose their own profession or employment 
but confirms the stereotyping of women in gendered roles.  
 Article 31 of the Women’s Rights Act states that the working hours for a woman with 
three or more children are reduced to six hours a day, and her living expenses paid by the 
government. The Article implies however, that a woman’s primary place is as a mother 
within the home caring for children, perpetuating gender stereotypes. Article 33 of the 
Women’s Rights Act stipulates:  
 
[the] [s]tate provides women workers with maternity leave of 60 days 
before childbirth and 90 days after, regardless of the length of service 
and in addition to regular and complementary holidays. Women 
cannot be made to work during maternity leave.  
 
Further, workplaces are not to dismiss female workers for reasons such as marriage, 
pregnancy, maternity leave, and breastfeeding (Article 34). The NKHR reports that while the 
Article protects women against unfair dismissal, it does not address other types of potential 
workplace discrimination based on harassment because of one’s gender.
134
 Women during the 
periods before and after childbirth are provided for in the Act but there are no provisions to 
protect women in other times during their working lives or for women who have no children. 
In addition, the Women’s Rights Act only protects women if they continue to work in the 
official state  labour force so if a woman leaves their official state employment after marriage 
or due to workplace instability then she is not protected by the Act. While North Korean men 
continue to go to their official workplaces distribution of food coupons and wages are 
provided irregularly or not at all. Some men who are able to pay a financial bribe to cover 




 In recent years, the North Korean government has not tightened restrictions on 
women’s economic activities in the unofficial market economy. Previously government 
regulation of the unofficial economy restricted the operation of markets to women younger 
than 55 years old. However, the state has shifted the responsibility of securing food and 
money for families to women regardless of age. This has had both positive and negative 
implications for women and their families. For example, women have become financially 
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independent but also have been punished for crossing the border to China to trade goods and 
have been exposed to prostitution, trafficking, and sexual abuse.
136
   
  
Sexual Assault, Prostitution and Trafficking of North Korean Women  
Due to the difficult living conditions in the DPRK since the 1990s, there have been reports of 
increased cases of sexual assault against North Korean women, increased numbers of women 
turning to prostitution as a means of survival and the trafficking of women to China. KINU 
reports that the sexual assault of women has become widespread as women have assumed the 
role of financial providers in the family and left their homes to work in the unofficial 
economy. Compared to the past, sexual assault to gain Party membership or promotion in the 
workplace has declined while assault cases in public places have increased.
137
 More 
specifically, individuals such as security agents at the market, safety conductors on the train, 
and soldiers have demanded sex from women who committed minor violations. There are 
also reported cases of sexual assault inside guard-post detention facilities.
138
 It is not clear 
how many North Korean women have experienced sexual assault as the North Korean 
government has not provided statistical data to the international community, the UN or other 
UN bodies such as CEDAW but NGOs have collected numerous testimonies of victims. The 
Women’s Rights Act includes no protection measures against the sexual assault of women. In 
communication between the North Korean government and UN, as discussed above, the 
government still argues that sexual violation against women is something that occurred in the 
past. 
 Since the food crisis, women have turned to prostitution as a means of survival.
139
  
The North Korean government has addressed this practice in the Women’s Rights Act. 
Article 40 of the Act states that anyone who engages in prostitution or anyone who organises, 
promotes, or coerces someone into prostitution will be punished in accordance with the law. 
The Women’s Rights Act elaborates on Article 7 of the Law on Equality of the Sexes, which 
only briefly addressed prostitution and relegated it to the colonial period.
140
 NGOs point out, 
however, that prostitution in the DPRK has not only become more pervasive, but also more 
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widely accepted by society as a survival strategy.
 141
  Some women enter the commercial sex 
trade as a means of earning for their basic survival and those organising the trade usually 
receive protection from collaborating North Korean Security Agents.
142
 KINU states there 
have also been reports of cases of under-aged prostitution and parents coercing daughters into 
prostitution for economic reasons.
143
 If caught engaging in prostitution, male customers are 
usually released by bribing officials, but the woman is punished.
144
  
 There has also been an increased number of women trafficked to China and into the 
sex industry or to marry Chinese men.
145
 Family breakdown contributed to an increase in 
trafficking of teenage girls whose parents could no longer fulfil their parental 
responsibilities.
146
 For the first time since the Law on Equality of the Sexes, the North 
Korean government addressed the trafficking of women in state law. Article 37 of the 
Women’s Rights Act stipulates that it is prohibited “to illegally restrict the liberty of women, 
damage the body of women by violent and non-violent means, and search the body of 
women”. Further, no one may kidnap, trade, rape or gang rape women (Article 39). 
Therefore, relevant organs are to establish plans to prevent kidnapping, trafficking, rape and 
gang rape of women, and punish anyone who has committed such acts, in accordance with 
the law (Article 39). This Article builds upon Article 7 of the Law on Equality of the Sexes, 
which only briefly states that the prostitution is prohibited.
147
 However, the Women’s Rights 
Act does not clearly outline the punishment of the perpetrator or the prevention plans to 
ensure these practices do not continue.  
   
Conclusion  
Since the promulgation of the Law on Equality of the Sexes in 1946, North Korean rhetoric 
has argued that the role of women was to turn to productive work in society to help build an 
independent socialist country. In its correspondence with the UN and CEDAW Committee, 
the North Korean government emphasised its efforts to eliminate all forms of discrimination 
against women by taking a two-pronged approach. The government stressed the importance 
of “protecting” women in state laws and policy and attributed gender discrimination and the 
trafficking of women to the historical timeframe of the occupation of Korea by Japan. In the 
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international climate of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the North Korean 
government continued its criticism of the Japanese government for these historical wrongs, 
deflecting attention from the contemporary tensions between Japan and the DPRK. Press 
releases addressed to the UN General Assembly in 2008 and 2010 raised this issue. In the 
context of increasing criticism of human rights abuses in the DPRK and the dire situation of 
women who crossed the border into China, some modifications were made in the 2009 DPRK 
Constitution, and the Women’s Rights Act was passed in 2010. Due to international pressure 
both the Constitution and the Act went beyond existing North Korean laws, mentioning for 
the first time issues such as domestic violence and prostitution. However, the government’s 
gendered language and the stereotyping of men and women to certain roles continued to be 
employed by the state in these laws. Therefore, although these laws can be seen as a step 
forward for addressing gender equality in the DPRK, they also expose the fact that not much 
has changed in North Korean society since 1946 and the promulgation of the Law on 
Equality of the Sexes. Twelve months after the North Korean delegation participated in the 
65th session of the UNGA in September 2010, the then leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong Il 
passed away in December 2011.  Within the same month of Kim Jong Il’s death leadership of 
the DPRK passed to his son Kim Jong Un (1983–). 





9. Conclusions  
 
Due to the profound interest of our Party, our women, as 
proud masters of the country along with men, are now 
making an active contribution to the revolutionary 
struggle and constructive work. 





In this thesis I have explored the use of gendered rhetoric in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea’s (DPRK, North Korea) communications with the outside world, focusing 
on the periods of rule by Kim Il Sung (1912–1994; ruler from 1946 to 1994) and Kim Jong Il 
(1941–2011; leader from 1994 to 2011). I have focused mainly on the period from 1964 to 
2011, analysing the English-language magazine, Women of Korea, from 1964 to 1992; the 
DPRK’s communications with the Committee to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (hereafter “CEDAW Committee) between 2000 and 2005; and the DPRK’s 
communications with the United Nations (UN) between 2006 and 2011. In order to 
contextualise these texts, it has also been necessary to survey the North Korean legal system 
and laws and policies on gender issues from 1946 to 2010. Further context has been provided 
by non-governmental organisations’ (NGOs’) reports from the 1990s to the present, which 
provide a different picture of life and of gender relations in the DPRK. My main 
methodology has been critical discourse analysis. That is, I have been interested not so much 
in the factual claims made by the North Korean government, but rather the gendered 
assumptions revealed in the rhetoric of the DPRK, whether in official English-language 
propaganda magazines, or in communications with the CEDAW Committee and other organs 
of the UN. 
Scholarly works to date have offered surveys of different aspects of North Korean 
society, the North Korean legal system, and the representation of North Korean women in the 
media. This thesis contributes to the field of gender and International Relations (IR) by 
answering the question of how the North Korean government has presented to the 
international community its goal of achieving gender equality and how it employs positive 
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portraits of relations among North Korean men, women and children to demonstrate its 
success in realising many of these goals. I have chosen to focus on these issues in the 
DPRK’s reporting to the UN, CEDAW Committee and in English-language magazines as 
they have been sources not yet examined in depth by other scholars. These sources offer a 
greater understanding of the North Korean government’s assumptions about gender equality 
and gender relations, as well as providing the few admissions by the North Korean 
government of the existence of gender discrimination in society and the family. The primary 
aim of the North Korean government has been to present a positive picture of gender equality 
and gender relations. Gender has played a vital role in the DPRK’s communications with the 
outside world, whether in promoting the success of the socialist answer to the “woman 
question”, or whether criticising other countries for their mistreatment of women. 
Over the years, the North Korean government has maintained that it has taken 
practical legal measures so that all North Koreans regardless of gender can realise their 
rights. The government, though, often interpreted this as meaning specific measures for 
women to ensure they were able to leave their homes to join the labour force. North Korean 
laws such as the Law on Equality of the Sexes (1946), the Law on the Nursing and 
Upbringing of Children (1976) and the Women’s Rights Act (2010) promote the idea of 
gender equality but also define women as mothers who are responsible for the home. North 
Korean policies socialised childcare and housework to ensure more women were able to join 
the labour force but were also based on the assumption that these activities within the home 
were not equally shared between both genders.
2
 It could be said that often the rights of North 
Korean women have been held back to assure a harmonious society and a stable family and 
work units.
3
 Despite the rhetoric of commitment to gender equality, notions of gendered roles 
persist in the DPRK,
4
 as assumptions by North Korean government about appropriate gender 
roles and what is considered masculine or feminine all inform the practices of North Korean 
men and women. 
The wording of North Korean laws, as well as the DPRK’s rhetoric in its reporting to 
the UN and in English-language magazines, restrict men and women to gendered roles in and 
outside the home. In no North Korean law and policy or government rhetoric is it mentioned 
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that North Korean men should perform duties in the home equal to that of women or even to 
ease the burden that women carry. The North Korean government claimed that once women 
had left the home to work outside the home they had achieved liberation from the shackles of 
a feudal society and colonial aggressors, but did not address the roles of men.
5
 The visual 
images and texts published in the magazine Women of Korea represent the government’s 
constructed view of masculinity and femininity from the 1960s to the early 1990s. This is 
particularly evident in the clothing styles assigned by the government to North Korean men 
and women – men clothed in modern suits and women in the traditional feminine hanbok.  
In Women of Korea, North Korean women are represented as revolutionary heroines 
and as ordinary women as part of the “Hidden Hero” campaign. Since the initial publication 
of the magazine the Kim family have been represented in the visual images and stories. Three 
prominent Kim family members appear in most issues of the magazine, Kim Il Sung, as 
father of Korea, his mother Kang Ban Sok, as the “Mother of Korea” and his first wife, Kim 
Jong Suk, as a loyal and devoted wife to her husband and the revolutionary cause. The 
depictions of the revolutionary Kim family present an idealised story of the liberation of the 
nation from Japanese colonial rule. Both Kim women are presented as revolutionary heroines 
who support the revolutionary cause by cooking, sewing, looking after children and being 
loyal to their husbands, while Kim Il Sung is presented as a father figure and patriarch of the 
Kim family and the entire Korean nation. In these representations of the Kims there is an 
unequal relationship that is not challenged by the government between the masculine 
characteristics of Kim Il Sung as a strong and dominant figure and the two Kim women who 
display appropriately feminine characteristics. This occurs even though Kim Jong Suk takes 
up arms to defend the revolutionary cause as she is predominantly represented as performing 
domestic chores on the battlefield rather than standing equal to her husband. In the DPRK, 
these representations of the revolutionary Kim family provide models for ordinary people to 
emulate, while also reinforcing the primacy and legitimacy of the Kim dynasty. In an 
international context, these representations promote the legitimacy of the North Korean 
regime and the idea that gender equality has been achieved by women leaving the home to 
participate in society.  
The visual images and text published in Women of Korea also reveal that once women 
left their home to join the labour force the North Korean government assigned them to 
occupations deemed suitable based on their gender. Typically women were allocated to 
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positions in the so-called “light industries” by the government, which was composed of 
occupations predominantly in the food and textile sectors, or in education, nursing, and 
service industries. Although the North Korean government promised women the same work 
privileges, wages, and social security as men by law, in practice women were not paid 
comparable wages for essentially comparable work and they were not equally promoted.
6
 
Further, cultural and patriarchal restrictions placed on North Korean women were not 
eliminated simply by joining the workforce. Instead women’s responsibilities increased as 
they were expected to continue to perform their work in the home with their work in society. 
Through the representations of ordinary women the North Korean government continued to 
emphasise the importance of women’s work in the home combined with their contribution to 
the labour force and nation building.  
 In Women of Korea, the visual representations of the revolutionary heroines and of 
ordinary women as part of the “Hidden Hero” campaign also reveal that the ideal clothing 
styles of North Korean men and women are clearly gendered. While there is an emphasis on 
femininity in everything worn by women,
7
 men are no longer portrayed wearing ethnic 
Korean clothing and instead are seen in Western-style suits or military uniforms. In the visual 
images revolutionary heroines and ordinary North Korean women are mostly represented 
wearing ethnic Korean clothing (hanbok), composed of the chima (jacket) and jeogori (skirt) 
or simple and modern clothing that retains distinctive feminine traits, consisting of dresses or 
blouses and skirts. Unlike other socialist states which glorified masculine clothing for 
revolutionary women, fashion in the DPRK has instead expressed feminine clothing for these 
heroines, seemingly contradicting the revolutionary spirit often associated with masculinity.
8
  
In the 1990s, the superficial rhetoric of the government on achieving gender equality 
was challenged by the economic crisis and food shortages.
9
  The most notable change that 
occurred from this time was the challenge to customary practices within the family unit, 
which resulted in North Korean women becoming the primary providers for their families. 
Many North Korean women were forced to implement survival strategies to save themselves 
and their families, such as trade activities along the Chinese border.
10
 In a situation where the 
state’s Public Distribution System collapsed and North Korean men were not able to provide 
financial support to their families, women became active players in local markets, trade 
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activities and as scavengers of food and medical supplies. Although gender stereotypes were 
challenged within the family unit and women became somewhat economically independent, it 
also added to the responsibilities of women, who were already expected to perform the 
majority of household chores.    
Since the 1990s, the North Korean government has communicated with the 
international community, the UN and various UN bodies such as the CEDAW Committee, 
due mostly to food shortages and the need for international humanitarian aid. Between 2001 
and 2005 the government engaged with the CEDAW Committee about achieving gender 
equality in the DPRK. The reports exchanged between the North Korean government and the 
CEDAW Committee revealed for the first time issues about gender relations within the 
country that had not previously been discussed with the international community. The reports 
focused on discrimination against North Korean women in all forms, verbal and physical, and 
in all parts of society from family life to the labour force. The North Korean government also 
addressed women’s access to education, health and employment in its reporting. Examining 
the DPRK’s reporting, however, reveals the extent to which gendered stereotypes still 
underpin the government’s view of the roles of men and women, even while it promotes a 
commitment to achieving gender equality to the international community. In North Korea’s 
reporting women are represented as mothers who are capable of performing domestic duties 
while contributing to the social reconstruction of the country. While the government has 
assumed that many North Korean women perform the majority of household chores, it has 
addressed this issue through the promulgation of laws to help lessen their burdens within the 
home. The government’s rhetoric in its reporting to the CEDAW Committee confirms its 
perception that women are the primary carers of children and responsible for cleaning and 
cooking, while men do not carry this burden. Further, once women left the home to work in 
the labour force they were assigned by the government to certain jobs in the so-called “light 
industries”, which were typically paid less than those monopolised by men. The North 
Korean government repeatedly stated in its reporting to the CEDAW Committee that it 
supported the principle of women’s rights but many aspects of gender equality have not 
adequately been addressed by the DPRK. 
 Although the DPRK communicated with the CEDAW Committee for the last time in 
July 2005, the North Korean government did continue to correspond with the United Nations 
General Assembly and other UN bodies about achieving gender equality. In its 
communications, the UN often raised concerns with the DPRK about the status of North 
Korean women in society, and access by women to education, healthcare and employment. 
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The UN also raised issues such as domestic violence, prostitution and the trafficking of North 
Korean women to China. At every possible opportunity, the UN and the international 
community emphasised the importance of improving the situation of North Korean women. 
Since 2005, the North Korean government has emphasised in its correspondence with the UN 
its efforts to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women by taking a two-pronged 
approach. First, the government has stressed the importance of gender-specific treatment of 
women in North Korean laws and policy and secondly, the government has answered the 
question of women’s rights by assigning gender discrimination and the trafficking of women 
to the historical timeframe of the occupation of Korea by Japan from 1910 to 1945. In its 
emphasis on the Law on the Equality of the Sexes in 1946, and its continued emphasis on 
colonial exploitation by the Japanese until 1945, the rhetoric of the DPRK has often seemed 
to be frozen in an early postcolonial and early Cold War framework. 
 In the DPRK’s communication with the UN, it has taken the position that the current 
prospects of achieving gender equality within the country cannot be separated from the 
historical issue of the sexual exploitation of Korean women by Japan during the colonial 
period and wartime. North Korea states that if the Japanese government does not recognise its 
past crimes against Korean women, then gender equality cannot be fully achieved on the 
peninsula. The DPRK does not acknowledge or address the current situation for North 
Korean women, who are victims of modern forms of trafficking. Instead the North Korean 
government insists that the state’s legal system has eliminated the trafficking of women 
within the country. As in so many other situations, the question of the exploitation of women 
has been mobilised by the DPRK in order to delegitimise the Japanese government at 
sensitive moments in international relations. It is clear that even though the DPRK has taken 
the initial step of agreeing to the guidelines set out in UN conventions, it does not mean that 
the North Korean government has always made sufficient legal changes to existing state laws 
to ensure the requirements of CEDAW are met. Any changes that have occurred to the roles 
of North Korean men and women since the mid-1990s and the DPRK’s accession to CEDAW 
in 2001 have taken place independently of the state and the North Korean legal system. 
Rather, changes to gender roles are an effect of the ongoing socioeconomic transformation of 
the DPRK. 
 Finally, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the knowledge of gender 
studies in the DPRK by employing the theoretical framework of gender and IR when 
critically analysing North Korean sources. By employing literary and visual analysis when 
examining the magazine Women of Korea and the communication between the DPRK and the 
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CEDAW Committee, I have contributed to gender and IR by introducing critical discourse 
analysis into this field. As gender and IR is still a fairly new area in academic research the 
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Article 1. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “discrimination against 
women” shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which 
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or 
any other field. 
Article 2. States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to 
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination 
against women and, to this end, undertake: 
To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their 
national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet 
incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate 
means, the practical realisation of this principle; 
To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including 
sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against 
women;  
To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis 
with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and 
other public institutions the effective protection of women against 
any act of discrimination; 
To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination 
against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions 
shall act in conformity with this obligation; 
To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women by any person, organisation or enterprise; 
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To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which 
constitute discrimination against women; 
To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute 
discrimination against women. 
Article 3. States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic 
and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to en sure the full 
development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise 
and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men. 
Article 4. 1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating 
de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined 
in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of 
unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of 
equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved. 2. Adoption by States Parties of 
special measures, including those measure contained in the present Convention, aimed at 
protecting maternity shall not be considered discriminatory. 
Article 5. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: 
To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and 
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the 
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped 
roles for men and women; 
To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of 
maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common 
responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development 
of their children, it being understood that the interest of the children 
is the primordial consideration in all cases. 
Article 6. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress 
all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women. 
 
PART II 
Article 7. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to 
women, on equal terms with men, the right: 
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To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for 
election to all publicly elected bodies; 
To participate in the formulation of government policy and the 
implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all 
public functions at all levels of government; 
To participate in non-governmental organisations and associations 
concerned with the public and political life of the country. 
Article 8. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal 
terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their 
Governments at the international level and to participate in the work of international 
organisations. 
Article 9. 1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or 
retain their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor 
change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the 
nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband. 2. 




Article 10. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education and 
in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
The same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for access to 
studies and for the achievement of diplomas in educational 
establishments of all categories in rural as well as in urban areas; this 
equality shall be ensured in pre-school, general, technical, 
professional and higher technical education, as well as in all types of 
vocational training; 
Access to the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff 
with qualifications of the same standard and school premises and 
equipment of the same quality; 
The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and 
women at all levels and in all forms of education by encouraging 
coeducation and other types of education which will help to achieve 
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this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks and school 
programmes and the adaptation of teaching methods; 
The same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study 
grants; 
The same opportunities for access to programmes of continuing 
education, including adult and functional literacy programmes, 
particularly those aimed at reducing, at the earliest possible time, any 
gap in education existing between men and women; 
The reduction of female student drop-out rates and the organisation 
of programmes for girls and women who have left school 
prematurely; 
The same Opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical 
education; 
Access to specific educational information to help to ensure the 
health and well-being of families, including information and advice 
on family planning. 
Article 11. 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men 
and women, the same rights, in particular: 
The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings; 
The right to the same employment opportunities, including the 
application of the same criteria for selection in matters of 
employment; 
The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to 
promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service and 
the right to receive vocational training and retraining, including 
apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training; 
The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal 
treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of 
treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work; 
The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, 
unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity 
to work, as well as the right to paid leave; 
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The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, 
including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction. 
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity 
and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take  appropriate measures: 
To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the 
grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in 
dismissals on the basis of marital status; 
To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social 
benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social 
allowances; 
To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social 
services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work 
responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through 
promoting the establishment and development of a network of child-
care facilities; 
To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of 
work proved to be harmful to them. 
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this Article shall be reviewed 
periodically in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, 
repealed or extended as necessary. 
Article 12. 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality  of men and 
women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning. 2. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of this Article, States Parties shall ensure to 
women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal 
period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during 
pregnancy and lactation. 
Article 13. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in other areas of economic and social life in order to ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular: 
The right to family benefits; 




The right to participate in recreational activities, sports and all 
aspects of cultural life. 
Article 14. 1. States Parties shall take into account the particular problems faced by rural 
women and the significant roles which rural women play in the economic survival of their 
families, including their work in the non-monetised sectors of the economy, and shall take all 
appropriate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of the present Convention to 
women in rural areas. 2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men 
and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, 
shall ensure to such women the right: 
To participate in the elaboration and implementation of development 
planning at all levels; 
To have access to adequate health care facilities, including 
information, counselling and services in family planning; 
To benefit directly from social security programmes;  
To obtain all types of training and education, formal and non-formal, 
including that relating to functional literacy, as well as, inter alia, the 
benefit of all community and extension services, in order to increase 
their technical proficiency; 
To organise self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain 
equal access to economic opportunities through employment or self-
employment; 
To participate in all community activities; 
To have access to agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, 
appropriate technology and equal treatment in land and agrarian 
reform as well as in land resettlement schemes; 
To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to 




Article 15. 1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law. 2. States 
Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men and 
the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women equal 
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rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them equally in all 
stages of procedure in courts and tribunals. 3. States Parties agree that all contracts and all 
other private instruments of any kind with a legal effect which is directed at restricting the 
legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and void. 4. States Parties shall accord to men 
and women the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and 
the freedom to choose their residence and domicile. 
Article 16. 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
The same right to enter into marriage; 
The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage 
only with their free and full consent; 
The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its 
dissolution; 
The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their 
marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the 
interests of the children shall be paramount; 
The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and 
spacing of their children and to have access to the information, 
education and means to enable them to exercise these rights; 
The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, 
wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions 
where these concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the 
interests of the children shall be paramount; 
The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to 
choose a family name, a profession and an occupation;  
The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, 
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition 
of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable consideration. 
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary 
action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to 





Article 17. 1. For the purpose of considering the progress made in the implementation of the 
present Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) consisting, at the 
time of entry into force of the Convention, of eighteen and, after ratification of or accession 
to the Convention by the thirty-fifth State Party, of twenty-three experts of high moral 
standing and competence in the field covered by the Convention. The experts shall be elected 
by States Parties from among their nationals and shall serve in their personal capacity, 
consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the representation of 
the different forms of civilisation as well as the principal legal systems. 2. The members of 
the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by States 
Parties. Each State Party may nominate one person from among its own nationals. 3. The 
initial election shall be held six months after the date of the entry into force of the present 
Convention. At least three months before the date of each election the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to submit their 
nominations within two months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical 
order of all persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties which have nominated them, 
and shall submit it to the States Parties. 4. Elections of the members of the Committee shall 
be held at a meeting of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General at United Nations 
Headquarters. At that meeting, for which two thirds of the States Parties shall constitute a 
quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those nominees who obtain the largest 
number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States Parties 
present and voting. 5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four 
years. However, the terms of nine of the members elected at the first election shall expire at 
the end of two years; immediately after the first election the names of these nine members 
shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Committee. 6. The election of the five 
additional members of the Committee shall be held in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article, following the thirty-fifth ratification or accession. The 
terms of two of the additional members elected on this occasion shall expire at the end of two 
years, the names of these two members having been chosen by lot by the Chairman of the 
Committee. 7. For the filling of casual vacancies, the State Party whose expert has ceased to 
function as a member of the Committee shall appoint another expert from among its 
nationals, subject to the approval of the Committee. 8. The members of the Committee shall, 
with the approval of the General Assembly, receive emoluments from United Nations 
resources on such terms and conditions as the Assembly may decide, having regard to the 
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importance of the Committee’s responsibilities. 9. The Secretary-General of the United 
Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the 
functions of the Committee under the present Convention. 
Article 18. 1. States Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, for consideration by the Committee, a report on the legislative, judicial, 
administrative or other measures which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of 
the present Convention and on the progress made in this respect: 
Within one year after the entry into force for the State concerned; 
Thereafter at least every four years and further whenever the 
Committee so requests. 
2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of 
obligations under the present Convention. 
Article 19. 1. The Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 2. The Committee shall 
elect its officers for a term of two years. 
Article 20. 1. The Committee shall normally meet for a period of not more than two weeks 
annually in order to consider the reports submitted in accordance with Article 18 of the 
present Convention. 2. The meetings of the Committee shall normally be held at United 
Nations Headquarters or at any other convenient place as determined by the Committee. 
Article 21. 1. The Committee shall, through the Economic and Social Council, report 
annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its activities and may make 
suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination of reports and 
information received from the States Parties. Such suggestions and general recommendations 
shall be included in the report of the Committee together with comments, if any, from States 
Parties. 2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the reports of the 
Committee to the Commission on the Status of Women for its information. 
Article 22. The specialised agencies shall be entitled to be represented at the consideration of 
the implementation of such provisions of the present Convention as fall within the scope of 
their activities. The Committee may invite the specialised agencies to submit reports on the 
implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activities. 
 
PART VI 
Article 23. Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions that are more 
conducive to the achievement of equality between men and women which may be contained: 
In the legislation of a State Party; or 
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In any other international convention, treaty or agreement in force for 
that State. 
Article 24. States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the national level 
aimed at achieving the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Convention. 
Article 25. 1. The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States. 2. The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations is designated as the depositary of the present 
Convention. 3. The present Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification 
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 4. The present 
Convention shall be open to accession by all States. Accession shall be effected by the 
deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary- General of the United Nations. 
Article 26. 1. A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time 
by any State Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations. 2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the 
steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such a request. 
Article 27. 1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date 
of deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of 
ratification or accession. 2. For each State ratifying the present Convention or acceding to it 
after the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall 
enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of 
ratification or accession. 
Article 28. 1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all 
States the text of reservations made by States at the time of ratification or accession. 2. A 
reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be 
permitted. 3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to this effect 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall then inform all States 
thereof. Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received. 
Article 29. 1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request 
of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request 
for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the  organisation of the arbitration, any one 
of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in 
conformity with the Statute of the Court. 2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or 
ratification of the present Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider 
itself bound by paragraph I of this Article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by that 
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paragraph with respect to any State Party which has made such a reservation. 3. Any State 
Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article may at any 
time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Article 30. The present Convention, the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
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Appendix 2. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All  
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
 
Article 1. A State Party to the present Protocol (“State Party”) recognises the competence of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (“the Committee”) to 
receive and consider communications submitted in accordance with Article 2. 
Article 2. Communications may be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of 
individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of 
any of the rights set forth in the Convention by that State Party. Where a communication is 
submitted on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, this shall be with their consent 
unless the author can justify acting on their behalf without such consent. 
 
Article 3. Communications shall be in writing and shall not be anonymous. No 
communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the 
Convention that is not a party to the present Protocol. 
 
Article 4. 1. The Committee shall not consider a communication unless it has ascertained that 
all available domestic remedies have been exhausted unless the application of  such remedies 
is unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring effective relief. 2. The Committee shall 
declare a communication inadmissible where: 
The same matter has already been examined by the Committee or has 
been or is being examined under another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement; 
It is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention; 
It is manifestly ill-founded or not sufficiently substantiated; 
It is an abuse of the right to submit a communication; 
The facts that are the subject of the communication occurred prior to 
the entry into force of the present Protocol for the State Party 
concerned unless those facts continued after that date. 
 
Article 5. 1. At any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination on 
the merits has been reached, the Committee may transmit to the State Party concerned for its 
urgent consideration a request that the State Party take such interim measures as may be 
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necessary to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victim or victims of the alleged 
violation. 2. Where the Committee exercises its discretion under paragraph 1 of the present 
Article, this does not imply a determination on admissibility or on the merits of the 
communication. 
 
Article 6. 1. Unless the Committee considers a communication inadmissible without 
reference to the State Party concerned, and provided that the individual or individuals consent 
to the disclosure of their identity to that State Party, the Committee shall bring any 
communication submitted to it under the present Protocol confidentially to the attention of 
the State Party concerned. 2. Within six months, the receiving State Party shall submit to the 
Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, 
that may have been provided by that State Party. 
 
Article 7. 1. The Committee shall consider communications received under the present 
Protocol in the light of all information made available to it by or on behalf of individuals or 
groups of individuals and by the State Party concerned, provided that this information is 
transmitted to the parties concerned. 2. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when 
examining communications under the present Protocol. 3. After examining a communication, 
the Committee shall 4. The State Party shall give due consideration to the views of the 
Committee, together with its recommendations, if any, and shall submit to the Committee, 
within six months, a written response, including information on any action taken in the light 
of the views and recommendations of the Committee. 4. The Committee may invite the State 
Party to submit further information about  any measures the State Party has taken in 
response to its views or recommendations, if any, including as deemed appropriate by the 
Committee, in  the State Party’s subsequent reports under Article 18 of the Convention. 
 
Article 8. 1. If the Committee receives reliable information indicating grave or systematic 
violations by a State Party of rights set forth in the Convention, the Committee shall invite 
that State Party to cooperate in the examination of the information and to this end to submit 
observations with regard to the information concerned. 2. Taking into account any 
observations that may have been submitted by the State Party concerned as well as any other 
reliable information available to it, the Committee may designate one or more of its members 
to conduct an inquiry and to report urgently to the Committee. Where warranted and with the 
consent of the State Party, the inquiry may include a visit to its territory. 3. After examining 
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the findings of such an inquiry, the Committee shall transmit these findings to the State Party 
concerned together with any comments and recommendations. 4. The State Party concerned 
shall, within six months of receiving the findings, comments and recommendations 
transmitted by the Committee, submit its observations to the Committee. 5. Such an inquiry 
shall be conducted confidentially and the cooperation of the State Party shall be sought at all 
stages of the proceedings. 
 
Article 9. 1. The Committee may invite the State Party concerned to include in its report 
under Article 18 of the Convention details of any measures taken in response to an  inquiry 
conducted under Article 8 of the present Protocol. 2. The Committee may, if necessary, after 
the end of the period of six months  referred to in Article 8.4, invite the State Party 
concerned to inform it of the measures taken in response to such an inquiry. 
 
Article 10. 1. Each State Party may, at the time of signature or ratification of the present 
Protocol or accession thereto, declare that it does not recognise the competence of the 
Committee provided for in Articles 8 and 9.2. Any State Party having made a declaration in 
accordance with paragraph 1 of the present Article may, at any time, withdraw this 
declaration by notification to  the Secretary-General. 
 
Article 11. A State Party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that individuals under its 
jurisdiction are not subjected to ill treatment or intimidation as a consequence of 
communicating with the Committee pursuant to the present Protocol. 
 
Article 12. The Committee shall include in its annual report under Article 21 of the 
Convention a summary of its activities under the present Protocol. 
 
Article 13. Each State Party undertakes to make widely known and to give publicity to the 
Convention and the present Protocol and to facilitate access to information about the views 
and recommendations of the Committee, in particular, on matters involving that State Party. 
 
Article 14. The Committee shall develop its own rules of procedure to be followed when 




Article 15. 1. The present Protocol shall be open for signature by any State that has signed, 
ratified or acceded to the Convention. 2. The present Protocol shall be subject to ratification 
by any State that has ratified or acceded to the Convention. Instruments of ratification shall 
be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 3. The present Protocol shall 
be open to accession by any State that has ratified or acceded to the Convention. 4. Accession 
shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations. 
 
Article 16. 1. The present Protocol shall enter into force three months after the date of the 
deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the tenth instrument of 
ratification or accession shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of its 
own instrument of ratification or accession. 
 
Article 17. No reservations to the present Protocol shall be permitted. 
 
Article 18. 1. Any State Party may propose an amendment to the present Protocol and file it 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall thereupon 
communicate any proposed amendments to the States Parties with a request that they notify 
her or him whether they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering 
and voting on the proposal. In the event that at least one third of the States Parties favour 
such a conference, the Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of 
the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of the States Parties present and 
voting at the conference shall be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations 
for approval. 2. Amendments shall come into force when they have been approved by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations and accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States 
Parties to the present Protocol in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 3. 
When amendments come into force, they shall be binding on those States Parties that have 
accepted them, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of the present Protocol 
and any earlier amendments that they have accepted. 
 
Article 19. 1. Any State Party may denounce the present Protocol at any time by written 
notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation shall 
take effect six months after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General. 2. 
Denunciation shall be without prejudice to the continued application of the provisions of the 
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present Protocol to any communication submitted under Article 2 or any inquiry initiated 
under Article 8 before the effective date of denunciation. 
 
Article 20. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States of: 
Signatures, ratifications and accessions under the present Protocol; 
The date of entry into force of the present Protocol and of any 
amendment under Article 18; 
Any denunciation under Article 19. 
1. The present Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish 
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.
 
2. The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of the present Protocol 
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 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women,” Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/54/4 (Fifty-




Appendix 3. Ten-Point Programme of the Association for the Restoration of the  
Fatherland (1936) 
  
 To mobilise the entire Korean nation and realise a broad-based anti-Japanese united 
front in order to overthrow the piratical Japanese imperialist rule and establish a genuine 
people’s government in Korea. 
 To defeat Japan and overthrow its puppet state “Manchukuo” by the Koreans resident 
in Manchuria through a close alliance between the Korean and Chinese peoples, and to effect 
full autonomy for the Korean people residing in Chinese territory. 
 To disarm the Japanese armed forces, gendarmes, police and their agents and organise 
a revolutionary army truly fighting for the independence of  Korea. 
 To confiscate all enterprises, railways, banks, shipping, farms and irrigation systems 
owned by Japan and Japanese and all property and estates owned by pro-Japanese traitors, so 
as to raise funds for the independence movement and use part of these funds for the relief of 
the poor. 
 To cancel all loans made to people by Japan and its agents and abolish all taxes and 
monopoly systems; to improve the living conditions of the   masses and promote the smooth 
development of national industries, agriculture and commerce. 
 To win the freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association, oppose terrorist 
rule and the fostering of feudal ideas by the Japanese imperialists, and to release all political 
prisoners. 
 To abolish the caste system, which divides the yangban (nobles) and the common 
people, and other inequalities; to ensure equality based on  humanity irrespective of sex, 
nationality or religion; to improve the social position of women and respect their 
personalities. 
 To abolish slave labour and slavish education; to oppose forced military service and 
military training of young people; to educate people in our national language, and to enforce 
free compulsory education. 
 To enforce an eight-hour day, improve working conditions and raise wages; to 
formulate labour laws; to enforce state insurance laws for the workers, and to extend state 
relief to the unemployed. 
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 To form a close alliance with nations and states which treat the Koreans as equals and 
to maintain comradely relations of friendship with states and nations which express goodwill 
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 Kim Il Sung, Ten-Point Programme of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland, (5 May 1936), 
(United Kingdom: the Association or the Study of Songun Politics, 2009), http://www.uk-songun.com 
/index.php?p=1_303_THE-TEN-POINT-PROGRAMME-OF-THE-ASSOCIATION-FOR-THE-
RESTORATION-OF-THE-FATHERLAND (accessed 10 November 2014); Baik Bong, Kim Il Sung: 
Biography Volume 1: From Birth to Triumphant Return to Homeland (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1969), pp. 282, 283. 
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Appendix 4. Declaration of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland  
(1936) 
 
Compatriots, brothers and sisters at home and abroad,  
 It is already 26 years since the 20 million Korean people with a long history of five 
thousand years were robbed of their dear homeland by the enemy, the Japanese imperialists. 
Under the colonial oppression of Japanese imperialism, our compatriots lead the miserable 
life of a ruined nation, worse than that of animals, undergoing all manner of hardships and 
privations and dripping with sweat and blood. No longer able to endure the Japanese 
imperialist tyranny, large numbers of our fellow countrymen were compelled to leave their 
beloved home villages and wander about in quest of a livelihood. Even in strange lands, all 
alone, they are subjected to every form of humiliation and contempt and are being trampled 
underfoot and slaughtered everywhere they go. 
 Our nation is, indeed, in an unheard-of wretched plight. Which road should our people 
take now, deprived of their homeland and weighed down with a terrible misfortune? For our 
nation, there is no alternative but to fight against the Japanese imperialist marauders. This is 
the only way to usher in the dawn of national liberation. 
 That explains why tens of thousands of Korean youths burning with love for their 
country joined the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army and are fighting bravely against the 
Japanese imperialists with arms in hand. Now, in all parts of the country the struggles of 
workers, peasants, youth and students against Japanese imperialist colonial rule are taking 
place one after another. 
 In the past, too, the ardent patriotism of our nation was displayed fully.  
 A great many people took part in the Righteous Volunteers’ Army Movement and 
fought bloody battles for several years against Japanese imperialism’s occupation of Korea, 
and at the time of the March First Movement, the whole nation rose in an anti-Japanese 
uprising in every nook and comer of the land.
4
 As a result, the spirit of our nation, ingenious 
and valorous, was demonstrated to the whole world. This fact proves that the Korean nation 
with its earnest desire for independence and sovereignty and a passionate fighting spirit will 
certainly accomplish the cause of national liberation. 
                                                     
4
 After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and until 1933, large volunteer armies waged war against the 
Japanese and Manchukuo forces over much of Northeast China. In the DPRK, those Koreans who volunteered 
are known as the Righteous Volunteers’ Army Movement. While the March First Movement was launched by 
the Korean people on 1 March 1919 in the Korean capital, Seoul. This movement is discussed in chapter 2.  
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 However, the aim of national independence and liberation was not achieved, though 
in the past many patriots had fought courageously, falling and dying. The principal cause is 
that all movements for the country’s liberation were not conducted according to a unified 
political programme and a correct line of struggle, and that an unsupported fight was fought 
without achieving the solid unity and cohesion of the anti-Japanese patriotic forces. Not only 
that. An allied front against the common enemy, the Japanese imperialists, was not built up in 
close contact with countries and nations opposed to Japan. This is also a major reason for 
failing to win the final victory. 
 We put forward the main political programme and the struggle tasks to fulfil the 
sacred duty for the liberation of the country on the basis of the bitter lessons and experience 
of the past. In accordance with this programme, we are setting up the Association for the 
Restoration of the Fatherland as a general leading body for uniting as one all the anti-
Japanese forces at home and abroad and ensuring a unified leadership for them, and are 
adopting its Ten-Point Programme. 
 On the basis of the main content of the Ten-Point Programme of the Association of 
the Restoration of the Fatherland, we declare to all our compatriots at home and abroad as 
follows: 
 The whole Korean nation will fight in unity against the enemy, the Japanese 
imperialist aggressors, irrespective of class, sex, social status, party affiliation, age and 
religious belief, so as to win back the country and establish a genuine people’s government in 
Korea. 
 We 20 million Korean people are leading the life of a homeless race, condemned to 
indescribable national oppression and ill-treatment and cruel exploitation under the colonial 
rule of predatory Japanese imperialism. The Korean nation’s liberation is the supreme task 
facing all Koreans. 
 If all 20 million of us, united in a body, join the anti-Japanese national liberation 
front, those with money contributing money, those with food donating food and those with 
skill and knowledge devoting their skill and knowledge, whether men or women, young or 
old, regardless of all distinctions, the Japanese imperialists will be destroyed and our national 
liberation and independence will be achieved. 
 Koreans living in Manchuria will strive to overthrow the aggressive machines of 
Japanese imperialism and its puppet state “Manchukuo” through a close alliance with the 




 The national autonomy of the Koreans in Manchuria we assert has nothing in 
common with the “autonomy in Jiandao” advertised by the predatory Japanese imperialist 
aggressors and their agents to hoodwink and alienate the Korean and Chinese nations from 
each other. All Koreans in Manchuria will achieve genuine national autonomy for the Korean 
residents in Manchuria by resolutely opposing the deceptive enemy-vaunted “autonomy in 
Jiandao” and overthrowing the Japanese Manchurian rule in close alliance with the anti-
Japanese masses in China. 
 For the liberation of the fatherland, we will expand and strengthen the revolutionary 
armed ranks. The Japanese imperialists and their agents are villainous aggressors and 
hangmen armed to the teeth. We must counter the armed foes with arms. 
 We can topple the accursed system of colonial rule and achieve the independence of 
Korea only when we further strengthen the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army and form 
various armed units with the revolutionary masses everywhere to defeat the Japanese 
imperialist aggressive army by fighting bloody battles against the enemy.
5
 
 In order to build a wealthy and mighty independent and sovereign state, we will carry 
out economic and cultural policies that are genuinely popular and democratic. 
 We will unconditionally confiscate factories, mines, landed estates, shops, banks and 
all other property owned by the predatory Japanese imperialist aggressors and treacherous 
pro-Japanese agents, promote the steady development of national industry, agriculture and 
commerce, ensure our people freedom of speech, press, assembly and association and 
equality of the individual, abolish the system of slave education and introduce an eight-hour 
day for the workers. 
 In order to facilitate the cause of national liberation, we will receive special donations 
and other forms of active assistance from capitalists with national conscience and from 
conscientious patriots and personages. 
 We will form a common front against the enemy, the Japanese imperialist aggressors, 
in close alliance with states and nations, which express goodwill and maintain neutrality 
towards the Korean national liberation movement. 
 We should crush the robber-like Japanese imperialist aggressors in close alliance with 
China and other countries hostile to Japanese imperialism and with the people oppressed by 
Japanese imperialist colonial rule. 
                                                     
5
  The Korean People’s Revolutionary Army was founded on 25 April 1932, as part of the anti-Japanese 
revolutionary struggle. The army later developed into the Korean People’s Army on 8 February 1948. 
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 We must regard as friends the countries and nations, which sympathise with the 
Korean national liberation movement and approach it with good faith and treat as enemies 
those who help the Japanese imperialist marauders and oppose the Korean nation. 
 Compatriots, brothers and sisters, who love their country and nation and want to cast 
off the yoke of bestial slavery and lead a worthwhile and hopeful existence as human beings. 
 We sincerely hope that you will immediately form organisations of the Association of 
the Restoration of the Fatherland in the factories, mines, railway service establishments, 
schools, newspaper offices, army barracks, shops and elsewhere in the urban and rural areas 
and will wage a vigorous struggle to win back the country through the concerted action of the 
whole nation under the banner of the Ten-Point Programme of the Association of the 
Restoration of the Fatherland. 
 The cause of our people fighting in firm unity for the country’s liberation is 
invincible. 
 Let us all fight for the complete independence of the country and the freedom and 
liberation of the nation! 















                                                     
6
 Kim Il Sung, Declaration of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland, (5 May 1936), (United 
Kingdom: the Association or the Study of Songun Politics, 2009), http://www.uk-songun.com/index.php?p= 
1_412_THE-INAUGURAL-DECLARATION-OF-THE-ASSOCIATION-FOR-THE-RESTORATION-OF-
THE-FATHERLAND (accessed 10 November 2014). 
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Appendix 5. “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche  
in Ideological Work” 
 
Today I want to address a few remarks to you on the shortcomings in our Party’s ideological 
work and on how to eliminate them in the future. As you learned at yesterday’s session, there 
have been serious ideological errors on the literary front. It is obvious, then, that our 
propaganda work also cannot have been faultless. It is to be regretted that it suffers in many 
respects from dogmatism and formalism. 
 The principal shortcomings in ideological work are the failure to delve deeply into all 
matters and the lack of Juche. It may not be correct to say Juche is lacking, but, in fact, it has 
not yet been firmly established. This is a serious matter. We must thoroughly rectify this 
shortcoming. Unless this problem is solved, we cannot hope for good results in ideological 
work. 
 Why does our ideological work suffer from dogmatism and formalism? Why do our 
propaganda and agitation workers only embellish the facade and fail to go deeply into 
matters, and why do they merely copy and memorise things foreign, instead of working 
creatively? This offers us food for serious reflection. 
 What is Juche in our Party’s ideological work? What are we doing? We are not 
engaged in any other country’s revolution, but solely in the Korean revolution. This, the 
Korean revolution, determines the essence of Juche in the ideological work of our Party. 
Therefore, all ideological work must be subordinated to the interests of the Korean 
revolution. When we study the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the 
history of the Chinese revolution, or the universal truth of Marxism‑Leninism, it is entirely 
for the purpose of correctly carrying out our own revolution. 
 By saying that the ideological work of our Party is lacking in Juche, I do not mean, of 
course, that we have not made the revolution and that our revolutionary work was undertaken 
by outsiders. Nonetheless, Juche has not been firmly established in ideological work, and this 
leads to dogmatic and formalistic errors and does much harm to our revolutionary cause. 
 To make revolution in Korea we must know Korean history and geography as well as 
the customs of the Korean people. Only then is it possible to educate our people in a way that 
suits them and to inspire in them an ardent love for their native place and their motherland. 
 It is of paramount importance to study and widely publicise among the working 
people the history of our country and of our people’s struggle. … Only when we educate our 
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people in the history of their own struggle and its traditions can we stimulate their national 
pride and rouse the broad masses to revolutionary struggle. Yet, many of our functionaries 
are ignorant of our country’s history and so do not strive to discover, inherit and carry 
forward our fine traditions. Unless this is corrected, it will lead, in the long run, to the 
negation of Korean history. 
 Once I visited a People’s Army rest home, where there was a picture of the Siberian 
steppe on the wall. Russians probably like that landscape. But we Korean people like the 
beautiful scenery of our own country. There are beautiful mountains such as Kumgang and 
Myohyang in our country. There are clear streams, the blue sea with its rolling waves, and 
fields with their ripening crops. If we are to inspire in our People’s Army men a love for their 
native place and their country, we must display more pictures of our own landscapes. … I 
noticed in a primary school that all the portraits on the walls were of foreigners, such as 
Mayakovsky and Pushkin, but there were none of Koreans. If children are educated in this 
way, how can they be expected to have national pride? … 
 We should study our own things in earnest and get to know them well… 
 It is important in our work to grasp revolutionary truth, Marxist-Leninist truth, and 
apply it correctly to our actual conditions. There should be no set rule that we must follow the 
Soviet pattern. Some advocate the Soviet way and others the Chinese, but is it not high time 
to work out our own? The point is that we should not mechanically copy the forms and 
methods of the Soviet Union, but should learn from its experience in struggle and from the 
truth of Marxism-Leninism. So, while learning from the experience of the Soviet Union, we 
must put stress not on the form but on the essence of its experience. … 
 Merely copying the forms used by others instead of learning the truth of Marxism- 
Leninism does us no good, only harm. In both revolutionary struggle and construction, we 
should firmly adhere to Marxist-Leninist principles, applying them in a creative way to suit 
the specific conditions and national characteristics of our country. If we mechanically apply 
foreign experience, disregarding the history of our country and the traditions of our people 
and without taking account of our own realities and our people’s political level, we will 
commit dogmatic errors and do much harm to the revolutionary cause. This is not fidelity to 




                                                     
7
 Kim Il Sung, “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work” 
(Speech Party Propagandists and Agitators, 28 December 1955), in Kim Il Sung, Selected Works 9 (Pyongyang: 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1982), pp. 395–408. 
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Appendix 6. “Ten Principles for a Monolithic Ideological System” 
 
Preamble 1. “1: Struggle with all your life to paint the entire society the single colour of the 
Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary thought. It is considered the highest 
doctrine of our party to paint the entire society the single colour of the Great Leader’s 
revolutionary thought, and a higher level of task is to construct our party’s unitary ideology 
system. 
 The implementation of a unitary ideology system must be constantly strengthened in 
connection with the principles. 
 Strengthen the Party of the glorious Leader Kim Il Sung, for the Great Leader Kim Il 
Sung who founded our Party. 
 Fight with devotion to protect and create a solid foundation of the authoritarian rules 
of a proletariat and socialist system established by the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung. 
 Dedicate everything to fighting to maintain the great revolutionary value of Juche 
Ideology, for unification of our motherland and the revolutionary victory of the whole 
country, for our nation’s socialism and the accomplishment of communism. 
 Fight till the end for the victory of Juche Ideology all over the entire world. 
 
Preamble 2. Respect and revere highly and with loyalty the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il 
Sung. Highly revering the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is the noblest duty of the 
revolutionary warriors who are endlessly loyal to the great leader. Within this lies the glory of 
our nation and the eternal happiness of our people. 
 The Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is a genius of the revolution, the sun of the 
people and a legendary hero whom we must respect unendingly, revere eternally and come to 
with the greatest happiness and glory. 
 Even in a short life, live only for the Great Leader, devote our youth and life for him 
and keep loyal minds toward the Great Leader even under unfavourable circumstances. 
 Believe firmly in the way pointed to by our Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, 
entrust our fate to the Great Leader and devote our bodies and spirits for the revolutionary 
fight driven by the Great Leader, carrying with us always, the strong belief that there is 




Preamble 3. Make absolute the authority of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung. 
Affirming the absolute nature of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s authority is the 
supreme demand of our revolutionary task and the revolutionary volition of our party and 
people. 
 Have a firm position and perspective that no one else has the knowledge required, 
only the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung. 
 Protect through the political thought and defend ‘till the end of life the Great Leader 
Comrade Kim Il Sung. 
 Propagate inside and outside the greatness of our Dear Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung. 
 Protect the Great Leader from attacks and criticism of every possible revisionism and 
enemy and defend the power and authority of our Dear Leader Kim Il Sung. 
 Regard as an emergency situation and pursue unyielding the fight against even the 
smallest challenge that could damage the authority and power of the Great Leader 
Comrade Kim Il Sung. 
 Respectfully worship our beloved Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s sculptures, 
plaster casts, bronze statues, badges with portraits, art developed by the Great Leader, board 
with Great Leader’s instructions, basic mottos of the Party. 
 Respectfully manage and thoroughly protect the records and sites of revolutionary 
struggle and the revolutionary history of our Beloved Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and 
the Party’s Unitary Ideology stronghold Museum of the Revolutionary Activities of Comrade 
Kim Il Sung and the Research Institute of Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s Revolutionary 
Thought.  
 
Preamble 4. Accept the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary thought as your 
belief and take the Great Leader’s instructions as your creed. Accepting the Great Leader 
Comrade Kim Il Sung’s thought as one’s own belief and taking his instructions as one’s creed 
is the most crucial element requested for one to become an endlessly loyal Juche communist 
warrior. It is also a precondition for the victory of our revolutionary struggle and its 
construction. 
 Our Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary thought and Juche ideology 
must be realised through our united belief and must be experienced in the flesh and bones of 
every person. 
 Our Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions must be adopted through a 
steadfast belief and firm principles in regards to all enterprises and in each person’s life. 
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 Unconditionally accept, treat as a non-negotiable condition, and decide everything 
based upon our Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions and in every act think only 
about the greatness of our Leader. 
 Systematically and fully master the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s laborious 
works, guidelines and his splendid revolutionary history. 
 Participate without absence in more than 2 hours of study groups, lectures and 
collective studies devoted to revolutionary ideas of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, 
ensure discipline for these studies and make these studies a habitual part of daily life, at the 
same time struggling with any contradictions or neglect towards ensuring such studies are 
always completed. 
 The system of delivering the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s guidelines must be 
thoroughly studied, and the Leader’s instructions and Party goals have to be communicated 
exactly and without misinterpretations or usage of one’s own words, and in a timely manner. 
 Use considerately the guidelines of the Leader when preparing reports, discussions, 
lectures or printed materials and eliminate any words or writing that is contrary to his 
instructions. 
 There must be a strict distinction between the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s 
guidelines and individual party executives instructions and it must be investigated if 
individual official’s instructions are matching the Leader’s ones. In the situation where there 
is but a slight difference, we must see it as a problem and fight against it. We must not deliver 
or collectively discuss the individual cadre’s statements as “conclusions” and “instructions”. 
 Struggle with provocative calumnies directed against our Great Leader Comrade Kim 
Il Sung’s guidelines and Party policy or with anti-Party activities. 
 Fight with all one’s will against anti-Party and anti-revolutionary thinking trends that 
have its origin in capitalistic ideas, feudal Confucian ideas, revisionism, dogmatism, 
toadyism and are contrary to the revolutionary thought of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung. Hold 
on to the purity of revolutionary thought and Juche ideas of the Great Leader. 
 
Preamble 5. Observe absolutely the principle of unconditional execution in carrying out the 
instructions of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung. Unconditionally executing the Great 
Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions is the basic requisite for proving loyalty towards 




 Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions must be viewed as a legal and 
supreme order and unconditionally realised without excuses or trivial reasons, but with 
endless loyalty and sacrifice. 
 Regard as a holy duty and supreme glory reducing the concerns of our Beloved 
Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and fight for it with complete dedication. 
To realise the guidelines of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, bring creative ideas and if 
the Great Leader presents his conclusion on some issue it must be accurately executed 
according to the centralism principle. 
 Once the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions and Party policy is 
accepted, it must be collectively discussed, the right policy implemented, a suitable concrete 
plan established and with creation of organised political work, pursue it in a Speed Battle 
Campaign. 
 For the execution of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s instructions the 
registrar must be made, implementation of them must be standardised, taught to others and 
implemented without ceasing. 
 Fight against those who accept our Beloved Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s 
instructions only in letter and sabotage the implementation of these instructions, show 
irresponsible or an incorrect attitude and oppose unhealthy situations that have its root in 
formalism, self-protectionism and neglect. 
 
Preamble 6. Rally the unity of ideological intellect and revolutionary solidarity around the 
Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung. The steel-like unity of the party is the source of the 
party’s invincible power, and a firm assurance of the victory of our revolution. 
 Defend the unity of ideological intellect around the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il 
Sung and consolidate it more ever more firmly. 
 At all localities and all guard posts, strengthen the solidarity of the ideological 
intellect of the columns through revolutionary struggle based on loyalty to the Great Leader. 
 As a rule, evaluate and treat all people using the degree of loyalty to the Great Leader 
Comrade Kim Il Sung as the yardstick and struggle against livelihoods that are at odds with 
the sole ideological system of the Party regardless of one’s position and distinctions. 
 Strictly oppose any situation of having illusions about or idolising or advocating 
through flattery individual officials and eradicate the problem of giving gifts to each other. 
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 Resolutely struggle in opposition to anti-Party elements such as factionalism, 
regionalism, and nepotism that could destroy the uniform solidarity of the Party and never 
waver at the slightest hint of such menace to completely overcome it. 
 
Preamble 7. Learn from the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and master communist 
dignity, the methods of achieving revolutionary tasks, and the people’s work styles. Learning 
the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s communist dignity, the methods of achieving 
revolutionary tasks, and the people’s work styles are the divine duties of all members of the 
party and workers, and the prerequisite for fulfilling the honorary fate of revolutionary 
warriors. 
 Possess a high disposition to the Party, the working class, and the people that puts the 
interests of the Party, the working class, and the people first, and sacrifice everything for 
them. 
 Fight on tenaciously with uncompromising combative spirit, firm revolutionary 
principle, indomitable revolutionary spirit, and faith in certain victory against the enemy 
class. 
 Handle all works frugally and boldly with responsibility and overcome the barriers by 
assuming the attitude of a revolutionary master and highly exercising the revolutionary spirit 
of self-reliance. 
 Oppose senility and stagnation, indolence and slackening and remain awash with a 
flourishing fighting spirit and passion to always work militantly, and reject passivity and 
conservative tendencies and embark in all undertakings boldly and grandly. 
 Solidly establish revolutionary perspective from a group point of view, thoroughly 
carry through the Cheongsan-ri spirit and Cheongsan-ri method, and penetrate deep into the 
crowd to teach them and study from them and live together with them. 
 Exhibit highly the revolutionary character of setting an example for others and always 
take the lead in doing difficult and hard work. 
 Always be humble and unceremonious in undertakings and in life. 
 Thoroughly reject old methods such as bureaucracy, subjectivism, formalism, and 
dogmatism. 
 
Preamble 8. Preserve dearly the political life the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung has 
bestowed upon you, and repay loyally with high political awareness and skill for the Great 
Leader’s boundless political trust and considerations. It is our highest honour to have 
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bestowed upon us political life by the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and repaying his 
trust loyally can lead to a bright future for our political life. 
 Consider political life as the first life, never bend one’s political beliefs and 
revolutionary integrity. Learn to throw away like bits of straw, one’s physical life for political 
life. 
 Value the revolutionary organisation, subordinate personal interests to organisational 
interests, and conspicuously display the collective spirit. 
 Consciously participate in organisational life to standardise and normalise the 
undertakings and said life. 
 Faithfully execute organisational decisions and mandate notification. 
 Actively participate in two-days and weekly organisational life summing up to self-
actualise the Great Leader’s teachings and Party policy and to sum up one’s undertakings and 
life on a high politico-ideological level, to embark in an ideological struggle by the method of 
criticism and continuously train and reconstruct oneself through the ideological struggle. 
 Engage in the execution of the revolutionary task, faithfully participate in labour and 
bring near completion of the revolution through a revolutionary practice process. 
 Display high political fervour and elevate the level of political theory and technical 
administration to handsomely execute the revolutionary mission to repay the Leader’s great 
political trust and care of granting the most precious political life. 
 
Preamble 9. Establish a strong organisational discipline so that the entire Party, the entire 
people, and the entire military will operate uniformly under the sole leadership of the Great 
Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung. Establishing a strong organisational discipline is the essential 
requirement to strengthen the party’s collective ideology, leadership, and its combat power. It 
is also a firm assurance for the victory of our revolutionary struggle and its establishment. 
 Execute the revolution and associated construction with the Great Leader Comrade 
Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary ideology as the sole guiding principle and thoroughly establish 
the Great Leader’s sole leadership system that makes the entire Party, country and military 
move in unison according to the teachings and orders of the Great Leader. 
 Establish a strong revolutionary order and rules that organise and advance all 
undertakings according to the Leader’s sole leadership system and handle policy questions 
solely through the teachings of the Great Leader and the conclusion of the Party. 
 Firmly secure the Party’s leadership on revolutionary struggle and all construction 
undertakings in all parts and units and the state economic apparatus. Labor group workers 
320 
 
ought to organise and advance all undertaking according to the Party and under the Party’s 
lead. 
 Accurately execute the decisions and orders of the Party and State to carry through the 
teachings of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung; struggle robustly against the situation of 
wrongly interpreting or altering said decisions and orders, and strictly abide by the law and 
rules of the State. 
 Do not allow any non-organisational phenomena such as individual cadre officials 
arbitrarily summoning an organised meeting of the lower-level Party, state apparatus or 
labour groups or arbitrarily reaching a “conclusion” in the meeting or bringing out an 
organisation for social movement without organisational approval. 
 Oppose and actively struggle against all kinds of behaviours by individual cadre, 
which go against the principles such as the individual abuse of power or authority. 
 Evaluate and position the cadre using the loyalty to the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il 
Sung as the basic yardstick, robustly struggle against and thoroughly apply the order and 
Party rules established by the Leader’s undertakings on handling problems with favouritism 
and acquaintance of relatives, friends, region, school and teachers and individual leaders 
arbitrarily firing or hiring each other. 
 Oppose and sharply struggle against the situation of leaking Party, State and military 
secrets. 
 Timely report to the Party organisation the non-organisational and disorderly 
situations that violate the Party’s unitary ideological system and sole leadership constitution 
whether it is big or small. 
 
Preamble 10. The great revolutionary accomplishments pioneered by the Great Leader 
Comrade Kim Il Sung must be succeeded and perfected by hereditary succession until the 
end. The firm establishment of the sole leadership system is the crucial assurance for the 
preservation and development of the Great leader’s revolutionary accomplishments, while 
achieving the final victory of the revolution. 
 Firmly establish the sole ideological system over the Party and whole society and 
firmly establish the central Party’s sole leadership constitution under the lead of the Great 
Leader to succeed and brightly complete the revolutionary accomplishments cultivated by the 
Great Leader. 
 Adhere to and forever succeed and develop the glorious revolutionary tradition 
accomplished by the Great Leader KIM Il Sung during the anti-Japanese revolutionary 
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struggle period and oppose and resolutely struggle against even the smallest expression of 
anti-Party activities that try to defame or obliterate the revolutionary tradition. 
 Do not connive towards the slightest phenomenon or element that depart from the 
Party’s sole leadership system, to the contrary, struggle against it. 
 Make all of your family as well as yourself look up to the Great Leader and fulfil 
loyal duty to him and remain endlessly faithful to the Party’s sole leadership. 
 Secure the authority of the Party through all means and defend the Party with your 
life. 
 All Party members and workers may become like the Great Leader KIM Il Sung by 
firmly establishing the Party’s unitary ideology system and must complete the revolutionary 
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Appendix 7. The Twenty-Point Platform (1946) 
 
 To completely liquidate all survivals of Japanese imperialist rule in the political and 
economic life of Korea, 
 To wage an implacable struggle against reactionary and anti-democratic elements at 
home and strictly ban the activities of fascist, anti-democratic political parties, organisations 
and individuals,  
 To grant the entire people freedom of speech, the press, assembly and religion. To 
provide freedom for the activities of democratic political parties, trade unions, peasants’ 
unions and other democratic public organisations,  
 To ensure that the entire Korean people have the right and duty to form people’s 
committees, the administrative organs responsible for all local affairs, through universal , 
direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot,  
 To grant equal rights to all citizens in political and economic life, irrespective of sex, 
religion and property status,  
 To guarantee inviolability of person and residence and protect by law the property of 
citizens and their private possessions,  
 To abolish all laws and judicial organs which were in operation in the years of 
Japanese imperialists rule, the after effects of which the people are still suffering, elect the 
people’s judicial organs on democratic principles and grant the citizens equal legal rights, 
 To develop industry, agriculture, transport and trade for enhancement of the people’s 
welfare,  
 To nationalise big enterprises, transport services, banks, mines and forests,  
 To allow and encourage free activity in private handicrafts and trade,  
 To confiscate the land belonging to Japanese nationalist, the Japanese government, 
traitors and landlords who have continuously rented out their land, abolish the tenant system 
and distribute free all the confiscated land among peasants making it their property. To 
confiscate without compensation all irrigation facilities and bring them under state control,  
 To fix market prices of daily necessities and combat speculators and usurers,  




 To introduce an eight-hour working day and fix minimum wages for factory and 
office workers. To prohibit employment of children under 13 and institute a six-hour working 
day for children 13 to 16,  
 To institute a life insurance scheme for factory and office workers and introduce an 
insurance system for workers and enterprisers, 
 To introduce universal compulsory education and widely expand the network of 
primary, middle and specialised schools and colleges maintained at state expense. To reform 
public education in line with democratic state system,  
 To actively develop national culture, science and arts and build more theatres, 
libraries, radio broadcasting stations and cinema theatres,  
 To set up special schools on a wide scale for training personnel to work in 
government organs and in all fields of the national economy,  
 To encourage scientists and artist in their work and give them assistance, and 
 To increase the number of state-run hospitals, wipe out epidemics and give free 
medical services to the poor.
9
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Appendix 8. The Women’s Rights Act (2010)  
 
Article 1. (The Mission of Women’s Rights Act) Women’s Rights Act of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea serves to firmly guarantee the rights of women in all fields of 
social life and heighten the position and role of women. 
Article 2. (The Principle of Gender Equality) It is a consistent policy of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea to guarantee gender equality. State shall strictly prohibit all forms 
of discrimination against women. 
Article 3. (Social Awareness of Women) Women play an important role in the welfare of the 
family and the development of the society. State shall raise awareness of women and firmly 
guarantee their rights in all parts of the society. 
Article 4. (Plan to Guarantee Women’s Rights) State shall establish a basic plan to guarantee 
women’s rights and execute it. Municipal People’s Committees shall establish detailed plans 
on yearly basis according to the state’s basic plan to guarantee women’s rights and execute it 
with precision. 
Article 5. (The Responsibility of Institution, Corporate Association and Organisation to 
Guarantee Women’s Rights) It is mandatory for institutions, corporate associations and 
organisations to guarantee women’s rights. Institutions, corporate associations, and 
organisations shall firmly guarantee women’s rights in accordance with this act. 
Article 6. (The Responsibility of All Municipal People’s Committees to Guarantee Women’s 
Rights) The guarantee of women’s rights is an important responsibility of each Municipal 
People’s Committee. Each Municipal People’s Committee shall designate the guarantee of 
women’s rights as an important assignment and take measures to ensure the rights of women 
in the area of jurisdiction. 
Article 7. (The Responsibility of Labor Organisations to Guarantee Women’s Rights) 
Women’s Coalition is an organisation of women for guaranteeing the rights of women. The 
Central Committee of the Democratic Women’s Coalition of Korea and each Women’s 
Coalition organisation shall responsibly endeavour to guarantee women’s rights in 
accordance with this law and the Charter of Women’s Coalition. Workers’ organisations 
including the General Coalition of Vocations, the Agricultural Workers’ Coalition and Youth 
Alliance shall establish plans to guarantee the rights of the women in their organisations in 
accordance with this law. 
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Article 8. (The Responsibility of Legal Institutions to Guarantee Women’s Rights) Legal 
institutions shall strictly enforce legal control in order to prevent women’s rights from being 
violated by any act of crime or violation of law. 
Article 9. (International Exchange and Cooperation) State shall promote exchange and 
cooperation with other countries and international institutions in the field of women’s rights. 
Article 10. (The Extent and the Application of the Law) This law regulates matters, which 
arise from guaranteeing women’s rights. Any item related to women’s rights, which is not 
regulated by this law, shall be governed by relevant law. Concerning women’s rights, an 
international treaty to which State is a party shall have the same force as this law.  
 
Chapter 2 Social and Political Rights 
Article 11. (The Basic Demands of Social and Political Rights) Women have the equal rights 
with men in the field of social and political life. No one may restrict or violate the woman’s 
social and political rights and status.  
Article 12. (Suffrage and Eligibility) Women have the equal rights with men to vote and to be 
elected. State shall actively encourage women to participate in social and political activities, 
and increase the proportion of female representatives in each People’s Assembly. 
Article 13. (The Right to Acquire, Change and Retain Nationality) Women have the equal 
rights with men to acquire, change and retain nationality. The nationality of a woman shall 
not be changed by marriage or divorce in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
Article 14. (The Right to Work in State Organs) Women have the right to work in all State 
Organs. State Organs shall actively take in female workers and guarantee appropriately their 
conditions of work and livelihood. 
Article 15. (Appointment of Female Officers) Institutions, corporate associations and 
organisations shall systematically train and appoint female officers. There must be no 
discriminations against women in the screening, training and appointment of officers. 
Article 16. (Protection in the Legal Sphere) Legal institutions shall respect the personality of 
the women and firmly guarantee their rights and interests when handling cases concerning 
women. 
Article 17. (The Processing of Claims and Petitions) Women have the right to make claims or 
submit petitions. Institutions, corporate associations and organisations shall responsibly look 
into any claims or petitions submitted by women and process it within due date. There shall 
be no failure to receive any claim or petition submitted by women, nor shall such claims or 
petitions be neglected.  
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Chapter 3 Educational, Cultural and Medical Rights 
Article 18. (The Basic Demands of Women’s Rights in Educational, Cultural and Medical 
Sphere) Women have the equal rights with men in educational, cultural and medical sphere. 
In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, women’s rights to education, culture and 
medical aid shall be firmly guaranteed by the proper State policy for women. 
Article 19. (Gender Equality in School Admissions, Advancement and Placement after 
Graduation) Organs supervising education and Municipal People’s Committees shall firmly 
guarantee women’s rights to equally enter or advance to each school and to receive equal 
placement after graduation. In case of recruitments by universities or vocational schools, 
there must be no exclusion or limitation of women in recruitment on grounds of gender, 
except in departments of specialised majors.  
Article 20. (Promotion and Protection of Female Students’ Body and Health) Educational 
organs shall provide education that accommodates the physical attributes of female students 
and facility for females, and protect and promote the health of female students. 
Article 21. (Parents’ Responsibility Concerning Compulsory Education) Parents or guardians 
shall perform their responsibility to ensure female children who reach school age receive 
education in accordance with Secondary General Compulsory Education System. Except for 
cases in which the relevant Municipal People’s Committee’s approval has been obtained due 
to illness or other necessary reasons, all female children who reach school age must enter 
school.  
Article 22. (Vocational Technique Education) Each Municipal People’s Committee and 
relevant organs shall provide adequate conditions for women to receive vocational technique 
education in accordance with the actual circumstances of the province. 
Article 23. (The Right to Cultural Life) Women have the equal rights with men to enjoy 
cultural life. Institutions, corporate associations and organisations shall provide what is 
necessary for women to equally participate in science, technology, literature, arts and 
athletics. 
Article 24. (The Right to Receive Medical Care) Women have the equal rights with men to 
receive medical care. Medical institutions shall be furnished with professional medical 
facility for women, protect the health of women and ensure that women are given access to 
medical care without experiencing inconveniences. Relevant institutions, corporate 
associations and organisations shall give priority to women’s access to medical care. 
Article 25. (Educational, Cultural and Medical Rights of Women in Rural Areas) Municipal 
People’s Committees and relevant organs shall provide necessary facilities and conditions for 
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women in rural area to receive equal education and medical treatment with women in urban 
areas and lead cultural life.   
 
Chapter 4 Labour Rights 
Article 26. (The Basic Demands of Women’s Rights in Labour) Women have the equal rights 
with men in labour. 
Article 27. (Guarantee of Labour Conditions) Municipal People’s Committees and relevant 
organs shall provide all conditions for women to actively participate in social labour. 
Relevant institutions, corporate associations and organisations shall run properly day care 
centres, kindergartens and other facilities so that working women may participate in labour 
without concern.  
Article 28. (Prohibition of Discrimination in Labour Assignment) Institutions, corporate 
associations and organisations, except for those professions or departments that are not 
appropriate for women, are not allowed to not take in women or restrict them for reasons 
such as gender, marriage, pregnancy and childbirth. It is prohibited to take in female persons 
who have not yet reached the legal age for labour. 
Article 29. (Protections in Labour for Women Workers) Institutions, corporate associations 
and organisations must pay full attention to the protection of women workers. Prescribed 
labour safety facilities and labour hygiene facilities shall be provided for women, and labour 
safety must be ensured in accordance with women’s physical attributes. Women cannot be 
assigned to work that is not appropriate for women. Women are given special protection 
during the periods before and after childbirth and during the breastfeeding period. 
Article 30. (Fields and Professions Prohibited for Women) The supervising organ for labour 
administration shall determine which fields and professions must be prohibited for women 
and enforce it. Institutions, corporate associations and organisations must not make women 
work in prohibited fields or professions, nor make a women worker who is pregnant or has an 
infant work at night. 
Article 31. (Gender Equality in Wage) Institutions, corporate associations and organisations 
must pay women the same wage as men for the same labour The working hours a day for a 
women worker with three or more children is six, and her living expenses shall be paid for. 
Article 32. (Gender Equality in Technical Qualifications and Grade Certificates) When 
carrying out qualifications or giving certifications for technique, relevant institutions, 
corporate associations and organisations must not discriminate women on grounds of sex.  
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Article 33. (Guarantee of Maternity Leave) State provides women workers with maternity 
leave of 60 days before childbirth and 90 days after, regardless of the length of service and in 
addition to regular and complementary holidays. Women cannot be made to work during 
maternity leave. 
Article 34. (Prohibition of Unjust Dismissal) Except for when the worker demands to do so, 
institutions, corporate associations and organisations must not dismiss a women worker from 
her workplace for reasons such as marriage, pregnancy, maternity leave and breastfeeding 
period. 
Article 35. (Application of Social Insurance System) Each Municipal Peoples’ Committee 
and relevant organs must thoroughly carry out Social Insurance System for women and 
stabilise the livelihood of women who has temporarily lost the ability to work due to reasons 
such as illness or injury and ensure adequate medical care for them.  
 
Chapter 5 Personal and Property Rights 
Article 36. (The Basic Demands of Women’s Rights of Person and Property) Women have 
equal personal and property rights with men. No one may violate women’s rights of person 
and property. 
Article 37. (The Inviolability of Person) Women have the inviolable right of person. It is 
prohibited to illegally restrict the liberty of women, damage the body of women by violent 
and non-violent means, and search the body of women. 
Article 38. (The Inviolability of Health and Life) Women have the inviolable right of health 
and life. It is prohibited to kill a newborn infant because she is a female and to mistreat or 
show contempt for women who give birth to a female child or are pregnant, ill, disabled or 
old. The execution of criminal punishment is suspended for pregnant women from three 
months before childbirth to seven months after childbirth.  
Article 39. (Prohibition of Kidnapping and Trafficking) No one may kidnap, trade, rape, or 
gang-rape women. Relevant organs shall thoroughly establish plans to prevent kidnapping, 
trafficking, rape and gang-rape of women, and punish strictly anyone who has committed 
such act, in accordance with the law. 
Article 40. (Prohibition of Prostitution) Anyone who engages in prostitution shall be 
punished in accordance with the law. Anyone who organises, promotes or coerces 
prostitution shall also be punished in accordance with the law. 
329 
 
Article 41. (Respect for the Personality and Honour of Women) Women have the rights of 
personality and honour. Institutions, corporate associations, organisations and citizens must 
respect the personality and honour of women.  
Article 42. (Property Rights of Women within the Family) A married woman has the joint 
ownership of family property with her husband. A woman may possess, use and dispose of 
family property equally with her husband regardless of her income. When she divorces her 
husband, a woman may claim her individual property rights. 
Article 43. (Gender Equality in Inheritance) Women have equal rights in inheritance with 
men. When the order of inheritance is the same, women must not be discriminated on 
grounds of sex. 
 
Chapter 6 Marital and Household Rights 
Article 44. (The Basic Demands of Women’s Rights in Marriage and Family) Women have 
equal rights in marriage and family with men. Marriage and family are under State’s 
protection. 
Article 45. (The Freedom of Marriage of Women) Women have the freedom of marriage. 
Women’s freedom of marriage may not be violated or be interfered with. 
Article 46. (Prohibition of Domestic Violence) There must not be any form of domestic 
violence against women in the family. Municipal People’s Committees, institutions, 
corporate associations and organisations shall adequately educate residents and employees 
against domestic violence so that domestic violence does not appear in the district or at the 
homes of the citizens under their supervision. 
Article 47. (Suspension of Filing for Divorce) When there is an issue of divorce between the 
married couple, the male may not file a divorce if the wife is pregnant or has given birth 
within a year. The foregoing does not prejudice a woman’s right to file a divorce against her 
husband. 
Article 48. (Division of Property in Divorce) When a married couple divorces, the question of 
dividing the house and family property shall be decided by the agreement between the two 
parties. When agreement is not reached, the presiding court shall decide the matter based on 
the specific circumstances of both parties and the principle of protecting the interests of the 
children and the woman. 
Article 49. (Right and Responsibility Regarding Underage Children) A woman has equal 
right and responsibility to protect underage children with her husband. When the husband has 
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deceased, lost his legal capabilities, or for other inevitable reasons cannot be the guardian of 
the underage children, the woman has the right and responsibility to protect the children. 
Article 50. (The Freedom of Childbirth) Women have the right to give or not give birth to 
children. Nationally, it is encouraged that women give birth to and raise many children. A 
physician shall be designated to a woman who gives birth to and raises triplets or more, and 
her child, and special benefits and considerations such as good residence, medicine, grocery 
and household goods supplied free of charge shall be given. 
Article 51. (Protection of Pregnant Women) When women give childbirth, the relevant 
medical institution shall provide safe and effective medicine and technology and responsibly 
ensure the health of women. Medical institutions and relevant institutions, corporate 
associations and organisations shall show deep concern for the protection of pregnant women 
and take good care of the mother and the child.  
 
Chapter 7 Supervision of the Protection of Women’s Rights 
Article 52. (Supervision of the Protection of Women’s Rights) The supervision of the 
protection of women’s rights shall be executed under the uniform direction of the cabinet by 
the relevant central organs and Municipal People’s Committees. Relevant central organs and 
Municipal People’s Committees shall rightly establish the supervision system for the 
protection of women’s rights and give adequate supervision and have control. 
Article 53. (The Responsibility of Women’s Organisations) The Central Committee of the 
Democratic Women’s Coalition of Korea and each Women’s Coalition organisation shall 
organise and execute enterprises of various forms and methods to raise social awareness on 
women’s rights and to raise the status of women. 
Article 54. (Monitoring of the Protection of Women’s Rights) The monitoring of the 
protection of women’s rights shall be carried out by the relevant central organs, Municipal 
People’s Committees and monitoring organs. The relevant central organs, Municipal People’s 
Committees and monitoring organs shall strictly monitor the situation regarding the 
protection of women’s rights. 
Article 55. (Administrative or Criminal Liabilities) Administrative or criminal liabilities shall 
be imposed according to each situation on individual citizens and responsible workers of 
institutions, corporate associations and organisations that have hindered the protection of 
women’s rights by violating this law.
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Appendix 9. Responsibility to Protect (R2P)  
 
Pillar One: The protection responsibilities of the State 
Pillar one is the enduring responsibility of the State to protect its 
populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their 
incitement. The latter, I would underscore, is critical to effective and 
timely prevention strategies. The declaration by the Heads of State 
and Government in paragraph 138 of the Summit Outcome that “we 
accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it” is the 
bedrock of the responsibility to protect. That responsibility, they 
affirmed, lies first and foremost with the State. The responsibility 
derives both from the nature of State sovereignty and from the pre-
existing and continuing legal obligations of States, not just from the 
relatively recent enunciation and acceptance of the responsibility to 
protect; 
 
Pillar Two: International assistance and capacity-building 
Pillar two is the commitment of the international community to assist 
States in meeting those obligations. It seeks to draw on the 
cooperation of Member States, regional and subregional 
arrangements, civil society and the private sector, as well as on the 
institutional strengths and comparative advantages of the United 
Nations system. Too often ignored by pundits and policymakers alike, 
pillar two is critical to forging a policy, procedure and practice that 
can be consistently applied and widely supported. Prevention, 
building on pillars one and two, is a key ingredient for a successful 
strategy for the responsibility to protect; 
 
Pillar Three: Timely and decisive response 
Pillar three is the responsibility of Member States to respond 
collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is 
manifestly failing to provide such protection. Though widely 
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discussed, pillar three is generally understood too narrowly. As 
demonstrated by the successful bilateral, regional and global efforts to 
avoid further bloodshed in early 2008 following the disputed election 
in Kenya, if the international community acts early enough, the choice 
need not be a stark one between doing nothing or using force. A 
reasoned, calibrated and timely response could involve any of the 
broad range of tools available to the United Nations and its partners. 
These would include pacific measures under Chapter VI of the 
Charter, coercive ones under Chapter VII and/or collaboration with 
regional and subregional arrangements under Chapter VIII. The 
process of determining the best course of action, as well as of 
implementing it, must fully respect the provisions, principles and 
purposes of the Charter. In accordance with the Charter, measures 
under Chapter VII must be authorised by the Security Council. The 
General Assembly may exercise a range of related functions under 
Articles 10 to 14, as well as under the “Uniting for peace” process set 
out in its resolution 377 (V). Chapters VI and VIII specify a wide 
range of pacific measures that have traditionally been carried out 
either by intergovernmental organs or by the Secretary-General. 
Either way, the key to success lies in an early and flexible response, 
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